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Abstract 
The governance of UK alcohol policy looks like a textbook case of decision-making 
by a closed community of policymakers and industry insiders, but this thesis 
challenges this view. Drawing on Jordan and Richardson’s policy communities 
approach and Dudley and Richardson’s later work on adversarial policy 
communities, it examines the complex development of UK alcohol policy using 
archival sources, government and pressure group reports, news releases and 
historic media coverage going back over a century. The primary focus of this 
research is Westminster, but the importance of subnational policy communities is 
also considered through an examination of Scottish alcohol policy development. 
Through case studies of four key areas of UK alcohol policy – licensing, drink-
driving, pricing and wider alcohol strategies – this thesis finds that the governance 
of UK alcohol policy is formed within policy communities, but ones that are much 
less closed and much more adversarial than traditionally thought. Alcohol-
producer groups exert significant influence on UK alcohol policy, but their 
influence peaked in the 1960s. Thereafter, policy communities fragmented as 
intra-industry divisions widened and public health groups made their influence 
felt. This research demonstrates that the policy community approach, in its 
adversarial form, remains relevant for understanding periods of policy stability 
and more radical reform in British politics. Further work is nonetheless required 
to understand more clearly the politics of collaboration and outsourcing within 
this variant of policy communities. 
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Chapter 1 
Government, policy, legitimacy and the study of alcohol 
 
The debate surrounding the governance of alcohol has attracted attention for 
centuries. Alcohol policy has been an area of interest, from concerns over 
drunkenness raised as far back as pamphlets in the 16th century (Nicholls, 2010, p. 
11-13), to Hogarth’s Beer Street and Gin Lane, the temperance movement with its 
social advocates such as Dr Barnado or the contemporary public health actors such 
as the Chief Medical Officer. The headlines are frequented with questions 
surrounding the governance of alcohol, with a perceived success of alcohol 
industry interests, and the comparative limited success of social or public health 
advocates (see King (2015, p. 138) and Harkins (2010)). Major changes on alcohol 
policy have been infrequent, but it is a policy area that has been affected by, and 
arguably affected, policy interventions for several hundred years. It gets a 
regulatory mention in Magna Carta back in 1215 and the Worshipful Company of 
Brewers claim that first tax on beer was some 27 years earlier.  
 
There have been legislative and regulatory interest into alcohol for centuries 
(outlined in Annex A, table A.1.) – with licensing, taxation and health 
considerations. Major changes going both towards more restrictions and greater 
liberalisation, in a pattern that rarely repeats, but may be considered to have 
phases of development. A brief analysis of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-
first centuries indicates a phase from the late 1860s running up to the 1920s when 
the sector came under increasing restrictions and greater regulatory oversight. 
Then a static period up until the beginning of the 1960s which then saw a rapid 
liberalisation, with some further measures, but generally a consistent position 
following, with the notable exception of drink-driving laws. This was up until the 
major reforms in the early twenty-first century, followed by a short period of 
greater regulation and restriction – which brings us to the current time when 
direction became more divided between Scottish and the UK government policy.  
 
This thesis is interested in the question of who governs UK alcohol policy. The idea 
that this area of policy-making is dominated by the alcohol industry is prevalent in 
the literature. An example of this is found from Gornall (2014a) in the 
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development of alcohol pricing policy, who states that, ‘the government 
consultation into introducing a minimum unit price for alcohol in England and 
Wales was a sham and that politicians ignored the strong health evidence in favour 
of protecting the interests of industry’. Gornall (2014a) argues that the regular 
contact with the industry, alongside campaigns and Parliamentary groups 
indicated that the government never actually intended the policy to come into 
existence, with agreements almost already in place. Similarly Gornall (2014c) 
when considering the arrangements for extra licensing hours at the football World 
Cup again reiterates the closeness to government to the alcohol sector and the lack 
of consultation with the public health community on extending licensing hours on 
match days. A more indirect argument of the pervasiveness of the alcohol sector is 
made by Gornall (2015) in his analysis that NICE (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence), being apparently overruled on making policy relating to alcohol, an 
area which it has sought to expand its purview. This cluster of coverage, on 
everything from pricing, to licensing and regulatory structure, suggests that 
alcohol interests were both pervasive and dominant. Several other studies also 
suggest that the industry-led interests dominate UK alcohol policy, Babor (2010) 
sees public health interest groups as lacking resources and access compared to 
alcohol interest groups. Alcohol Justice, previously called the Marin Institute for 
the Prevention of Alcohol and Other Drug Problems, published research that 
argues that long-term support of politicians from the alcohol sector in elections 
has given significant weight to the sector’s arguments (Marin Institute, 2008). 
 
This thesis does not question the influence of the alcohol industry on alcohol 
policy, but it does question whether the alcohol sector is dominant. It considers the 
comparative roles played by the alcohol, regulatory and the public health interests 
in the context of policy development.  To better understand the roles played, the 
policy intent, the route of development and the range of concerns that led to policy 
outcomes, the roles of various other actors such as public health groups, regulatory 
groups such as the Local Government Association or Magistrates’ Association, and 
case study specific groups such as drivers or transport interests, alongside the role 
of new regional venues such as Scotland will also be considered. 
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1.1. Policy Communities – a British typology? 
Lasswell (1936, p. 295), when considering the role that groups and interests play 
in policy, offered that, ‘the study of politics is the study of influence and the 
influential’; demonstrating that the relationship between government and interest 
groups has long been a central preoccupation of political science.  This thesis seeks 
to understand influence and dominance in the development of alcohol policy. Is 
power in the hands of a few, illegitimate and distant from the needs of the 
electorate? When reflecting on this within the realms of alcohol, it offers an 
opportunity to consider perceptions of power and influence, how policy is 
developed and what role is really played by alcohol producing and retailing 
groups.  
 
In his seminal work, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, 
Robert Dahl (1961) challenged the conceptualisation that decision-making in the 
United States was dominated by elites. Basing his analysis on case studies within 
New Haven, Connecticut, Dahl demonstrated that interest groups influenced 
government decisions in education, urban planning and political appointments, 
but concluded that no one socio-economic group monopolised the political process 
across all three policy areas – influence within one policy element was not a wider 
guarantee of being influential. He also outlined how organised groups can take on 
the democratic consciousness of the ‘individual’ within the system by representing 
their views with a collective voice. This was a form of indirect democracy, 
maintained by a competitive environment and changing internal balances. This 
contrasts to the model of elites from Pareto (1901), Mosca (1939) and Michels 
(1915) that separated the entire influence of groups from a compatibility with 
democracy, with elitism separate from political control or influence, refocused the 
influence of groups into a context that could be a tool of, or indeed a key feature of, 
a democratic system. This pluralist conception of group politics, developed not 
only by Dahl, but also scholars such as Arthur F. Bentley (1967), Walter Lippmann 
(1922, 1927) and David Truman (1962), has been roundly criticised by scholars. 
‘The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent,’ argued Elmer Eric Schnattschneider (1960), a pioneer of neo-
pluralism. Connolly (1969) was especially critical of the attempts to find legitimacy 
in exclusory arrangements that hampered disorganised interests, often being in 
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tune with Lowi (1969) and his concerns over the intentionally exclusive nature of 
interest’s ability to demonstrate that interest. Mancur Olson (1971) showed that 
whilst money will always matter, it is also motivation, with smaller groups better 
placed, all other thing being equal, to overcome the logic of collective action that 
occurs when the individuals can free-ride on the efforts of others to influence 
politicians.  
 
That pluralistic model was both complemented and challenged by the classic iron 
triangle model of American policy development – a model of three participants – 
interest groups; the administration’s representative (whether an agency or 
department); and the relevant congressional committee. This model, which 
received much of the literature’s interest in the 1950s and much of the 1960s, with 
notable contributions from McConnell (1966) and Lowi (1964) though later 
criticised as rigid and lacking an ability to adapt to changing circumstances – 
although there was arguably much more nuance in the literature. Hugh Heclo 
(1978) offered an alternative vision in developing the concept of an issues 
network, more open, more disparate model of group engagement – with fewer 
rules and fewer relationships. For Hugh Heclo (1978, p. 102) these issue networks 
‘comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual 
commitment or of dependence in others environment’, meaning that there is no 
necessity for all to agree, or none. Indeed, their relationships are not one of mutual 
benefit, being rather more individualistic in their nature. 
  
Dahl is best remembered for his works within US politics, but began with studying 
the British political system. In his, regrettably often neglected, study of British 
socialism in the inter war period, Dahl (1947) explored the trade union 
movement’s unsuccessful attempts, through its influence on the Labour Party, to 
gain a decision-making role in industrial policy. As powerful as the unions were, 
Dahl records, the leadership of the Labour Party agreed only to consult workers on 
industrial policy, a position on which it remained steadfast even after the party 
took power in 1945.  Ultimately, Dahl concluded, the Attlee administration chose 
the politics of ‘community over interest group’, the former being expressed 
through ministries held accountable to Parliament, as ‘the sole majoritarian in 
Britain’ (Dahl, 1947, p. 899). Insightful though this analysis was, students of British 
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politics were slow to embrace the study of interest groups. A decade later, Samuel 
Beer (1956) would bemoan the surprising lack of interest in British pressure 
groups. His work stimulated others, but still tried to find reflections of the 
American system within the United Kingdom, whilst offering the first broad 
attempt to consider a British system. 
 
Jeremy Richardson and Grant Jordan’s Governing Under Pressure (1979) was 
arguably the first systematic attempt to develop a theory of group politics 
exclusively on the basis of the British experience. ‘It is the relationship between 
committees, the policy communities of departments and groups, the practice of co-
option and the consensual style,’ Richardson and Jordan conjectured, ‘that perhaps 
better accounts for policy outcomes than do examinations of party stances or 
parliamentary influence’ (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 74). The terminology of 
community was influenced by Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) in their analysis of HM 
Treasury’s relationships with other government departments. They had compared 
the process of policy development as being comparable to that of a small village 
community, with comparisons to the close relationships between participants, that 
whilst they may occasionally be in conflict, they will usually come to agreement, 
and all peacefully co-exist around the village green. The commonality in 
terminology between these approaches is clear, but also the intended focus on 
collaboration, mutual benefit and negotiation. 
 
For the analysis of the British policy style this was provocative to existing 
approaches in at least two respects. Firstly, it challenged prevailing views of 
‘British policy-making as a process played out between the electorate, Parliament 
and Cabinet’ (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 41), de-emphasising the roles of 
ministers and Members of Parliament at the centre of democracy, whilst 
emphasing the role of the interest groups and civil servants.  Secondly, the 
emphasis on consensus and the ability to be consensual was at odds with the UK’s 
public conflict between the government and groups over industrial relations under 
Labour and Conservative Governments in the 1970s. Yet in spite of the book’s title, 
the policy communities approach was more interested in instances of political 
exchange than pressure group politics. From the perspective of governments – 
across both parties, the embrace of interest groups offered a means to avoid or, at 
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the least, hide conflict (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 175). This concern over 
conflict related not only to policy formulation but also policy implementation, 
where groups had the power to stop the best-laid plans of civil servants and deny 
the necessary resources to actually deliver the policy. The authors highlighted the 
importance of clientelism, whereby government departments used interest groups 
as leverage in their battles with other parts of Whitehall – policy communities 
became champions and assets. For interest groups, policy communities offered 
influence and legitimacy, albeit at a cost of, inter alia, reducing freedom for 
manoeuvre and increasing political vulnerability. 
 
Literature since Richardson and Jordan (1979) has tended to narrowly define 
policy communities as closed, strictly stable relationships, such as the Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992a) typology that sees policy communities as the closed, rigid end of a 
scale of different policy networks. This interpretation, or reinterpretation of policy 
communities continues to a more spectrum analysis in Rhodes (1997) and Bevir 
and Rhodes (2003) – incrementally becoming both more closely defined – and less 
observable. For the majority of subsequent interpretations policy communities 
came to be seen as closed relationships that favoured stability rather than change, 
while Richardson and Jordan’s (1979) original conception of group politics was 
much more open and dynamic. The construct acknowledged the tendency of policy 
communities to pre-empt new legislation and the ability of some groups to 
penetrate, and arguably dominate, the consultative system. However, it also 
highlighted the alternative channels of influence open to such groups, including 
parliament and the media – that were often sacrificed, but still occasionally 
activated. For instance Richardson and Jordan (1979, p. 127) gave the example of 
how environmental groups used backbenchers to highlight concerns over road 
haulage that had been neglected by the Minister of Transport, which had tended to 
ignore the interests of that group within the alternative system.  This combination 
of approach demonstrates that the central, core element was the key position of 
groups – it could be exclusionary, but only to groups who could not deliver some 
required element that allowed for policy development and implementation. In 
comparison to the US models that either saw a purely pluralist model of open 
systems or the neo-pluralist system that more neatly accepts a closed model, 
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policy communities in their original form offered neither exclusively – the door 
was often shut, but very rarely locked.  
 
That the traditional approach of policy communities came to be seen as closed, and 
somewhat conservative, interpretation of relationships between governments and 
particular interest groups was influenced by the subsequent work of Richardson 
and, particularly, Jordan’s in this field. ‘[B]oth government and groups will share 
an interest in the avoidance of sudden policy change,’ Jordan and Richardson 
(1982, p. 93-94) in a follow up article to Governing Under Pressure – increasing 
and clarifying the element of incrementalism common in interpretations of policy 
communities. This journey from original concept to being focused on a usual 
behaviour as an indication of activity or ability to act led to differing directions of 
development by the approach’s originators.   
 
In 1990, Grant Jordan had arrived at an even more static conception of policy 
communities, which he defined as ‘a special type of stable network’ (Jordan, 1990a, 
p. 327), adding that, ‘a policy community exists where there are effective shared 
‘community’ views on the problem. Where there are no such shared views no 
community exists.’  He further assessed that, ‘the policy community is one type of 
network, it is a network which has achieved, at least temporarily, understandings 
which benefit all participants’, (Jordan, 1990b, p. 472). Jordan’s development was 
influenced here by Rod Rhodes (1988), a pioneering theorist of British politics, 
who situated policy communities within a wider taxonomy of group politics, a 
taxonomy, as earlier stated, that continues to grow. Rhodes (1997) contrasted the 
‘stability, highly restricted membership, vertical interdependence, [and] limited 
horizontal articulation’ of policy communities with the ‘unstable, large number of 
members [and] limited vertical interdependence’ of issues networks.  This 
consideration is further developed within Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin (1994, 
p. 37) with a refocus on the comparatively limited incrementalism of the policy 
community process, accompanied by its style of negotiation, making the argument 
that,  ‘Acceptance of this principal rule - premised upon the shared attitudes and 
values of community members - shapes participants' behaviour. If bargainable 
incrementalism is not acceptable then groups must find another mode through 
which to pursue their goals. A group which rejects bargainable incrementalism 
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excludes itself from that policy making arena. Thus, it is the (incremental) process 
of policy change which drives behaviour,’ (Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994, 
p. 37). 
 
 
Despite this refining of his understanding Jordan (2005) still finds criticism for 
Grant (2005a, 2005b), who makes an argument for reconsideration of policy 
communities existence in finding, within the fire service, what could be considered 
in many ways a near perfect type for the more traditional typology. The overall 
comparison is that policy communities are to neo-pluralism, this taxonomy seems 
to suggest, as pluralism is to issue networks. This both stretched and marginalised 
the original model, which sought to explain relationships that led to policy, in 
seeking to answer criticism the purview of policy influence was narrowed, rather 
than seeking to understand if any external factor was missing that could explain or 
overcome elements of the critique. 
 
Whilst much of the literature that followed the first approach of policy 
communities sought to either criticise or marginalise policy communities within a 
wider policy network’s typology, Richardson’s work on policy communities went 
in a different direction that refined the original approach in an attempt to grapple 
with the problem of policy change (Richardson, 2000). A key contribution in this 
respect is the idea of adversarial policy communities (Dudley and Richardson 
(1996)). Simply put, such communities refer to a situation in which a traditional or 
‘core’ policy community faces a challenge from an alternative policy community in 
ways that contribute to dynamic policy change (Dudley and Richardson, 1996, p. 
67). The two communities engage not in a process of deliberation or even 
negotiation, the authors suggest, but instead compete for influence in different 
arenas (Dudley and Richardson, 1996, p. 67). A case in point, they suggest, is the 
evolution of British trunk roads policy between 1945-95, which saw an emergent 
environmental community engage with public inquiries on highways in ways that 
disturbed the core policy community between the road lobby and the Department 
of Transport. The result was a significant policy change which saw Ministers 
change or cancel specific road building projects and reconsider trunk roads policy 
more generally.  
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1.2. Alcohol policy – influence and the influential 
The governance of alcohol policy in the UK would appear to be a textbook case of 
decision-making that is dominated by a particular interest group. Considering 
exclusively the 21st century, claims about the influence of the drinks industry on 
UK alcohol policy in political debates are pervasive. Whilst alcohol policy covers a 
huge range of activities – some of which – from food safety to exports will not be 
covered. Instead the focus will be on regulatory interventions that have, or are 
intended to have, positive influences on the negative health and social elements of 
alcohol consumption. These include its licensing for sale and cost, any broad-based 
interventions and arguably the most covered or reviled negative side effect – harm 
from drink-driving.  Babor (2010) in his study of alcohol policy across the world 
clearly defines an argument between the use of public health policy and policy 
influences by economic or social interests.  
 
Whilst Greenaway (2003) gives a broad historical overview, his further work on 
consideration of the Licensing Act 2003 (2011), argues that if the alcohol interests 
are perceived as winning, it is down to the framing of the issue. In effect – agenda 
and venue are considerations that are vital for interpreting alcohol policies impact, 
rather than necessarily the participants. More recently, arguably clustered since 
the licensing reforms of the early 21st century, or equally surrounding peak alcohol 
consumption in the United Kingdom in the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
(Sheen, 2014), several studies have shown the ways in which the considered 
negative, industry-led interests have appeared to dominate policy. The argument 
made by Babor (2010) is in effect made that it is one of differential resources, with 
the inability to make the case the reason for apparent defeat of public health 
interests, and therefore harm to the public good. Citing Casswell (1995) the case is 
made that ‘these include ongoing lobbying of politicians and other politicians and 
working through the mass media to influence both public opinion and the political 
climate’, (Babor, 2010, p. 228).  
 
The idea that UK alcohol is dominated by a closed policy community can b e found 
in the work of Holden and Hawkins, alongside McCambridge, who in a series of 
articles describe the governance of UK alcohol policy as, in effect, a closed policy 
community premised on a privileged relationship between representatives of the 
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alcohol industry and the Department of Health, the Home Office and the Treasury 
(Hawkins, Holden, and McCambridge (2012); Holden and Hawkins (2013); 
McCambridge, Hawkins, and Holden (2014); and Hawkins and Holden (2014)). 
The alcohol industry, one study concludes, ‘are involved at every stage of the policy 
process and are seen by government as key stakeholders who must be consulted – 
and where possible accommodated – in policy debates’ (Hawkins and Holden 
2014: 67). Key channels of influence, they note, include regular meetings between 
industry representatives and ministers, special advisors, members of parliament, 
consultations, all-party groups and party conferences. At the same time, devolution 
had a partially disruptive effect on this policy community, the authors conclude 
(Holden and Hawkins 2012). By devolving powers over public health from London 
to Edinburgh, the Scotland Act (1998) shifted the centre of decision-making over 
UK alcohol policy and in so doing created new opportunities for public health 
groups to challenge the alcohol industry. Public health representatives saw their 
access to policymakers increase sharply, especially after the Scottish Nationalist 
Party won power (Holden and Hawkins 2012). While this access bore fruit in the 
Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012, the authors suggest, industry 
representatives succeeded in diluting and delaying this legislation. Should the 
alcohol sector, Hawkins and Holden (2014) ask, ‘enjoy the same (or greater) level 
of influence on the policymaking process as practitioners and experts within a 
given field’, (Hawkins & Holden, 2014, p. 68). In this interpretation the apparent 
lack of access from the public health community to these networks where policy is 
decided is a negative and the benefits of access of the industry is substantial. The 
works indicate an alcohol industry dominance that leads to poor policy, with poor 
policy to an extent being determined by any policy that is not originating from the 
public health community – industry-developed policy being at best a poor 
interpretation of public health goals. A dimension of this is shown in the criticism 
of the research role of the industry, with the most recent examples from 
Andréasson and McCambridge (2016) and Hellman (2018) – both criticizing the 
research and questioning its usefulness, whilst also making clear the belief that by 
accepting funding from alcohol interests for research, the credibility of the 
researcher is therefore open to question, let alone the results. 
 
 
 21 
1.3. Policy communities, alcohol policy and the UK 
Members of the alcohol industry, one Hawkins and Holden study concludes, ‘are 
involved at every stage of the policy process and are seen by government as key 
stakeholders who must be consulted – and where possible accommodated – in 
policy debates’ (Hawkins and Holden 2014: 67). Key channels of influence, they 
note, include regular meetings between industry representatives and ministers, 
special advisors, members of parliament, consultations, all-party groups and party 
conferences. At the same time devolution had a partially disruptive effect on this 
policy community, the authors conclude (Holden and Hawkins 2012). By devolving 
powers over public health from London to Edinburgh, the Scotland Act (1998) 
shifted the centre of decision-making over UK alcohol policy and in so doing 
created new opportunities for public health groups to challenge the alcohol 
industry. Public health representatives saw their access to policymakers increase 
sharply, especially after the Scottish Nationalist Party won power (Holden and 
Hawkins 2012). While this access bore fruit in the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Act 2012, the authors suggest, industry representatives succeeded in 
diluting and delaying this legislation. 
 
Should the alcohol sector, Hawkins and Holden (2014) ask, ‘enjoy the same (or 
greater) level of influence on the policymaking process as practitioners and 
experts within a given field’, (Hawkins & Holden, 2014, p. 68). In this 
interpretation the apparent lack of access from the public health community to 
these networks where policy is decided is a negative and the benefits of access of 
the industry is substantial. The works indicate an alcohol industry dominance that 
leads to poor policy, with poor policy to an extent being determined by any policy 
that is not originating from the public health community – industry-developed 
policy being at best a poor interpretation of public health goals. A dimension of this 
is shown in the criticism of the research role of the industry, with the most recent 
examples from Andréasson and McCambridge (2016) and Hellman (2018) – both 
criticising the research and questioning its usefulness, whilst also making clear the 
belief that by accepting funding from alcohol interests for research, the credibility 
of the researcher is therefore open to question, let alone the results.  
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This thesis argues that the governance of UK alcohol policy can be understood 
within a policy community context, but one that is much less closed, and much 
more adversarial, than Holden and Hawkins suggest. Its central argument is that 
the core policy community between the alcohol industry and key government 
departments peaked in the 1960s, with the development of the system outlined in 
the Licensing Act 1964 being arguably the peak point of the core policy community 
relationship. Thereafter, this policy community became more fragmented, as 
changes within groups and representative bodies diluted the previous abilities of 
the participants. This was influenced by two key developments - as intra-industry 
interest group politics came to the fore marked in many ways by the breakup of 
the major brewers dominance, the expansion of the off-trade and a new diversity 
in alcohol consumption moving from beer; and the successor groups to the 
temperance movement, which is characterised as the, ‘new temperance 
movement’, that emerged both from elements of the historical organisations and 
the increasing interest of the medical community in alcohol policy. By the early 
2000s, the governance of UK alcohol was characterised by adversarial policy 
communities in which different strands of the alcohol industry, and this new 
temperance movement, jostled for position and primacy – with variability in these 
often appearing both on an issue-by-issue and regional basis.  
 
Considering Greenaway (2003) and being less focused on the outcome, but instead 
agenda and venue, you can consider the policy communities from a different 
context and find much less consistency in true influence. Its central argument is 
that there is an alternative interpretation that uses both considerations of resource 
and historical precedent. In terms of resources, Richardson & Jordan (1979) 
outline the vital role of participants within a community to deliver their members 
or indeed deliver a policy. The groups who will, on a practical basis, make a policy 
happen will also play a role in developing it – a very implementation-based view 
and useful to understand how interests seemed to lead on policy development for 
sustained periods. 
 
There is also that ‘decision-making is governed by the rules of the game’, 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. viii) with groups becoming part of the established 
mindset within the community. It is a model that relies heavily on pragmatism 
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from participants, who are willing to come up with a compromise solution and 
accept an outcome that is not necessarily entirely in line with their interest. In the 
UK context there are examples where this has happened both for and against 
alcohol interests. Between the 1920s and late 1950s the dominant group with the 
alcohol policy communities was the temperance movement – with a successful 
programme of shutting down drinking establishments and with more restrictive 
licensing hours. This group delivered an active membership who sat on 
compensation boards (which closed licensed establishments) and were effective 
advocates in licensing hearings – they also delivered a loud cheerleading force for 
the policy. At the same time – this was a notable compromise on their ideal 
position of prohibition of alcohol – moderating their position and accepting the 
rules of the game. 
 
In the attempts to reform alcohol policy in the late 1970s and 1980s, clearly the 
alcohol industry representatives had a similar form of dominance – yet once again 
accepting measures on advertising, some restrictions and elements of policies to 
which they were opposed. To take one single snapshot and make interpretations of 
a failed or successful model, discounts entirely the changing membership of the 
policy communities, which has much greater variety.  The argument about 
Scotland and minimum unit pricing also plays into a similar narrative. Either you 
have the situation where a new force is now dominating, and the alcohol industry 
refuses to play by the rules of the game (the game being implementing a pricing 
policy) or alternatively the policy is having difficulty being implemented because it 
is not a true policy community – by excluding the groups responsible for delivery. 
A policy community’s membership and the dominance by one group/interest may 
vary but the interpretation that one group’s dominance is the reason for or against 
greater levels of policy shift somewhat misinterprets the concept of a policy 
community. Indeed, ‘unless there is some particular crisis facing the policy 
community, then radical policy change is unlikely to be achieved’, (Jordan & 
Richardson, 1987, p. 259) – and if it is – for example on licensing in the 21st 
century – it will create turmoil that fundamentally leads to a period of severe 
policy instability. In looking at the development of alcohol policy within the British 
context, this tends to lead to the interpretation that a policy community, or a series 
of policy communities, exists. This is despite a narrow interpretation of industry 
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dominance, or somehow industry takeover of policy, is a questionable assumption, 
relying on a small period snapshot and presuming that policies pursued, 
interpreted as negative on a public health dimension, are not credible policies 
when all dimensions of policy are interpreted.  Richardson & Jordan’s (1979) 
model of a policy community is imperfect, but offers potential as a credible framing 
of alcohol policy development over the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
with insights into how policy can, does and may in the future develop. It can be 
viewed as a negative, a positive or indeed simply a workable network for policy 
development. The periods where different, or varied, interests dominated or 
captured areas of alcohol policy is not a clear example of swapping with a period of 
each in charge. Neither is it two set groups with clear dividing lines move between 
control and being external to the discussion. It is potentially a myriad more 
complex, but looking at who dominates at one period, will not necessarily remain a 
consistent guide going forward. 
 
1.4. Methods and dissertation plan 
These methods focus deliberately on a historical, documentary analysis, using 
articles, papers, reports and archives as a primary source as policy was developed, 
rather than a focus on perceptions of outcomes through interviews.  The analysis 
of archival sources, ranges from the period of the First World War, with areas of 
focus from every Government since the 1950s up until the coalition government of 
the 2010s, with available elements of archival sources from the alcohol sector itself 
also sought. Alongside this consideration of historic media coverage, online articles 
and newsletters from the same timeframe are used to create a more complete 
evidence base. From the government side minutes, correspondence, internal 
memos, research reports, appearances from Hansard and speeches, provide a 
strong context for most of the twentieth century, with consultation documents, 
newspaper reports, group newsletters, minutes of government networks, and 
digital articles that considered policy development surrounding alcohol. Further 
releases from trade associations, non-governmental organisations and government 
departments are used to consider position and narrative. Whilst varying based on 
timeframe and group, analysis of sources such as select committee inquiries, 
government investigations and commissions; political manifestoes; and reports 
from all potential participants that often include their analysis of development. 
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The case studies within this thesis seek to use this analysis to consider influence 
both in terms of seeking whether influence can be measured or demonstrated. 
They will consider factors such as the level of access to the policy development 
process, whether there is mutual understanding of policy issues and goals, and the 
policy outcomes. Attention is paid not only to Dahl’s idea of power as influence – 
that is the ability of one actor to get another to do what it would not otherwise 
have done – but also Bachrach and Baratz (1962)’s idea of the second face of 
power. The latter captures the ability of actors to decide what does and does not 
make it to the policy agenda. 
 
The plan of this thesis is as follows; the following Chapter 2 covers the key 
elements in the theoretical literature concerning policy communities to provide a 
framework for analysis of case studies that follow. In particular, it exposes some of 
the criticism of the original model for policy communities and elements made to 
challenge this within the academic literature. This is to demonstrate that this is a 
theory that has faced a barrage of criticism on all sides – from those who consider 
it too narrow to those who find it too wide. It has endured and case studies found 
indicate that whilst it may not always be an observable phenomenon it could exist 
within the background machinations of policy development. It goes on to consider 
the Dudley and Richardson (1996) model for adversarial policy communities as an 
alternative, arguable enhanced model for consideration, whilst also offering some 
of the theoretical work on regional policy communities. Chapter 2 is a service 
chapter that provides essential background to the case study as it shows examples 
of methods to consider policy communities, challenges faced in finding them and 
offers models that allow for consideration of policy communities in the alcohol 
context. 
 
The argumentation begins in Chapter 3, where the theory is applied to an analysis 
of the case of licensing in two case studies. These case studies offer two 
demonstrations of policy communities in action within different historical 
contexts. The first considers the policy development that led up to both the 
Licensing Act 1961 and the more influential Licensing Act 1964. The second case 
study moves forward several decades to the Licensing Act 2003, which was 
similarly preceded in reform by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.  Using 
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sources taken mainly from National Archive materials for the first case study, with 
a wider ranging study of media coverage, select committee reports and 
consultation responses for the second - this is a critical engagement with central 
elements of the policy community model. The first case study offers a context for a 
close comparison to the traditional approach of a policy community whilst the 
second includes elements that could offer perspectives on the adversarial policy 
community approach – demonstrating core elements that a traditional policy 
community could still be used as a tool to understand policy development, whilst 
also being occasionally inconsiderate of elements that would make it a stronger 
model – arguably improved by the adversarial model. It also offers consideration 
for the inspiration and intent of alcohol policy on licensing – was this the alcohol 
industry getting their way, which may be true, or instead the successful 
implementation of manifesto policy – which is a more clear, accurate 
interpretation.  
 
Chapter 4 considers attempts to change the law relating to drink-driving. Following 
from an initial case study on the law’s creation and implementation it then 
examines the impact of what can be considered inquiries and reports of the 
Blennerhassett Committee alongside both of the North Reviews. This offers a 
wider context for policy development, alongside the realities of policy 
implementation – the possible versus the preferable. In this context it also offers 
consideration of adversarial policy communities and outsourcing of policy 
communities – where an argument can be made that a policy community could 
lead on an area of policy, but chooses not to. This also gives a context for 
considering the parallel environment in Scotland that chose a different policy path, 
considering the role policy community structure played in both policy 
development and the policy outcomes. 
 
Through Chapter 5, the focus is on price. The case studies in this chapter also cover 
a variety of styles of attempted policy change. Starting with an attempt to cut the 
price of alcohol through the Department of Economic Affairs in the late 1960s, 
whilst support for the industry was found in the policy community surrounding 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, at the same time – potentially offer 
indications of an adversarial environment in an earlier context. The attempts to 
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argue for alcohol taxation as a health tool in the 1980s and early 1990s show how 
despite impressions in the public context or evidence, the position and influence of 
a policy community are more closely related to policy delivery. The end of the New 
Labour government, which introduced the Alcohol Duty Escalator, followed by a 
coalition government that first sought a system of minimum unit pricing, but then 
changed tack to cut alcohol taxation, offers further consideration for the 
reassertion of a policy community that can deliver a policy. Scotland and its battles 
on minimum unit pricing offers context that policy communities can seek to limit 
or restrict policy – even when technically losing a policy argument – having an 
ability to influence implementation and deliver their members. 
 
In Chapter 6, the consideration of wider alcohol strategies with case studies that 
demonstrate the development of policy considerations and the respective policy 
communities – from the start of the twentieth to the twenty-first century. The first 
of these case studies looks at the temperance movement and the First World War, 
a time when experimentation with alcohol policy was significant – and there was a 
limited role for alcohol interests. The second considers how the medical interest 
groups focused on the alcoholic as an individual for intervention wider than whole 
population solutions – and how at this level of intervention their policy community 
was to dominate. The next set of case studies looks at a failed attempt for an 
overall strategy in the early 1980s following a report from the Central Policy 
Review Staff – which leaked and led to the re-exertion of dominance of a policy 
from one policy community from another. In the late twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century the New Labour Government sought to introduce a wide 
Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy – these showed fracturing of the policy 
community relationships and an indication that others were seeking influence – 
but in reality, very limited changes and incrementalism applying. By the time of the 
coalition government, the Alcohol Responsibility Deal Networks were almost a 
policy community by design – offering further consideration for the concept of 
policy communities. Scotland also once again offers a parallel study for an 
environment where a different or regional policy community has authority. 
 
The final chapter, Chapter 7, will seek to tackle the multiple strands of thought the 
study of alcohol and policy communities raises. It will look to analyse the 
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development of alcohol policy across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries both 
in the context of Babor (2010) and Greenaway (2011) – did the influence of alcohol 
groups overcome all other considerations or are concerns that they are in a 
position of  dominance an overwhelmingly miscontextualising the policy reality? It 
will also look to see what the lessons are for alcohol and policy communities – 
what can be understood from the case studies and how this can add to the 
considered literature on policy communities. It will also seek to understand 
considerations of policy communities in the wider network literature – are 
adversarial policy communities an improved approach and where can they be 
developed to better understand the British model of governance? 
 
The final conclusion will seek to both answer the Dahl (1961) question asking who 
governs alcohol policy and what role groups play in influencing policy 
development – whilst also seeking to analyse whether policy communities should 
be reconsidered as reflective of the British typology of governance. It will reflect on 
whether a re-examination of the traditional Richardson and Jordan (1979) policy 
community offers a useful typology for understanding British governance, whether 
the Dudley and Richardson (1996) model of adversarial policy communities 
improves upon this understanding and beyond this what other features could be 
considered within the adversarial policy community concept. 
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Chapter 2 
Policy Communities in Contemporary Politics 
‘We see policies being made (and administered) between a myriad of 
interconnecting, interpenetrating organisations. It is the relationships involved in 
committees, the policy community of departments and groups, the practices of co-
optation and the consensual style, that perhaps better account for policy outcomes 
than do examinations of party stances, of manifestoes or parliamentary influence,’  
Richardson and Jordan (1979, p. 74) 
 
We can trace the study of the role of groups in British politics back as far as the 
1950s from authors such as Beer (1956) and Mackenzie (1955), with even earlier 
consideration of Herring (1930) who argued that there was a British system of 
lobby groups worthy of consideration. Despite this it was decades before scholars 
sought to more widely theorise British group politics. Richardson and Jordan’s 
(1979) work, ‘Governing under Pressure’, was influenced by the American 
literature on groups, but determined to rework it into a British context. Whilst 
they recognise works such as Beer (1965) in the attempts to develop a workable 
approach to the role of groups in politics within a British context they argued that 
their approach presents almost a step change in the interpretation of British 
politics, an approach they argued was, ‘a process played out between the 
electorate, Parliament and the Cabinet’, (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 41).  
 
Whilst they indicated that this approach represented a challenge to the existing 
interpretation of the British political system, little evidence from the literature to 
indicate that the perceived interpretation, effectively the Westminster model, was 
widely accepted – it could be seen in many ways a straw man. Considering the 
literature of the time the focus of most works on the Westminster model, such as 
Schaffer (1965) talk about the Westminster model as a policy export to former 
British colonies – rather than its role within the British system.  Clearly there was 
an interpretation that this was the case – as Gamble (1990, p. 407) noted, ‘this 
Westminster model with its elaborate conventions for the conduct of 
parliamentary business, the institutionalization of opposition and the rules of 
debate, became not only a notable British export but the key element in the British 
School's account of British politics.’  
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Whether it was widely accepted or not, the policy community approach 
represented a significant challenge to this understanding of British policymaking. 
It lowered the role of parliament, that was ‘unable to influence the central political 
issues’, (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 41) and parties, where, ‘problems are 
handled similarly irrespective of which government is in power’, (Richardson & 
Jordan, 1979, p. 43), but raising the role of groups and the central government, 
with specific consideration of government departments. This is outlined more 
succinctly in the consideration that if Parliament happened to be involved in 
practical details rather than simple ratification, ‘the normal processing system has 
blown a fuse’, (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 117).  This challenge to the system is 
crystallised by Jordan and Cairney (2013) who note the Westminster model and 
policy community approach are incompatible as explanations of the British 
political system – for one to have validity, the other must not apply to the British 
system. The lack of evidence that the assumed Westminster model was not 
necessarily the focus of the literature in understanding British politics, did not 
negate that the assumed role of parliament was significant and groups a later, or 
side consideration. Richardson and Jordan (1979), faced criticism and yet their 
approach remains an ambitious attempt to go beyond a parliamentary 
understanding of British politics to develop a theory of group politics that was 
suited to understanding the UK.  
 
This chapter examines the development and operationalisation of the policy 
communities approach that will guide the subsequent empirical chapters. It begins 
by setting out the traditional conceptualisation of policy communities approach as 
a way of understanding British policymaking. This is followed by a consideration of 
the scholarly critiques of this approach, especially in the view of the Thatcher 
government. The response of Jordan and Richardson (1983) to this critique in 
more closely defining certain elements and more widely considering exogenous 
factors, alongside attempts to embed policy communities within the wider 
literature by Marsh and Rhodes (1992a), Rhodes (1997), Daugbjerg and Marsh 
(1998) and Bevir and Rhodes (2003) are also examined. The third section will 
consider how to an extent policy communities have been reconsidered by Dudley 
and Richardson (1996) through the concept of adversarial policy communities – 
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that acknowledge both collaborative and competitive elements of multiple policy 
communities seeking to influence or manage a similar sphere of policy 
development. The final section looks to the operationalisation of the policy 
community approach – considering how we would identify the presence of 
traditional and adversarial policy communities in relation to UK alcohol policy. 
This section draws on the approaches of Grant (2005a) and Daugbjerg (1998) to 
operationalise the ideas of policy communities. 
 
2.1. The original policy community approach 
The policy community approach was devised to explain the process in which 
policies were made in Britain, effectively focusing on the twentieth century and 
initially at creation in the period before the Thatcher government that challenged 
much of the status quo. It is a theory about relationships, collaboration and usually, 
though not necessarily, incrementalism. Richardson and Jordan (1979, p. 74) 
outline that their approach of policy communities is both more confusing, fluid and 
less public than the more static, what they term as traditional approaches, such as 
the earlier highlighted Westminster model. Challenges appear in seeking to 
understand or analyse an approach that is even in concept difficult to identify. 
Reflecting on the initial conceptualisation the naming of such an approach as a 
community, rather than a network, group or indeed institution was a deliberate 
choice to aid the understanding of British policy development. The policy 
communities approach relies on what they termed as, ‘unwritten rules’, 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 74) which this section will seek to outline – the key 
features of the approach and elements that distinguish the policy community 
approach from its alternate models of parliamentary, party or manifesto-led 
dominance. Fundamentally Richardson and Jordan (1979, p. 74) argue that their 
approach provides a better account of the British model of policy development – 
and whilst some elements remained underdeveloped also offered a compelling 
account for understanding policy development within any strand. Despite 
challenges, the policy communities approach has a conceptual and explanatory 
value that offers significant opportunities to understand policy development.  
 
The approach uses the terminology of a pressure group, taking in elements of what 
the authors regarded as the generally accepted definition, using the work of 
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Kimber and Richardson (1974) to effectively consider it on a group’s ability to 
articulate demands on government. This was further expanded by taking on the 
expanded definition of the lobby found in Finer (1966), ‘the sum of organisations 
in so far as they are occupied at any point in time trying influence the policy of 
public bodies in their chosen direction, though (unlike political parties) never 
themselves prepared to undertake the direct government of the country.’ This 
wider definition effectively indicates that pressure groups were any group beyond 
political parties that had a policy objective and an interest in an area. The approach 
also indicates that it is the compartmentalisation and effectively closed nature of 
each policy community that holds influence - ‘the policy making map is in reality a 
series of vertical compartments or segments – each segment inhabited by a 
different set of organised groups and generally impenetrable by unrecognised 
groups or the general public’, (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 174). The definition 
also allows for government departments, publicly owned businesses and bodies to 
themselves be pressure groups, ‘behaving in almost exactly the same way as more 
conventional external pressure groups’, (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 25). The 
conceptualisation of the pressure group is quite wide within the approach – but 
recognition is vital for participation. In effect within the policy community 
approach many pressure groups are considered to exist – but only a few will have 
an opportunity to influence despite their desire to be a participant. For the 
purposes of the empirical chapters this definition of a pressure group will be used 
that is behaviour focused. A pressure group exists when it is organised, has desired 
outcomes and seeks influence that it does not directly hold – in this circumstance a 
government department or body that had clear authority, or sought clear 
authority, over an issue is not a pressure group – but if it did not, it could be a 
pressure group. This challenge of understanding a pressure or interest group is 
further considered by Jordan, Halpin and Maloney (2004), who even cite 
Mackenzie (1955) who identified and sought to address the lack of clear definition. 
It tries to answer a question from Richardson (1999) as to whether the lack of 
clearer definitions causes difficulty, arguing that it does. They suggest a wider 
approach could be beneficial breaking down the terminology into interest groups 
that are, ‘dedicated politically relevant organisations (normally with members or 
supporters) and use policy participants for organisations not primarily dedicated 
to political activity. The sum of these two categories is the pressure participant 
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category,’ (Jordan, Halpin and Maloney, 2004: p. 208). This challenged 
assumptions made in Jordan and Richardson (1987, p. 14-18) where they had 
made the case for a much broader definition of pressure groups.  
 
A central feature of policy communities is the role of consultation between 
government and pressure groups. The argument is that there is almost a cultural 
desire to consult within the British system – reaching out to pressure groups for 
technical guidance, or to understand the challenges and complexities (Richardson 
& Jordan, 1979, pp. 44-46). This process does not necessarily negate the role of a 
legislative environment in designing policy, yet instinctively the desire to consult 
on design and delivery of policy, drives policy. This inclination to consult is limited 
in that, ‘consultation can be essentially a process of exclusion’, (Richardson & 
Jordan, 1979, p. 45) – whilst many are potentially consulted, there are 
contributions that are taken more seriously and considered more closely – those 
from the groups who make up the policy community. This consultation is not 
limited to simple responses – consultative relationships develop between civil 
servants within a department and specific pressure groups. The two then go on to 
form close, and exclusive, consultative relationships within their policy areas. 
Using the example of the rationalisation of the water sector in the 1970s 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) also refine their understanding of the consultative 
relationship to focus on those who are generally on-board with the policy 
direction. Opponents find themselves excluded from the policy community – which 
allows more compliant pressure groups on opportunity to influence the technical 
details of the policy. Considering this style of consultation, Jordan and Cairney 
(2013, p. 254) assert that, ‘consensus has long been seen as both democratically 
and politically valuable and hence often (normally) there was an attempt to reach 
agreement with affected interest groups rather than the ‘top-down’ imposition of 
decisions.’ Within the original work it is argued that, ‘when groups become 
embedded in the policy formulation process, it is little wonder that they see MPs as 
a last resort,’ (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 136), with parliamentary democracy 
much more of an endorsement exercise rather than adding significantly to the 
debate. Beyond the concepts of parliamentary democracy others are also 
challenged; ministerial accountability, party politics and similar, are to an extent 
 34 
downplayed for this consultation-led structure of policy development between 
pressure groups and government departments.  
 
The approach, ‘draw(s) attention to the internal divisions within government itself 
and stress the degree to which government is plural and not singular’, (Richardson 
& Jordan, 1979, p. 25), with competitive interests within government. The 
approach indicates that policy communities organise themselves around 
government departments – rather than the government as a whole – and that there 
is not prime-ministerial dominance over policy development. Departments 
compete for resources and favour their own interests – financial, political or even 
process. A policy community will organise around and within a department or 
agency – whichever has authority over the policy area. This interpretation also 
shows that pressure groups will seek to be supportive of government departments 
who are their champion. This is a mutually beneficial relationship – beyond the 
basics of having technical expertise for policy development provided, there are 
practical advantages in making sure from a departmental side that policy can or 
will actually be implemented – and from a pressure group perspective policy is 
implementable, with the least harm or most advantage for them. There is also the 
possibility of non-legislative solutions to policy challenges that decreases the time 
of policy implementation and the compliance challenges from both sides. As 
Richardson and Jordan (1979, pp. 29-30) offer, ‘understanding the divided nature 
of the centre and the manner in which policy is handled permits the critical 
understanding that pressure groups can be – and we would go as far as to say often 
are – allies of departments.’ Arguments within the policy community will not be 
aired outside when greater, collective interests on resources and influence are 
crucial. In effect, policy communities come together, exist and develop policy due 
to the benefits offered by participation. That a seat at the table is worth accepting 
compromises for, that being able to participate from the beginning of policy 
discussions is positive and that there also exists the potential for larger rewards in 
being preferred as the implementation device for policy decisions. These 
stabilising factors; a seat at the table, the opportunity to actively participate and 
the role as an implementer of the policy, negate the potential for internal conflicts 
within a policy community, allow for the acceptance of concession and promote 
compromise. 
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An argument is made in the original construct of the policy community approach 
that this could be considered group sub-government – that there is devolved 
authority to policy communities – and the pressure groups that make up these 
communities. In effect, there is an argument that within every policy arena, there 
are pressure groups with government knowing whom have the greatest 
combination of influence and expertise – ‘civil servants know their customers’, 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 54). This translates into authority to further 
government policy objectives – but also becoming a tool of government - those 
who exist as part of the policy community to an extent lose their individual status, 
‘boundaries are unclear, government and governed is difficult to maintain as a 
distinction’, (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 61). This is also both combined and 
challenged with the tradition of clientelism within departmental and pressure 
group relationships that is analysed to exist within the British context. The aspects 
stressed are that within a sub-government system there is more likely to be 
disagreement over policy objectives within a policy community, yet with a 
clientelist relationship it is more likely that there will be collaboration and 
identification within a policy community – the relationship is clearly consensual 
and collaborative. Whilst this is not clearly acknowledged by Richardson and 
Jordan (1979), there are many features which indicate it could be considered to be 
within the pluralist tradition, typified by Dahl (1961), in understanding the 
concept of government. At the same time, the elements of favouritism and 
exclusion of pressure groups also demonstrate that elements of neo-pluralism can 
be found within the approach. 
 
The behaviour of policy change also plays a role in considering policy communities 
- important within this is the incrementalism of policy development. The 
consistency of approach, the close relationships and similar features mean that 
dramatic change is less likely, with reform being gradual and designed for ease of 
implementation. Part of this is the challenge to authority that appears after policy 
changes have been implemented – the larger the challenge the greater opportunity 
for a reaction arguably in line with Newton’s third law – that each action has an 
equal and opposite reaction. The approach includes consideration that where, ‘new 
groups have emerged in order to challenge existing decisions’, (Richardson & 
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Jordan, 1979, p. 5) that have, ‘different values and beliefs and making quite new 
demands that conflicted with traditionally established groups’, (Richardson & 
Jordan, 1979, p. 5). New pressure groups represent a challenge to the community 
and interrupt its consistency. Another feature for the incrementalism expands on 
the closeness of the relationship between the government department and the 
group – expanding on the sub-government analysis – that the institutionalism that 
appears with a policy community relationship creates some form of alignment and 
mutual interest – if people generally agree and have done so for a long time it is 
unlikely that new, more radical concepts appear at a high frequency.  At the same 
time by presuming that being part of a policy community offers benefits, this to an 
extent meaning that being outside should have costs, meaning that these costs 
should be greater in value than the compromises endured. In turn this means a 
requirement for an element of exclusivity, to have an advantage over competitive 
pressure groups. The divide between those pressure groups within a policy 
community and those who remain excluded is an important feature in seeking to 
find examples of the traditional policy community approach. 
 
This approach sees a collective of communities, each organised essentially around 
a government department, with each community focused on a specific area or 
range of policy.  There is an assumption of policy sectorisation or segmentation, 
with contrasting characteristics from both pluralism and corporatism, 
accompanied by strong elements of clientelism with the group dynamic.   
It is a relationship of mutual benefits, with both sides – both government and 
groups - in many ways representing each other to their audience – whether that is 
their membership of the wider government apparatus respectively. This 
relationship does change in depth – sometimes being more focused on 
consultation and at others on clientelism dependent on the issue – yet this shift 
does not dramatically affect the approach. There is a clear understanding that 
within the policy community model is that ‘decision-making is governed by the 
rules of the game’, Richardson and Jordan (1979, p. viii), argue, with willing 
participants, who accept outcomes that may not be entirely what they wanted. At 
the heart of this argument is that by seeking to understand policy communities it is 
likely that a more compelling narrative of policy is found than by considering 
manifestos, party positions or the influence of parliament alone. 
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2.2. Policy communities in crisis? 
Elected in 1979, the first Thatcher government challenged the status quo and with 
it the conceptual and explanatory power of the policy communities approach. It is 
arguable that the timing of Richardson and Jordan (1979) first publishing their 
policy community approach was unfortunate –  with the new government’s more 
aggressive approach to policy development with more radical change, presenting a 
challenge to the original policy community approach as an explanatory device. The 
original draft of the approach indicated that ‘rules of the game’ existed which 
contextualised negotiations, in effect setting a framework for group influence and 
the acceptance that some areas as beyond the realm of negotiations. The sudden 
shift in government policy direction destabilised the long-formed post-war 
compromise and historic stability. Given this stability had provided the negotiation 
platform central to the approach, it raised questions to its validity. Pressure groups 
found an interest removed or changed; whether it was the rolling back of elements 
of the welfare states or the opening up from state control of certain markets, ahead 
of the even more radical reforms of later terms, areas of broad acceptance had 
changed. Departments had changed purposes – with elements of public 
management moved and new participant pressure groups appearing. What was 
once considered unthinkable was now practically the key area of negotiation – 
incrementalism, arguably a symptom rather than cause of policy communities, 
seemed to have changed to wholesale giant leaps. The use of the word ‘community’ 
had been a deliberate framing device for the approach – yet the political 
atmosphere seemed to indicate that this kind of relationship was no longer viable 
or in step with government demands. The crisis for policy communities was 
whether this was indeed an approach to understanding the development of policy 
in the British context, was it only a small part of a much larger story, or was it 
merely a descriptive tool for a temporary political circumstance, a simplified time-
limited observation that offered little. For Jordan and Richardson (1983, p. 610), 
‘the Thatcher government (elected in 1979) which deliberately developed an 
image of radical change and a determination to stick to its chosen path was in 
reality little different from its predecessors in its basic policy style.’ This section 
will consider all three potential attempts to frame policy communities within the 
literature in response to this apparent crisis, how the understanding of policy 
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communities developed and the development made in response to these 
challenges as the approach developed. 
 
The key feature to recognise when considering the challenge made by an 
apparently more radical, less orderly or negotiated style to the approach is that 
whilst there was some large-scale policy change in certain public sector 
environments, especially in areas being privatised, there was also continuity and 
persistence found across several policy arenas. Whilst it should not be seen as a 
period when an apparently radical political ideology representing a challenge to 
the approach rather than a style of governance, it is still worth consideration of the 
areas of stability within this period such as the National Health Service and the 
persistence of comprehensive schools. ‘When challenged by powerful interest, Mrs 
Thatcher was, like all her predecessors, ready and willing to negotiate’, (Jordan & 
Richardson, 1983, p. 610). The elements of persistence in the face of apparent 
radicalism allowed for the policy community approach being further developed by 
Jordan and Richardson (1983). Within this they offered development of the 
original theory in the Thatcher-governmental era, in the context of attempts 
having been made by the new Government to abolish many of the features key to 
policy community groupings that had been observed in the original work. This 
refining of the approach effectively completed what can be considered as the 
traditional policy community approach and gave more elements that can be used 
for operationalisation of the model. The crisis was arguably a useful tool to 
highlight the stronger, clearer features of the policy community approach, with five 
key elements, ‘sectorisation, clientelism, consultation, institutionalisation of 
compromise, and the development of exchange relationships’, (Jordan & 
Richardson, 1983, p. 604). The challenge presented to the approach in a period of 
apparent radical policy shifts, rather than being a destructive force, or indeed an 
indication that the approach was demonstrably invalid, allowed instead for the 
approach to be clarified and become less what was earlier termed as fuzzy.  
 
The first feature of this, the sectorisation, built on the earlier considerations with a 
sharper focus. It highlights the importance of bureaucratic accommodation, ‘a 
pattern of relationships over time which tends to keep issues off the political 
agenda and attracts little public or indeed academic attention’, (Richardson & 
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Jordan, 1979, p. 604) within the system, it argues for relationships that benefit all 
those within the sector that are coordinated and effectively leaves areas 
considered either irrelevant or lacking importance for others. The sectorisation is 
closely related to features surrounding clientelism – the relationships are such 
that, ‘not only is the department not an unwelcome recipient of group “pressure”, 
but the department will itself try to mobilise activity by groups’, (Jordan & 
Richardson, 1983, p. 605). There are other features that indicate high levels of 
clientelism – with elements of sponsorship, consideration offered for their so-
called clients to feed into wider considerations and have early awareness of 
decisions or opportunities. The combination of almost a narrow, very limited 
policy focus and pressure group membership, combined with a two-way 
clientelistic relationship – one where both pressure groups and departments see 
each other, and themselves, as clients that creates an almost institutionalised 
relationship. The third feature focuses, as did the original approach, on the 
importance of consultation. They expand that it is not merely consultation but 
more widely a relationship focused on negotiation – consultation is real and will be 
considered. The negotiation environment is important and is necessary – as Jordan 
and Richardson (1983, p. 606) outline it, ‘comes not only from broad cultural 
values, but from purely functional requirements’. In effect – pressure groups have 
more practical experience than departments or civil servants – their input and 
consideration should deliver a better policy. There is also a legitimacy argument 
that is applicable from the consultation and negotiation environment. Whilst a 
government may argue legitimacy – through elections and manifestoes – an 
individual department, especially the civil service could lack this. Pressure groups, 
representative of at least certain interests, have elements of legitimacy that may be 
needed to justify policy. By actively including them in negotiated outcome, they 
share in this legitimacy – their opposition or deliberate exclusion tarnished 
legitimacy. The level of consultation is an indicator of a policy community – how 
groups are consulted, what elements are listened to and what weight is put on 
their input plays a significant role – yet it is still not a pure measure for modelling – 
it is a consideration and a sum of all elements as to whether there is enough 
consultation or negotiation to consider whether a policy community is in existence. 
The increased value in consultation within a closed environment is a greater 
indication of a policy community - Jordan and Richardson (1983, pp. 607-608) 
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focus on how the elements of shared language and framing of an issue offer an 
indication of the relationship. The integration of groups within the policy 
development process and the accommodation of their concerns play a key role in 
the traditional policy community approach. The work notes the practical 
difficulties in abolition of the individual panels and groups that make up a policy 
community, highlighting the fourth feature - what is described as ‘the 
institutionalisation and regularisation of compromise’, (Jordan & Richardson, 
1983, p. 608). The challenge to the policy community approach sees that influence 
was taken from them to a more radical, government-led direction. ‘An official 
report in 1980 listed some 1,561 advisory bodies,’ (Jordan & Richardson, 1983, p. 
608) – whilst only proposing removing around 15 per cent – many of which 
survived. The persistence of these groupings is down to the advantages offered as 
it, ‘grants initially hostile groups a role and in doing so effectively socialises them 
into the norms of behaviour in the policy process’, (Jordan & Richardson, 1983, p. 
608). This institutionalisation also gives a platform for expanding the testing of a 
policy – by considering elements in a community, pressure groups will also be 
considering them with their members – sense checking policy and giving it an 
audience of expertise ahead of its final implementation. The final feature is the 
development of exchange relationships – a multi-part relationship. It offers that 
sudden shifts in policy offer disadvantages – consistency and certainty are much 
easier to manage as a department and as a pressure group. That there is a mutual 
ability to trade the various advantages participants have within a policy 
community for the advancement of their collective interests. At the same time that 
the roles of the participants evolve so that all in a policy community become policy 
professionals – the blurring of roles and the creation of greater institutionalism.  
 
These combined features bring back one of the standard elements of the 
traditional policy community approach – the role of incrementalism. Jordan and 
Richardson (1983, p. 608) consider that this tendency for incrementalism is a 
feature almost like a magnetic field – pulling all participants in to a smaller scope 
of policy consideration as they are pulled together. They argue that whilst there is 
capacity to pull beyond the magnetic field – it is likely that most policy will be 
captured within it. This offers an indication that the incrementalism that may 
indicate a traditional policy community approach is not an essential element – 
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more radical shifts are possible as long as the elements of consultation, 
compromise and the procedural elements remain. The presence of incrementalism 
should be expected, but its absence does not indicate the lack of a policy 
community. There is greater caveating of the limits of the policy community 
approach in the later work – there are areas where a policy community approach 
is unlikely to be found. These are areas such as defence where urgent government 
direction is needed, where public interest is such that scrutiny stops a more closed 
environment or where too many departments have an interest to organise a stable 
policy community. It is argued that these discrepancies or exceptions do not 
change the overall narrative for policy development – it is that this style of 
approach remains the normal British style for policy development. 
 
Alongside the challenge made by government, there were also attempts to embed 
the policy community approach with other theoretical approaches. These were 
most notable within the expanding policy network literature and with attempts 
made to place policy communities as a type of network with specific 
characteristics. This attempt to specify a more exacting or limited standard of 
definition of policy communities focused on certain characteristics of the approach 
that whilst eliminating elements that were arguably unclear, yet in providing 
clarity might have removed usefulness or even the key understanding of the 
approach. Challenge to the traditional approach came both as fundamental 
criticisms from Dowding (1995, 2001) of the style of investigation or modelling of 
policy communities. Examples such as the salmonella in eggs episode as outlined 
by M. J. Smith (1991) identified potential flaws in the traditional model that 
exposed weaknesses. In effect they asked whether they remained an effective 
device to understand policy development and whether their approach was too 
unclear to be used as a tool for analysing policy development. The traditional 
understanding of policy communities has seen challenges and development, with 
considerable critique focusing on what was considered a rather rigid and specific 
approach. Whilst there have been many attempts to develop the policy community 
approach as a tool both in itself and to some as a specific area of policy networks - 
Rhodes (1981, 1986) and Marsh and Rhodes (1992a), offer two of the major 
attempts to categorise – seeking to consider a wider analysis beyond the original 
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construct, but arguably also ignoring elements of the traditional policy community 
approach to fit their wider modelling. 
 
Following on from the initial work of Richardson and Jordan (1979) an attempt 
was made by Rhodes (1981), in an analysis the development of policy within and 
across local authorities, to find a firmer, less descriptive understanding of the 
terminology. This offered a critique and direction of development for the policy 
communities typology, which sought to develop a framework of understanding 
power-dependence between policy makers, offered some development of policy 
community thought. The typology also develops the policy community concept 
more widely into the local policy arena. In considering this typology the original 
interpretation sees policy communities as in existence, with private and public 
participants, making up multi-levelled (through government structure) 
communities.  Important within this is a, ‘monopoly of representation’, (Rhodes, 
1981, p. 118), being a necessity for a policy community, the increased central 
government creep in local government being indicative of the potential for policy 
communities.  An interesting feature of Rhodes’ (1981, 1986) work in looking at 
central-local power, is the consideration of subnational levels of government in 
understanding policy communities. He notes that a policy issue may appear that 
would normally be within the purview of a national policy community, however 
due to its level of implementation within the wider public sector could lead to the 
said nationally-focused policy community having little or no development role in a 
specific tenet of its policy. When Rhodes (1986) redeveloped his typology to create 
five policy decision-making or network groupings, with various levels of 
participation, exclusion and focus; it was argued that a combination of features 
that, in different circumstances, offered indications of the presence of policy 
communities and also the lack of key functionality necessary for a policy 
community to be in existence. Notably within this is the question of openness of 
the environment. Whilst there was not a central clarity proposed, in a 
consideration of areas of policy, which initially would be assumed to be available 
to local government bodies, that have instead been assigned to a closed quango 
environment with a closed national negotiation, or technocratic, environment 
offering indications for a policy community. This work effectively sought to limit 
the interpretation of the policy community approach, adding caveats that are not 
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found in the traditional policy community as outlined in Jordan and Richardson 
(1983). An example of this is the indication that policy communities cover almost 
an entire department, lacking specificity or nuance. 
 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992b) to an extent built on the earlier Rhodes (1981, 1986) 
work putting policy communities at one point of a range within their wider policy 
network environment. This structure had policy communities as one extreme that 
moved on to a developed Hugh Heclo (1978) model of issue networks. The 
typology, as outlined in table 2.1. below, sets out the various dimensions of 
consideration and the expected variable within each in what could be considered a, 
‘stricter definition of policy community than that used by Richardson and Jordan’, 
(Dudley & Richardson, 1996, p. 67).  This typology of a policy community implies 
incrementalism to policy development, without opportunity for radical policy shift. 
Whilst not as restrictive as the earlier typology by Rhodes (1981, 1986), the effort 
to frame the policy community approach within policy network structure limits 
the original construct. Considering table 2.1., most elements certainly follow a 
construct that fits with the Jordan and Richardson (1983) traditional policy 
community approach. These were indicators more than necessity – the exclusitory 
factors in membership are more extreme. The frequency of the interactions is 
common when there is a policy focus, yet it is for the most part a quieter period, 
with the elements of incrementalism indictative that consistent interaction is 
important – making this a tick box item is a construed limit on the approach. The 
element of the typology that is the most consistent to the approach is the issue of 
power – arguing the same narrative found in the Jordan and Richardson (1983) 
traditional policy community approach. 
 
Table 2.1. Marsh and Rhodes Typology of a Policy Community 
Dimension  Policy Communities 
Membership Number of participants Very limited number, some groups 
consciously excluded 
 Type of interest Economic and/or professional 
interests dominate 
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Integration Frequency of interaction Frequent, high-quality, interaction 
of all groups on matters related to 
policy issue 
 Continuity Membership, values, and outcomes 
persistent over time 
 Consensus All participants share basic values 
and accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome 
Resources Distribution of resources 
(within network) 
All participants have resources; 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship 
 Distribution of resources 
(within participating 
organisations) 
Hierarchical; leaders can deliver 
members 
Power  There is a balance of power among 
members. Although one group may 
dominate, it must be a positive-sum 
game if community is to persist 
(Marsh & Rhodes, 1992a, p. 251) 
 
The originators of the policy community approach took their research in different 
directions. Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin (1994) focus on the division between 
insider and outsider groups. They link the existence of insider groups to the 
consultative style of policy development – indeed, they are almost natural bed 
fellows – whilst also arguing that ‘consultation is a functional necessity in the 
process of developing effective policies,’ (Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994: p 
22). They also argue that consultation increased throughout the Thatcher 
government and that it was very much an exchange relationship. This contribution 
indicates that insider status is granted on certain terms, ‘possession of a (valuable) 
resource, for example: economic power, knowledge (normally technical expertise), 
representative base, implementation power, compliance power etc,’ (Maloney, 
Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994: p. 29). Therefore, the analysis suggests that group 
insider status is a privilege granted not on ideological, but practical grounds.  In 
what is undoubtedly firm criticism, Keith Dowding (1995), challenged both the 
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attempts to turn policy communities into a typology and the subsequent attempts 
to create a wider policy network consideration. The fundamental criticism from 
the first Dowding (1995) objections is that policy communities, in their original 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) construct, were effectively a metaphorical tool to 
explain descriptive relationships. In contrast they were not tools for analysis or 
consideration of empirical examples – more widely the strict framing of a policy 
community within the wider approach progressively made the metaphorical 
analysis less useful as attempts to understand causal elements to how policy was 
developed – they are mildly interesting constructs that do not offer anything 
analytical or offer explanations for decisions. On policy communities Dowding 
(1995, p. 139), observed that it was, ‘simply metaphorical heuristics, though no 
less serviceable for that’. The critique is especially aimed towards the Rhodes 
(1981, 1986) model for policy networks – highlighting its limitations citing that, 
‘you cannot have a theory about dogs which only applies to alsatians and not 
poodles, then study two dogs and conclude that one is more poodle-like and 
another more alsatian-like,’ (Dowding, 1995, p. 141). The critique from Dowding 
(1995), whose central argument was that the entire policy community concept was 
a metaphorical device not a model or approach, also pointed out specific flaws in 
the Marsh and Rhodes (1992b) typology. For example – he critiqued directly the 
dimension that considers resources as frankly, being completed inaccurate - it was 
argued that they were the property of agents not the network. This apparent 
conflation between properties of the actors and the network exposed limits in the 
typology. 
 
As an example of a much-examined case study, the existence of an agricultural 
policy community has been both observed and challenged. For example, Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992b), dispute a policy community’s existence, seeing a more open 
relationship with a wide number of groups, due for the most part to the large 
number of groups that can be seen to participate in the policy process. This is 
challenged by Daugbjerg (1998), who finds that there is a policy community with 
both primary and secondary groupings. Grant (2005a, p. 304) argues that, ‘the NFU 
is the primary community; groups like the Country Landowners Association and 
the food processors are in the secondary community’, it is also noted the groups 
that do not have this regular contact, such as environmental groups, are generally 
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excluded. The formation of this community came about through a long-term 
mutually beneficial relationship between the participants – starting with interests 
in the Second World War and developing over time. This relationship has been 
maintained primarily through this mutual interest in shared values – centred on 
increasing agricultural production. As issues appeared, ‘the status quo was 
maintained by the closed policy community so as to ensure that policy was made 
within a small group who had shared values on the goals of agricultural policy,’ (M. 
J. Smith, 1992, p. 40). Issues that these groups had little interest in, such as 
environmental issues, just were not on the agenda. The policy community’s 
survival was maintained by an element of concession and adaptability – willing to 
take costs for the benefits of being in the policy community. In this circumstance 
there was an external challenge – with the previous mutual agreement that 
continuously increasing agricultural production was a key policy objective affected 
by external actors. The reaction of the groups guaranteed the policy community’s 
survival. They accepted the changing circumstance, developed moderate, 
implementable policies and made sure they managed the process of change to the 
new status quo. The agricultural policy community survived an external shock by 
making step-by-step concessions – an incremental answer to a push for radical 
policy shift. 
 
With a continued focus on agricultural issues, Smith (1991), using the salmonella 
in eggs crisis of the late 1980s as a case study, sought to understand the apparent 
collapse of a traditional policy community within the agricultural policy arena, but 
with a useful tightened focus on one area.  The background to this was that in the 
Second World War food was very much a political issue, having conflicting 
interests with the central issues being; which specific foods, their cost and their 
nutritional value in terms of comparative food production. As the war ended the 
central objective changed with maximum levels of production being the central 
issue, backed by willingness for government economic investment in food 
production. The issue became one of vital national importance, but only in terms of 
delivering these high production returns. This made the existence of a tight 
grouping, with these who could actually deliver the desired policy outcomes, an 
obvious device, with a policy community born. This community excluded 
consumer groups, though not consciously, mainly as they offered little – at this 
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stage the policy outcomes to an extent matched their own and they could bring 
only limited resources to the table. The problems for this policy community 
appeared by its inability to address a developing issue – its inaction and inability to 
adjust created a political crisis. The issue in this circumstance was salmonella in 
eggs, and whilst Edwina Currie’s resignation played an important role, it was an 
inability of the policy community to adapt that caused the crisis. Though it was 
1988 when the political issue of salmonella arose the policy community had been 
aware for some time, but that community had decided it was not an issue worth 
addressing, nor of informing the public of the possibility it may develop as an issue 
for consumers.  After the resignation of the minister an assumption of business as 
usual was made by many of the policy community participants. However, in failing 
to adequately address an issue of food safety, the policy community had both 
helped develop opposition from groups previously either compliant or lacking in 
power, alongside creating unnecessary political controversy. The core economics 
had also changed with the support for food manufacturing no longer mutually 
beneficial for both producers and retailers with the adoption of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The healthiness of food became an issue for retailers in 
increasing the saleability of their products. In turn, retailers no longer accepted 
policy community outcomes in the same way as before – demanding different 
standards and products to those the community had negotiated upon. This 
effective failure of a traditional policy community, to being forced into a direction 
against the community’s objectives is both an example of how a demanded level of 
policy outcome, in effect a response that is not incremental, and also an outside 
issue can affect a policy community. In this circumstance it is argued that a policy 
community became an issues network. 
 
The apparent radicalism in style of policy development of the Thatcher 
government asked questions of the original policy community approach, with 
Jordan and Richardson (1982) effectively arguing that this indicated limitations to 
approach but with some refining allowed for what this thesis labels as the 
traditional approach to still be of use. Counter arguments to this have persisted 
with Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) arguing that the continued consultative nature of 
the new regime made the case that the traditional model was retained – it was just 
sold in a different way. Even Richardson (2000, pp. 1014-1015) acknowledged that 
 48 
this approach, ‘places insufficient emphasis on the extent to which the 
Conservatives systematically changed the underlying bases of the consultations 
that they continued to conduct with the affected interests’. The combined lack of 
clarity and indication of outcomes similar to those found in the 1970s as part of 
Richardson and Jordan’s (1979) original policy community approach led to 
reactions that ranged from refining the approach, considerations for alternatives 
and an analysis that limited its interpretation from being the standard British style 
of policymaking to simply one type of many. Some considered restrictions for the 
apparent potential for policy communities to exist around certain issues or 
interests and in the most extreme case that the policy community approach was 
metaphorical – a good descriptive term but inadequate or inappropriate as a tool 
of analysis. Despite these challenges, the approach persisted in the literature and 
as a tool used to analyse the British style of policy development. 
 
2.3. The return of policy communities 
The policy community approach has seen continued interest, with case studies by 
Grant (2000, 2005a), especially of the fire service, demonstrating both an interest 
in the approach and attempts to operationalise it in both a historical and current 
context. Potential limits of the traditional approach were also recognised by Jordan 
and Richardson (1982) in their consideration of water privatisation. In this 
circumstance they found that a new policy community developed when an external 
variable came into play. A new agency was created, a new policy community 
formed, effectively transformed. Richardson, Maloney, and Rudig (1992) further 
considered the privatisation of the water industry in the United Kingdom – and 
more keenly highlighted the effective failure of the policy community to construct 
a policy outcome or scenario that they could find acceptable. The argument made 
is that the traditional policy community approach effectively lacked a system of 
transformation– there was a shift in the policy that was dramatic – against the 
wishes of the incumbent policy community. The process of devolution also 
produced new considerations for the policy community approach, Cairney (2014: 
p. 318) outlined that, ‘devolution has produced a new form of group-government 
relationships in Scotland’. The development of this alternative venue, with a broad 
range of powers over many areas, he shows, prompted reorganisation and 
reconsideration – challenging long standing processes and relationships. It has 
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allowed, through this different venue structure, groups that may not have been 
able to influence at a UK level to have a new role. The Scottish policy environment 
also has a different approach to the wider United Kingdom, with a greater trend 
towards universalism. This feeds into what Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn (2009) 
outlined as territorial policy communities, where the expansion of devolution has 
created new venues for policy community formation that may take different 
approaches to the established equivalents. This point is further outlined by 
Cairney (2013), when considering the education sector, argues that new policy 
communities have appeared, with organisations changing their strategy and even 
their structure to respond to the new Scottish venue. 
 
Whilst there were multiple attempts of development, Dudley and Richardson 
(1996) produced a compelling approach that sought to answer some of the 
challenges to the policy community concept by considering whether factors 
beyond the initial scope of assessment and behaviours not previously accounted 
for could have an impact. Their approach of adversarial policy communities, which 
was further developed by Dudley and Richardson (2004), expands on the 
traditional approach, challenging preconceptions of some key features whilst also 
offering a wider explanation both for more radical policy change and the 
persistence of policy communities in these periods of radical change that the 
traditional approach struggles to account for. This acknowledges the use of the 
term community, reflecting back to H. Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) with their 
village or community description as reflected in the earlier section, with its closer 
relationships and shared interest, but in this case the village green may also be the 
scene for an episode of Midsomer Murders.  It also builds on concepts that were in 
the original Richardson and Jordan (1979) analysis but were considered more 
minor. 
 
The consideration of an adversarial policy community approach by Dudley and 
Richardson (1996) was also a reflection of the divide between the originators of 
the policy community approach. Jordan was drawn to the study of policy networks 
in a way that cast doubt on his original work. Responding to a case study by Grant 
(2005a) on the fire service as a traditional policy community, Jordan (2005, p. 319) 
stated that, ‘we never saw a policy community as anything other than a synonym 
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for arrangements captured by others.’ The policy communities approach, he 
suggested suffers, ‘inherent uncertainty over what is being described’, (Jordan, 
2005, p. 318) which made operationalising the approach difficult. Richardson, in 
contrast sought to refine the idea of a policy community by recognising an element 
of competition between communities as he developed the approach considering 
water privatisation in Richardson et al. (1992) and the development of the 
adversarial approach within Dudley and Richardson (1996). 
 
The adversarial policy communities approach sees each individual community as 
having a measurable degree of conformity to the traditional approach, essentially 
having many similar dimensions – whilst adding in a competitive element or 
alternative for policy development. The adversarial approach also has a paradox 
compared to the traditional approach – those qualities that are seen in the 
traditional approach to reinforce stability – are actually agents for change in 
certain scenarios. More widely they have the ability to disobey the central 
principle of the traditional policy community approach – that they will disobey the 
‘rules of the game’. To an extent they can remain within their own policy 
community, whilst acting to open up their adversarial policy community or at least 
seeking to shift the policy control to their policy community – arguing that these 
distinct communities could come together for some form of negotiated settlement, 
‘may be naive when one considers the major differences in problem definition 
between the two adversarial communities’, (Dudley & Richardson, 1996, p. 81). 
The traditional policy community focused in on the importance of government 
departments. Whilst the adversarial approach still makes clear they maintain 
influence it also advocates a wider consideration of venue, ‘different sets of policy 
actors used different venues to press their case on government and on the wider 
public’, (Dudley & Richardson, 1996, p. 80). Specifically, venue shopping becomes 
an important feature – whether it is between departments or level of government, 
at the trans-national level within European structures or including the devolved 
nations of the United Kingdom. There are other features such as inquiries or 
commissions that have progressively featured more heavily in policy development 
– forming policy communities around these circumstances. The argument made for 
adversarial policy communities appears to become stronger with the increasing 
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opportunity for transience of policy between these arenas and less stability than 
the traditional policy community approach would indicate. 
 
The conceptualisation of adversarial policy communities is both complementary 
and in conflict with the earlier consideration of policy communities. For example, 
Daugbjerg (1998, p. 67) notes that the traditional approach would indicate that, 
‘conflict between government departments or agencies as to who is responsible for 
a policy area is often the most important reason a policy community does not 
develop’. The adversarial argument would indicate that conflict instead instigates 
multiple policy communities to either develop or become more visible – arguably 
in a more prominent fashion than in an area without conflict. This highlights the 
existential difference between the traditional and adversarial approaches; that 
policy communities can exist without control or authority over a policy area. It 
indicates government departments and institutions may well have policy 
communities organised around them without direct influence but seeking that 
influence. In effect, the adversarial policy community approach’s key feature is that 
control of a policy area is a flexible element between policy communities. That 
control does not currently exist within a specified policy community incentivises 
behaviour that increases the opportunity for control. Advantage and supremacy 
can also be fleeting within the adversarial policy community environment; it 
indicates the need for greater adaptability. A snapshot assessment will give a clear 
view of a given situation yet variable factors, as discussed in the next section, can 
lead this to change on a regular basis. That existence of a policy community is not 
reliant on actual policy influence is a direct contrast to the traditional approach, 
that power can ebb and flow contrasts with the traditional stable relationship 
based on a consistent oversight of public policy development. It argues that 
ambition and potential of influence also leads to a policy community structure 
around an alternative venue – whether that’s a department, agency, inquiry or 
different level of government.  
 
What drives change with a policy community structure – both in the traditional 
and adversarial approaches? In the traditional approach stability, and acceptance 
of a conflict avoidance approach within the membership (Richardson & Jordan, 
1979, p. 189), that normally leads to incrementalism are key features.  The 
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interpretation is that policy communities persisted because the change was not 
actually that dramatic, more a changing in speed not a change in direction at any 
stage. The adversarial policy community approach’s explanation of change is based 
in the differing components of each policy community – from the department or 
agency it surrounds to the groups that make up its membership. To have a seat at 
the policy community table there is still an element of exchange relationships – 
assets – practical and political - are delivered and shared by the wider 
membership. It is how these assets are both used and their usefulness that explain 
the major differences in how change occurs between the traditional and 
adversarial policy communities.  Anything beyond incremental change within 
policy communities will occur in three major circumstances – though even if these 
circumstances exist it does not guarantee change will be immediate, which adds to 
the adversarial environment. The first of these are changes in bureaucratic 
interests – departments change and shift, budgets are cut or increased and the 
priorities change. This is something that can be accounted for both within the 
traditional and adversarial approaches, a normal feature of policy development. 
Secondly group interests can change – new facts, new business and new realities 
have considerable effects on what groups want, what they are prepared to do and 
where their limitations lie. This is an area that is less well covered in the 
traditional policy community approach, but actively considered in the adversarial 
as groups develop to seek influence or no longer desire it if the price becomes 
unacceptable. There is a strong argument that whilst disloyalty comes with a cost 
and loyalty a reward – on occasion this is reversed if those with these gifts change. 
Thirdly there are the exogenous factors – whilst policy communities are argued to 
exist as a better understanding of policy than the considerations of parliament, 
central government or political parties there are circumstances when they will be 
taken over by them. The typical examples of these include items such as manifesto 
commitments, a decision at a transnational level, a media campaign focused on a 
public fear or even a public health scare. This risk or shock to a policy community 
leads to challenges – there will be potentially an adversary better equipped or 
more willing to deal with this new challenge.   
 
In the trunk roads case study overview from Dudley and Richardson (1996) they 
note that the road haulage industry initially dominated on trunk road policy, being 
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the policy community surrounding the issue, as it was both an expert group and an 
organisation of vocal hauliers who could create substantial political noise. This 
combination allowed for long, sustained periods of dominance. Meanwhile the 
environmentalists were value based initially but developed an expertise that 
created more opportunities for engagement and discussions regarding policy 
impact (Dudley & Richardson, 1996, p. 70). The shifts in influence towards the 
environment-led policy community may have been made feasible by new venues 
appearing and the change in bureaucratic goals – yet delivery required that the 
environment groups went beyond simply being advocacy coalitions and also 
became epistemic communities. Pressure groups developed and became able to be 
agents of delivery, or arguably pressure, in a departmental interest. This focus 
could be economic development, scientific discovery or societal concerns. 
Alongside this the seats around the tables were limited – there were few places for 
campaigners but more for experts. Groups that provided both effectively were 
much more likely to gain influence and that same applied to policy communities. A 
fundamental difference between the traditional and adversarial approach of policy 
change is that policy communities themselves can in the latter approach effectively 
change their outputs to change the conversation; not just exerting influence on the 
consultation and direction of travel, but the entire focus of any consultation let 
alone its final destination. Dudley and Richardson (1996, p. 64) surmise it as, 
‘Given the separate character of each arena, what might be termed the adversarial 
policy communities of the road and environmental lobbies have adopted a 
chameleon-like quality.’ This quality of being able to remain to the fundamental 
features of a policy community, but be adaptive to seek control offers an 
opportunity to consider shifts in policy in a broader scope than the traditional 
approach– and see if the approach itself has more validity. 
 
2.4. Operationalising the policy community approach 
As previously indicated Grant (2000, 2005a) sought to use the Daugbjerg (1998) 
typology as a test for the existence of a traditional policy community, primarily 
looking at the issue of the fire service. By removing considerations or resources 
and power, whilst actively highlighting the institutionalised nature of the policy 
community, this typology makes it easier to say whether a policy community 
exists. This section extends Daugbjerg (1998) to the Dudley and Richardson 
 54 
(1996) adversarial policy community approach, with the aim being to say under 
what circumstances a policy community exists in a given policy area and to identify 
whether it conforms to the traditional or adversarial conceptions thereof. 
 
A policy community Daugbjerg (1998, p. 44) suggests, can be understood along 
three dimensions: membership, integration and institutionalisation. As outlined in 
table 2.2. below, the membership of a policy community is offered as a privilege to 
a very limited number of members who in turn represent only a narrow range of 
interests. A traditional policy community is highly integrated, as evidenced by 
frequent interaction between the members of a policy community both in terms of 
bargaining and negotiation, taking clear primary features from Jordan and 
Richardson (1983). In its third element - institutionalisation, finally, refers to the 
shared understanding on policy principles and the procedures concerning 
problems within the community – in effect the rules of the game. 
 
Table 2.2.: The Daugbjerg Typology of Policy Communities 
Dimension Policy Communities 
Membership Very limited number of members. Narrow range of interests 
represented. 
Integration Bargaining and negotiation. Frequent interaction. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy principles and procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
(Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 44) 
 
Extending this typology to the adversarial communities approach, it is expected to 
encounter a core policy community as described by Daugbjerg (1998, p. 44) 
alongside one or more alternative policy communities. Compared to the core 
policy community, the alternative policy community will have a limited but 
generally different number of members and range of interests represented. More 
specifically, we would expect to observe both different interest groups and 
different constellations of interest groups belonging to the core and alternative 
policy communities. The alternative policy community will also be highly 
integrated, although it might rely on different forms of bargaining, negotiation and 
interaction than the core policy community. A consensus should hold among the 
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members of the alternative policy community with regard to policy principles and 
procedure, but it should be noticeably different to that which holds among 
members of the core policy community. This idea of competing consensuses is 
important not only in differentiating the core and alternative policy communities, 
but also their political tactics. The battle to frame and reframe policy is a key 
characteristic of adversarial policy communities found in Dudley and Richardson 
(1996; 2004, pp. 28-30). 
 
Table 2.3.: Adapting the Daugbjerg Typology for Adversarial Policy 
Communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Alternative Policy 
Community 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Very limited number of 
members, mostly different to 
the core policy community. 
Narrow, alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Integration Integrated into the dominant 
body for policy development 
at any specific point. 
Bargaining and negotiation. 
Frequent interaction. 
Bargaining and negotiation – 
of an alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. Frequent 
interaction. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures to 
approach policy problems. 
An alternative consensus on 
policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
 
As outlined in table 2.3. two other dimensions of adversarial communities can help 
to distinguish this form of group politics from the traditional policy community 
approach. The first is what Dudley and Richardson (1996) refer to as a dialogue of 
the deaf. Protective of its privileged position in policymaking and possessed of 
differing beliefs and values, core policy communities are reluctant to give members 
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of alternative policy communities access or to engage in direct forms of 
deliberation and negotiation over policy – exclusivity on the apparent dominant 
route is a highly important component. This leads to the second dimension of the 
approach, which is that the rival policy communities, because the potential for 
dialogue is so limited, tend to seek out alternative arenas that can affect or resist 
policy change. Dudley and Richardson (1996) give the example of the European 
Union as one such alternative community, which allowed environmental policy 
community to push its agenda in Brussels in ways that fostered policy change in 
the UK. More widely this could include different approaches such as consultations 
or devolved government. There is also the dimension that an alternative 
community will move to behave like the core, indeed become the core, if it 
achieves the ambition to be dominant over an issue – in effect the alternative 
community exists to become the core – and a core can become an alternative. This 
is usually apparent when policy transformation is happening or has happened – 
incrementalism to an extent is an indication of policy community stability and the 
maintenance of the core policy community – yet by seeking to find attempted 
challenges or failed attempts to change policy direction an alternative policy 
community can be found.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
In Governing under Pressure, Richardson and Jordan (1979) sought to theorise a 
British, consensual style of policy development. Their approach of policy 
communities faced criticism for struggling to explain periods of radicalism in 
British politics and attempts to embed it within the wider policy network 
literature.  Having initially sought to update their approach (Jordan & Richardson, 
1983), the originators of the traditional policy community approach took divergent 
paths. Jordan cast doubt on the utility of policy communities approach following 
criticisms from Dowding (1995) while Dudley and Richardson (1996) reworked it 
through his adversarial policy community approach. The traditional policy 
community approach has been subject to considerable criticism, yet it has 
persisted. There are not bountiful policy community examples, Grant (2005b, p. 
304) argues, but, ‘the reason for this is that the concept is not so much vague, but is 
trying to capture a phenomenon that has fairly blurred edges.’ This thesis asks 
whether the governance of UK alcohol policy can be understood as a traditional 
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policy community or a site of contestation between adversarial policy 
communities. The work by Daugbjerg (1998) operationalising the traditional 
policy communities is extended to the adversarial approach. Taking this approach 
across three dimensions that allow us to consider whether a policy community 
exists it also allows for comparisons to understand the comparative influence of 
each policy community. These dimensions – membership, integration and 
institutionalism all have features that collectively allow for the identification of a 
policy community – whether this is a traditional, core or alternative community. 
 
The small and tight membership representing a defined set of interests, the 
negotiated settlements found within an integrated system and their almost 
institutional status within the system of government. These can be assessed and 
judged, whilst measurement may be difficult, it can be scaled partially by the level 
of decision made. This has been demonstrated to be a stable approach to 
operationalising the traditional policy community approach to make an 
assessment, whilst allowing for elements of the blurriness key, firm features that 
describe the traditional policy community can be found.  At the same time, there 
are fewer examples for a comparative analysis of adversarial policy communities. 
Whilst in the traditional approach the option for a group on the outside of a 
community was to seek membership or seek to bring down the community, the 
adversarial approach indicates an environment for more favourable alternate 
policy communities to be developed and then seek to seize the issue. To an extent, 
ownership of a policy issue is not an essential requirement for the development of 
a policy community, only needing the potential to somehow gain access. It is 
definitively harder to find a policy community that does not have influence or has 
limited influence. By using the methods of Grant (2005a) with an expanding 
typology based on Daugbjerg (1998) and including the fundamental elements of 
the adversarial approach a workable device for analysis is available. Whether a 
traditional or adversarial approach of policy communities exists requires a greater 
consideration of policy construction over a sustained window of development. 
Identifiable items that indicate a shift from one policy community to another start 
primarily with a policy shift that goes beyond incremental change – often this will 
come alongside a shift in government department control – a transformative policy 
causing ruptures.  There are certainly limitations to these approaches, with the 
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differing nature of groups, departments and how policy is implemented having a 
dramatic effect on how close to an archetype an example of policy development 
can be. By seeking to understand whether a traditional or adversarial policy 
community environment provides an improved approach understand how alcohol 
policy developed, and at the same time analysing what methods can be applied to 
seeking to understand if policy community structure played a role in the policy 
outcomes. This chapter has assisted in provided an operationalised variant of both 
policy communities approaches. Across the four case studies covered in the next 
chapters it will enable both a tool to study alcohol policy development and an 
understanding as to whether, the policy communities approach explains the 
outcomes of alcohol policy, or instead does not. The key elements are maintained 
across these types and styles – a limited membership of narrow interests, an 
environment of bargaining and negotiation, and consensus on the policy 
challenges alongside the viable policy tools available to meet them. 
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Chapter 3 
The development of Licensing Acts 
Comparisons and contrasts between 1964 and 2003 
‘As one advances in political sophistication one soon learns that one should never 
raise in this House any question to do with the licensing laws, the licensing laws being 
regarded as sacrosanct and as the untouchable class among Acts of Parliament.’  
Lord Balniel (HC Deb, 1959-60a) 
 
The licensing of the sale of alcohol has been a feature of British society for over 
700 years. Whilst arguments exist over the first introduction of alcohol licensing it 
is most commonly cited as the Vagrants and Vagabonds Act of 1494 (Light, 2005, p. 
268; Schofield, 2002, p. 864), with the act’s title making clear the target audience.  
As time progressed the ‘Gin Lane’ and ‘Beer Street’ works of Hogarth made their 
mark on influencing public policy development, with a fairly direct path to the 
temperance movement that peaked in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. New 
Licensing Acts came quite frequently in this period, generally amending small 
elements without a holistic view of licensing structure.  This rapid fire allowed a 
mismatch of idiosyncrasies with new laws meant to strengthen licensing 
occasionally doing the opposite – such as when an 1872 law that sought to move 
the legal drinking age to 13, managed to remove prior provisions that made it 
illegal for an under 16 to purchase spirits. By the 20th century acts such as the 
Intoxicating Liquors (Sale to Children) Act 1901 which made it illegal to purchase 
alcohol under the age of 14 marking the first, clear step in this programme of 
which the final notable example was the Intoxicating Liquor (Sale to Persons 
Under Eighteen) Act 1923 which raised the purchase age to 18, although still 16 
with a meal. This mismatch was seen, by the late 1950s, of being in need of reform 
– something that was argued in the manifestoes of both the Conservative Party 
(1959) who argued for a revision of the laws that were, ‘at present so full of 
anomalies’, and Labour Party (1959) which called for a full Royal Commission on 
licensing. To achieve more clarity and appropriateness with the licensing system 
much debate and considerable consultation followed before being brought into 
legislative context with the quite comprehensive Licensing Act 1964.  Just over 
thirty years later, and again a political audience was questioning an aged system of 
licensing, full of apparent idiosyncrasies unsuitable for the 21st century – for 
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example, ‘in 1998, Home Office minister George Howarth said that New Labour 
intended to ‘blow away the cobwebs in British life’ by transforming alcohol 
licensing’, (Nicholls, 2012b, p. 252). Once more the political practicalities and 
difficulties took time to be overcome, much debate and considerable consultation 
took place before the Licensing Act 2003 was developed – another attempt at 
comprehensive reform.  
 
This chapter seeks to understand the process of development for these two key 
pieces of licensing legislation, how groups participated in their development, the 
structure of this consultation and the effects this framework of consultation had on 
the subsequent legislation.  It will consider the role played by policy communities 
in determining the outcomes of the Licensing Acts of 1964 and 2003, whilst 
reflecting whether this is better explained by the traditional or adversarial policy 
community approach. In terms of group interests they can generally be grouped 
into alcohol retailers and producers; the regulators such as the Magistrates 
Association and Local Government Association; and what transitioned from the 
social interests of the temperance groups (which was composed of many smaller 
groups, but had levels of national organisation) to the medical interest groups that 
included professional groups such as the British Medical Association but also the 
prominent Institute of Alcohol Studies – which as Greenaway (2003, p. 176) notes 
is an almost direct successor of the earlier temperance groups. 
 
In broader terms, this chapter will seek to understand the influence the alcohol 
sector had the developments of licensing policy, during both time periods. It will 
also look at how that influence was demonstrated and felt – as noted considering 
both policy community approaches whilst also seeking evidence for the 
considerations raised by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Dahl (1958) beyond the 
policy community approach. In effect, it is looking for those who benefit from the 
system of policy development, whether it is access or agenda setting, and those 
whose influence is felt when the key decisions are made. To allow for this analysis, 
it considers the negotiations that took place between the participants and the 
effective status of the respective group. This is not only a question of access to the 
civil servants who were tasked with developing the detail of the licensing policy, 
but how in all circumstances they sought to influence the framing of the policy 
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challenge. It will seek to understand what, if any, privilege of access was offered to 
other participants such as the public health groups as well as secondary alcohol 
industry organisations and regulatory bodies such as the Magistrates Association 
and the Local Government Association. Alongside this it will seek to test the 
respective groups own expectations for influence and the reality of their policy 
impact – as well as the changes in this as government policy direction or desire 
changes. Taking these various strands of influence, the chapter will seek to better 
understand the role played by groups in the development of licensing policy. This 
will be used, alongside the policy community approach, to facilitate a consideration 
of influence within licensing policy and consider whether the alcohol sector does 
indeed dominate. 
 
The first section of this chapter will look at the period that led up to the enactment 
of the Licensing Act 1964, an Act which apart from minor variation developed a 
settled licensing structure that lasted until the early 21st century. This section will 
consider the role played by policy communities by looking to understand how 
groups sought to influence the early process, what structures of consultation were 
in existence and how decisions were made.  The second section will look at the 
period that led to the Licensing Act 2003, the first full-scale review of British 
alcohol licensing since 1964. Similarly, it will seek to understand the role played by 
policy communities – both looking for similarities to the process up to the previous 
Act and the changes in structure in this circumstance. By having a set point to 
compare to, it gives an opportunity to carefully consider whether the adversarial 
policy community approach applies and what this can tell us about policy 
development on licensing. Following this, the final section will consider the 
approach to licensing in Scotland where they have similar rules, but with a 
separate public health objective. It will seek to consider elements of territorial 
policy communities, but in the context of an adversarial policy community 
effectively venue shopping for a set objective.  The conclusion will seek to 
understand the differences in policy development; the role played by policy 
communities and whether an adversarial policy community approach offers an 
improved narrative for the development of licensing policy in the United Kingdom. 
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3.1. The build-up to the Licensing Act 1964  
The Licensing Act 1964 removed all previous alcohol licensing regulation and 
replaced it with a new system. This new system saw extended hours of operation 
for public houses and restaurants, which now facilitated the potential for alcohol 
to be served throughout lunch and removed elements of late afternoon closing. It 
also standardised the end of serving time at 10.30pm for public houses, with a set 
drinking up period and a 2.30am late night licence. Licensing was now under the 
full consideration of magistrates and the previous Licensing Boards, which could 
close and compensate a public house without evidence of misbehaviour, were 
removed. This was a significant change given that Britain’s licensing system had 
stayed fairly consistent since the 1920s barring some minor changes in the 
Licensing Act 1953. This highly regulated system was designed in a period where 
the temperance movement was at its greatest strength, with proposals that 
empowered local bodies, restricted access and gave the ability for public houses to 
be closed, with compensation, at the point of renewal of licence if local justices 
decided against renewing a licence. In the range of tens of thousands of public 
houses closed through this period as alcohol availability was reduced (Sheen, 
2014). By the 1950s the position of public houses, off-licences and the temperance 
movement in British social consciousness had changed dramatically. The Licensing 
Act 1953 created three categories of licence – the Restaurant Licence, the 
Residential Licence and the Occasional Licence – showing some differentiation and 
recognition of a change in the retailing of alcohol. These relatively limited 
developments were nevertheless a progression towards a more liberal regime, 
which were opposed by the temperance movement. The evidence suggests that the 
leading alcohol producers and retailers, led by the Brewers’ Society were pushing 
for change and had parliamentary influence through the infamous brewing lobby. 
There was clearly pressure being exerted by groups, although no political party 
had sought to dramatically reform the system or seen this as an item of the 
electorate in the terms of making a manifesto commitment. This was to change in 
the 1959 election and set in place the process of review.  These proposals were 
staged in two sections, the first under the Licensing Act 1961, which was another 
modest set of amendments, with a comparatively radical restructure in the 
Licensing Act 1964. The staging of the Acts is also worth considering – there were 
dual objectives – tidying up the somewhat malformed existing provisions whilst 
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also liberalising the system – that complicated the challenge as one often 
complicated the other. This section will set out the background, practical 
development and consultative relationships in the development of this piece of 
legislation, whilst seeking to understand the role of policy communities in these 
developments.  
 
As pressure built from interest groups, which slowly fed into the wider public 
consciousness that the licensing regime was not fit for the modern British society 
and tastes – with coverage for example of the inability to have wine with lunch - 
ahead of the 1959 general election both the Conservative and Labour parties made 
proposals for reviews of the licensing regime, without specific commitments to 
inclusions in any proposed legislation. The Conservative Party manifesto opined 
that; ‘We believe that it is by emphasis on the home, enlargement of educational 
opportunity, development of services for youth and a spread of the responsibilities 
of property that national character can be strengthened and moral standards 
upheld. In addition, we shall revise some of our social laws, for example those 
relating to betting and gaming and to clubs and licensing, which are at present full 
of anomalies and lead to abuse and even corruption,’ (Conservative Party, 1959). 
Meanwhile the Labour Party in the leisure section of the manifesto proposed, ‘A 
Royal Commission will be set up to review and recommend changes in the 
licensing laws,’ (Labour Party, 1959). The Conservative election victory was 
followed up in the debate following the Queen’s Speech of 1959 where the Home 
Secretary, Rab Butler MP, made clear that a new Licensing Bill was under 
consideration. This was expanded upon with comments made in a parliamentary 
debate of January 1960 when he both outlined the headline focus of the proposals 
and stated, ‘I have authorised the Home Office to circulate some tentative 
proposals to club and licensed trade associations and other interested bodies.’ (HC 
Deb, 1959-60d vol. 616 col. 561).  These initial proposals from the Government, 
the least controversial of which would appear in the Licensing Act 1961, included a 
new category of licences for restaurants, differentiating drinking with a meal and 
without; changes to the permitted hours with proposals for a total permitted nine 
licensing hours and a terminal hour of 11pm; serving of a drink with lunch until 
3.30pm, if a meal was served before 3pm; a proposal for off-licences to be able to 
sell alcohol outside of the permitted hours; allowance for a hotel resident to extend 
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their privilege of buying drinks at any time for their guests; and an extension of 
late-night venue hours to 2.30am across the country.  
 
This commitment to revision of licensing reform had elements of controversy. For 
a considerable time since the First World War the temperance movement had 
successfully sought to apply restrictions and restrict the number of licences 
available (see Greenaway (2003, pp. 91-147)). Inevitably there was likely to be 
multiple interested parties, with greatly contrasting demands. Following the Home 
Secretary’s offer of considering these proposals with interested parties, the Joint 
Under-Secretary of State, one Dennis Vosper MP, was assigned to manage the 
legislation, with the support of a series of civil servants who became increasingly 
important in the process. They set to establish a consultative process with a 
variety of groups and organisations with a keen interest in the sector. The records 
suggest that from an industry perspective the most important participant was the 
Brewers’ Society – they represented the interests not only specifically the 
manufacturers of the major alcohol beverage consumed, but also given that their 
membership were the owners of the majority of public houses in this period 
("Brewing Trade Review," 1964). Other manufacturers included the Retail Wine 
and Spirit Trade Co-ordinating Committee and the Wine and Spirit Association of 
Great Britain. From a retailer point of view, alongside the Brewers’ Society (Home 
Office, 1 December 1960c), the National Federation of Off-Licence Holders 
Associations of England and Wales (Home Office, 1 December 1960b, 24 
September1960), The National Consultative Council of the Retail Liquor Trade, the 
Licensed Victuallers Defence League of England and Wales, the Licensed 
Victuallers Central Protection Fund of London, the British Travel and Holidays 
Association, the Association of London Clubs and the Caterers’ Association of Great 
Britain (Home Office, 7 August 1959a) and the British Hotels and Restaurants 
Association (Home Office, 1 December 1960a), were also involved in the 
consultation.  The Association of Municipal Corporations was a participant 
although exclusively from a planning point of view, not having an interest in the 
more broad licensing changes, the Magistrates’ Association and the Justices’ Clerks’ 
Society (Home Office, 7 August 1959b) participated from a practical point of 
consideration meanwhile the Bow Group fed in from a political point of a view to 
the consultative process.  
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In direct contrast to the industry groups with a commercial and implementation 
interest, there existed a significant block of collected temperance movements 
(Home Office, 24 March 1958, 28 July 1960). These associations had been 
historically very influential in the drafting of policy towards licensing and alcohol, 
indeed Greenaway (2003, pp. 89 - 90) highlights clearly their influence in the 
Licensing Acts of the 1900s that actively restricted the supply of alcohol and added 
the so-called local option which permitted the removal of licensed premises at 
point of renewal of licence – despite being at that stage somewhat divided in 
ambition – prohibition or restriction.  The Home Office records demonstrate that 
these various temperance societies made considerable external noise about the 
proposals for licensing reform, from press commentary to their own publications, 
communications through the church network and various campaign activities. The 
consultation with these groups was, on the face of it, considerable, and there was 
an expectation that their contribution would be closely considered – as their letter 
to the Minister Dennis Vosper MP noted - ‘I should be glad to think that you would 
deem them worthy of consideration, coming from the source they do,’ (The Rt Rev 
the Lord Bishop of Bradford, 27 January 1961). 
 
Whilst arguments persisted from all sides on a variety of issues, there was a 
combination of consensus and political will to progress forward some of the 
proposals relatively rapidly. These emerged as the Licensing Act 1961, which at 
that point expressed the first notable changes in legislation for almost forty years – 
although would be replaced in its entirety by the later reforms. The Act was 
introduced by Dennis Vosper MP who stated that the intended purposes of the Act 
were, ‘first, to revise social legislation in the light of present-day conditions; 
secondly, to achieve a balance between the restraints necessary to prevent abuse 
and the need for freedom in a responsible society; and thirdly, to introduce a Bill to 
suit the general interest and have particular regard to the needs of the consumer’, 
(HC Deb, June 21, 1961). The Act made being served alcoholic drinks in a 
restaurant or hotel considerably easier, standardised the core hours of licensing 
operation, whilst also allowing some local variance of these measures. Of separate 
interest this Act also made some provisions on drink-driving (whilst at this point it 
was an offence to be drunk in charge of a vehicle there was no legal limit on drink-
 66 
driving) with the consistency in hours being argued in part as a discouragement 
from certain drink-drivers going from venue to venue in pursuit of a later service 
time. It is also notable that this Act made it illegal to have a licensed venue on a 
motorway - which was not included in the 1964 Act which repealed the 1961 Act – 
an error which was later repeated and continues to court controversy following 
the opening of the ‘Hope and Champion’ at a service station on the M4 in 2014 with 
press coverage indicating the response being strong and that, ‘public health 
experts and charities say it offers a “deadly temptation” to motorway users’, 
(Withnail, 2014). The third reading of this Act was also notable for the open 
discussion of the influence of interest groups on the development of these 
proposals. Dennis Vosper himself noted that, ‘I think that it is fair to say that the 
consumer has perhaps tended to be under-represented in our deliberations, while 
the demands of particular interests have been, no doubt quite rightly, heavily 
pressed,’ (HC Deb, 1960-61b vol. 642 col. 1558) however of wider interest was a 
debate on the various lobbies involved in the Act’s progress. 
 
Simon Wingfield Digby MP noted that, ‘Reference has been made already to the 
way in which the Bill has evoked very strong religious and moral reactions, in 
particular on the part of what one hon. Member opposite called the "teetotal 
lobby",’ (HC Deb, 1960-61c vol. 642 col. 1574). He further added, ‘I feel that the 
members of what has been called the teetotal lobby have had a bit more than their 
share of influence during the course of our discussions. The very fact that the hon. 
Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher), whom I regard, rightly or wrongly, as 
one of that lobby, likes the Bill as it now stands leads me to believe that, perhaps, a 
rather vocal minority has had more than its share of concessions.’ The existence of 
this lobby was disputed by Glenvill Hall MP, who claimed, ‘Those of us who are 
teetotallers need not be ashamed of it, but so far as I know, there is no teetotal 
lobby. There is in this House a group of over 100 Members, drawn from all sides of 
both Houses, which is interested in temperance legislation.’ The debate over 
whether a lobby existed and who was part of it became quite a flavour in this 
debate. The general negative light that this lobby was termed by MPs on the 
Government benches was of interest. There was a specific interjection from 
Llywelyn Williams MP who added, ‘The hon. Gentleman has referred to the teetotal 
lobby, as he calls it. Has he never heard of the brewers' lobby?’ (HC Deb, 1960-61d 
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vol. 642 col. 1618). In rather amusing fashion the MP in question, William 
Shepherd, agreed that this lobby did exist, but that it itself was against some 
features of this Bill, also looking to in effect manipulate the situation for its 
interests, against the wider public interest. Whilst in Parliament debates were 
being had, civil servants sought to come to agreements with the various groups 
with whom they had been in consultation. They made recommendations to the 
Minister on what elements of the proposed Act he should concede, which he 
should compromise on and where he should stand firm – with an analysis of 
whether the Brewers would use ‘their’ MPs to make amendments on these issues. 
This consideration in general reflected that they would not, nor could they actually 
deliver their MPs in Parliament. To an extent the parliamentary debate over the 
existence of a group of supportive MPs took the focus away from the policy detail – 
instead the debate over influence replaced a debate of policy – the Bill passed and 
became an Act with relatively little parliamentary alteration – apart from that 
which had potentially been agreed already between groups and government.  
 
Even with the passing of the Licensing Act 1961 the consultation with groups did 
not stop, however the breadth of consultation was considerably less. Whilst 
previously the greatest level of direct engagement was with the Brewers’ Society, 
there had been at the very least considerable symbolic time with the temperance 
movement and an appropriate voice to other trade bodies. The longer term 
consultation much more closely focused around practical concerns rather than 
larger scale changes – not that the Licensing Act 1964 did not make these changes 
but instead it seems tacit agreement had been reached on a comparative 
liberalisation of licensing – it was only how it would work that would be the major 
concern. This meant that the Brewers’ Society, and to an extent the British Hotels 
and Restaurants Association, were the key consultative bodies with their collective 
ownership of the tools of implementation. That Magistrates’ concerns had been 
overcome in the Licensing Act 1961 also assisted on this – removing a potentially 
problematic issue that appeared again in the twenty-first century.  The 
comparative consultation was of varied style, length and impact. The archives offer 
series of letters, minutes and private notes that indicate that many sought 
engagement. To look first at the temperance movement, their involvement 
surrounded firstly a series of letters, making observations on the proposals and 
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individual issues – much like a consultation response of the modern era. A 
ministerial level meeting was organised, with representatives from a half-dozen 
temperance movements such as The Temperance Council of the Christian 
Churches – with the meeting coordinated through the National United Temperance 
Council who outlined in more detail their concerns in a full meeting with Dennis 
Vosper (Home Office, 20 September 1960). This was followed up with examples of 
campaign materials, some polling they organised and various letters indicating 
their gratitude for the meeting. Yet there was no grand follow-up, no further 
briefing for the department or minister, and certainly no direct policy shift. Other 
alcohol groups had similar meetings, whether they were representatives of wine or 
licensees, they would get a meeting, some letters and then, on occasion, a minor 
amendment. The Magistrates’ Association received more of a targeted response, no 
ministerial meeting, but they did see their suggested drafts of amendments 
considered with most accepted such as the suggestions made in a letter from the 
secretary J. F. Madden (27 March 1961) made to the Home Office’s senior civil 
servant. The Brewers’ Society had a different position. Whilst they received only a 
singular full ministerial level meeting like the others, they enjoyed other meetings 
with their own policy group leaders with specific civil servants. This was followed 
by a range of correspondence, back and forth on specific wording on various 
elements – usually surrounding implementation. Offering a clearer picture of the 
Home Office position is this line from an internal Home Office memo discussing the 
Brewers’ Society’s suggestions, which outlines the opinion of the Minister: ‘he also 
thinks we should be sympathetically disposed to any suggestions for “technical” 
amendments,’ (H. Division, 3 January 1961).  There is a distinct similarity to what 
M. J. Smith (1992, p. 29) described as a, ‘shadow commodity structure’, in the 
development of policy – where policy design was created for the benefit of almost 
equal partners.  Yet, not all were equal partners, some did not have access to this 
area of policy, indicating elements of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962, p. 952) second 
face of power and the restrictions placed on policy development – it was for the 
discussion of some groups, not all, with the temperance groups definitively 
excluded. On this consideration, amendments were suggested by all groups, with 
certain groups having a very specific level of influence on certain items – the 
influence of the British Hotels and Restaurants Association’s (Home Office, 1 
December 1960a) direct members interest in facilitating lunchtime drinking being 
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a prime example. Off-licence representatives had a considerable influence in this 
area of licensing, with a certain level of consultation for other alcohol bodies on 
wider issues.  On wider, broader, issues only one group had consistent 
conversation and that was the Brewers’ Society (Home Office, 1 December 1960c). 
Various references were made to their variety of technical committee Chairman 
and line-by-line issues. Compromises were usually reached with ‘acceptability’ 
being a key concept that is found throughout the archives. There was also a 
consideration that this is not the only channel for the Brewers’ Society – that there 
was a ‘brewing lobby’ of MPs who were apparently willing and able to put further 
amendments down beyond concessions from the Home Office. An important 
government briefing note (J. Griffiths, Roberts, & Parker, 28 February 1961), 
outlines the recommendations on what amendments should be resisted, which 
accepted and those that will inevitably have to be debated throughout the 
legislative development anyway.  Within this note are interesting points on the 
interaction between groups and government – on one amendment it is noted that, 
‘The government would take this over’, on another that the amendment was, ‘To be 
run by a brewers’ backbencher’, and indeed that one was, ‘for the brewers to run, 
preferably through a non-brewers’ spokesman on the committee’ (J. Griffiths, 
Roberts, & Parker, 28 February 1961). Within this note a lobby was acknowledged, 
that had influence, but the expectation was that government could overcome or 
should at least attempt to – and the group had further opportunities to argue their 
case or manage it with apparent disinterest from the government. 
 
The product of this consultation was a new Act that swept away all before it – 
repealing all prior licensing legislation. This clean piece of legislation set a 
framework that would last for decades – despite it in many ways not fully meeting 
the expectations or hopes of anyone involved. The guiding principles of the Act, 
with generally standardised hours, drinking up time, the role of the licensee and 
the magistrates’ role in granting a licence remained for the most part untouched, 
they had consented and compromised on all other areas in exchange for that 
retained influence. However, there was some clearing up that needed to happen. 
The sweeping away of all before inevitably left gaps, issues that were not picked up 
at the time of passing the legislation – or tellingly ignored. An interesting feature 
was the Compensation Levy funds – where a solution to public funds existing 
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without anything agreed to spend them on was only finalised several years later to 
an anomaly. The new Act was certainly contentious with the temperance 
movement and other advocates against the extension of licensing hours. There was 
some backlash, however the health and alcohol arguments, alongside drink-driving 
and other factors were not yet established in the public consciousness. 
Nevertheless, the changes post this point were incremental and gradual - with a 
modest extension to opening hours – up to 11pm - and the slight liberalisation of a 
minor feature occasionally appearing. The common factor to these changes was a 
close consultative environment with the licensed trade and the supportive consent 
of the Magistrates’ Association as the interpreters of the law. 
  
Table 3.1. The policy communities surrounding the development of the 
Licensing Act 1964 to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy Communities Alcohol producers, Magistrates’ 
Association and retailers 
Membership Very limited number 
of members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Brewers’ Society, hotel and 
restaurants, with some additional 
producers and retailers. 
Magistrates’ Association a willing 
participant in the two-sided 
(regulator/regulated) 
implementation of licensing policy. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Clear examples of bargaining and 
negotiation with membership. 
Regular interaction, with back and 
forth exchange of letters – 
coordinated tactics for the 
legislative process. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Recognition that liberalisation is 
desirable and ‘modernisation’ the 
focus. Whilst the brewers’ apparent 
lobby was something that created a 
concern within the legislative 
arena, in reality acceptance of a 
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negotiated approach for the general 
development of policy. 
 
The historical evidence thus indicates on a prima facie basis there was a level of 
access afforded to a wide range of groups with an interest in alcohol policy. This 
access was at a relatively high level – with some of the key civil servants and the 
lead Minister present at meetings with organisations representing a variety of the 
perspectives on the policy. There was clearly a historic temperance movement in 
the United Kingdom, which had from the 19th century influenced policy towards 
alcohol and had appeared to secure strong relationships.  They also had an 
expectation to be inside the tent, influencing policy.  Yet by the early 1960s the 
public sentiment had shifted – Hogarth-style imagery and preachers on street 
corners proclaiming its evils no longer dominated alcohol. There is evidence of 
drip feeding from groups surrounding alcohol-producers towards a more liberal 
policy – and that both major parties felt able to put statements in their respective 
manifesto calling for licensing changes indicates that if there was a general public 
interest in alcohol licensing it was passive and not against reform. That there was 
not an exact interpretation of an appropriate end position could account for the 
comparatively radical shift in policy, yet this was also a progressive, gradual shift. 
It moved away from the previous consensus position, but not in a manner that 
dramatically affected the operations of the major alcohol producer and retailer 
interests – it may have been a friendlier climate but certainly no easy ride. Seeking 
to understand the policy environment that facilitated this outcome is worth 
consideration in the policy community approach context. In table 3.1., when 
contemplating whether a traditional policy community approach could assist in 
explaining this policy development, the apparent very narrow membership, closed 
to groups who were not supportive of the policy goals, or at the very least would 
negotiate or compromise in line with the key principles to an extent greatly fulfils 
this dimension. It is clear from this relationship is that the central, and closest, 
participant from a group perspective was the Brewers’ Society. They clearly had 
respected influence, negotiated wording, were acknowledged in having their own 
supportive Members of Parliament that allowed for an almost joint legislative 
approach with the government, and are noted as the primary representative 
bodies for public houses that represented the majority of licences in existence at 
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this point. They were very much insiders, clearly consulted, very much able to 
influence and with an indications of a traditional policy community being able to 
deliver their members support for the policy. Whilst a somewhat crude 
assumption, that the most significant attention was focused on one body can be 
found in the volume of paperwork – that two separate archive files exist for the 
Brewers’ Society on their own, compared to a collective five for all other alcohol, 
retail and temperance bodies shows their significance. Beyond this simple 
measure further detail of the consultation, the amendments and the final Act all 
typify that the key partner for the development of this legislation was indeed the 
Brewers’ Society – they were almost a wing of the government’s own policy 
development. They were not alone in influence - the other powerful participants 
were the specialist associations, the economic and professional groups – who all 
provided an element of licensing policy that the Brewers’ Society could not – 
technical, enforcement or elements of the restaurant trade. This type of 
relationship shares many similarities to M. J. Smith (1992) work on the agricultural 
policy community – there is a central, key trade group (in this case the National 
Farmers’ Union), accompanied on an issue by issue basis by smaller groups with 
more specialist knowledge. Beyond this the other outside, non-professional 
groups, whilst getting the occasional audience had no serious bearing on the final 
outcome if another group had a clear interest. The Magistrates’ Association 
completed the groups – the regulator and regulated both having a key role in 
developing the policy they would collectively implement. After the Brewers’ 
Society they were the next most central group – arguably they had a position of 
equal weight, but they had an area which required less legislative scrutiny. When 
considering the traditional policy community approach, and the Daugbjerg (1998) 
typology, this seems to be a very close fit, almost a prime case study. On the key 
characteristics, it fits extremely well and could be considered, in isolation, a strong 
example for inclusion in the original Richardson and Jordan (1979) case studies – 
with their approach offering a practical narrative explanation of the development 
of the Licensing Act 1964. In isolation this fits well, although when more widely 
contextualising it does require excluding elements of the opposition to the policy 
development within licensing and the change in policy direction that preceded this 
act. 
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Table 3.2.: The policy communities surrounding the development of the 
Licensing Act 1964 compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for 
adversarial policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Alcohol producers, Magistrates 
‘Association and key others 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range 
of interests represented. 
Brewers’ Society, hotel and 
restaurants, with some 
additional producers and 
retailers. Magistrates’ 
Association a willing participant 
in the two-sided 
(regulator/regulated) 
implementation of licensing 
policy. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Clear examples of bargaining and 
negotiation with membership. 
Regular interaction, with back 
and forth exchange of letters – 
coordinated tactics for the 
legislative process. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Recognition that liberalisation is 
desirable and ‘modernisation’ 
the focus. Whilst the brewers’ 
apparent lobby a concern that 
could go into the legislative 
arena, in reality acceptance of a 
negotiated approach for the 
general development of policy. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Temperance representatives 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly 
different to the core 
policy community. 
Considerable number of regional 
associations with two or three 
major groups. All have similar 
interests in preventing the 
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Narrow, alternative range 
of interests represented. 
availability, and consumption, of 
alcohol. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation – of an 
alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Interaction was frequent and 
attempts were made at 
bargaining – but no clear 
alternative venue for policy 
development. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – 
with potential use of 
alternative procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Supportive of current licensing 
principles (arguments for them 
to be strengthened rather than 
removed) and against the 
increasing availability of alcohol. 
Supportive representatives in the 
Houses of Parliament. 
 
Within the core community, as outlined in table 3.2., the outcomes were negotiated 
as equal partners and to an agreed policy programme. The closeness, access and 
acceptance of expertise on exact policy detail from those in the alcohol producer 
and retailer groups by the Home Office, led to policy design that met industry 
requirements. There is clear evidence both in the consultations and the actual 
legislative outcome for this.  Beyond this core community, when seeking to 
understand policy communities found around the 1964 Act, we can at first identify 
that there is evidence of groups, primarily focused around the temperance 
movement, with very different desired outcomes seeking to influence policy 
development. These groups had historically made large levels of external noise 
through their campaign work and had access in developing policy. Yet throughout 
the development of this legislation, they sat outside of the core policy community, 
in what by considering table 3.2., we can examine whether there is an alternative 
policy community. They received access, but had no mutuality with the 
government in this area in terms of desired policy goals – this was a period of 
liberalisation, but these groups were making an argument for continued 
restriction.  There was no symbiotic relationship of policy development, with 
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feedback on policies one way – critique from the temperance groups, but no 
response as such from the government. For all their noise, and no desire to cause 
displeasure towards these groups from the government, these groups simply did 
not have any real influence on the policy process or outcomes – they did not get 
what they wanted in any significant way.  There may have also been another 
alternate community, which includes some of the smaller industry groups that had 
a more focused area on which their input was welcome – off-licences and dining 
groups for example. If their suggestions, or amendments, clashed with the core 
community’s interests then this became an area where negotiated outcomes were 
pushed up to the core – with the outcomes decided outside their sphere of 
influence. In seeking to find a major alternative community, reflecting the 
temperance movement’s groups and interests, at the very least it saw less of an 
ability to influence, negotiate or bargain. Overall, seeking evidence of an 
adversarial policy community environment, the lack of a clear alternative venue 
for the temperance movement means this remained an imperfect approach – 
although their attempts to engage with the Home Office and influence indicate they 
were at the very least venue seeking.  
 
When seeking a comparison between the approaches, the traditional style explains 
the development effectively, but not conclusively. The adversarial approach 
demonstrates that if there was a desire for alternative community inhabited by the 
temperance groups, but at the very least it was underdeveloped without a clear 
venue. Reasons for this are unclear, but a credible understanding can be 
considered if we note that these temperance groups formerly were the 
membership of the core policy community – if we were to trace the case study back 
to the last major reforms before this we may find the situation reversed on 
membership of the core and alternative.  This is not something where a clear 
assumption can be made – outcomes and behaviours would make a compelling 
argument for it as an explanatory device for the lack of a clear alternative policy 
community – yet the historic evidence is in itself unclear.  When examining the 
Licensing Act 1902, Greenaway (2003, p. 77) argued that, ‘reform was introduced 
despite, rather than because of, the work of temperance pressure groups’. They 
were agitators, but had not necessarily reached the closer relationship of a core 
policy community. There is also the question of the manifesto commitments that 
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were made ahead of the consideration of reform, which can be argued to create a 
democratic mandate for the changes. Evidence suggests that these commitments 
had followed pressure that groups had been putting forward, which challenged the 
status quo on existing policy. Whilst incremental reform had taken place before 
this, there were clear indications that something more radical was being 
demanded – whether this was a challenge from an existing policy community or an 
alternative policy community making a challenge to the core is slightly unclear – 
yet as they moved on to a consultative stage the membership of the core or 
traditional policy community became very evident. 
 
Changes to the licensing system are infrequent and often technical in their nature. 
The framework to this new Act was designed in a way, almost by intention, that in 
the future tinkering and minor changes were not only possible they were 
preferable to wholesale change. Whether this was a policy framework deliberately 
designed for a policy community to operate within is uncertain but certainly it was 
beneficial – whether we consider it fits better within a traditional or adversarial 
approach. That the Licensing Act 1964, with only incremental changes, persisted 
for almost forty years offers opportunities for consideration. As Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992a, pp. 262-263), tell us that policy communities, ‘foster incremental changes, 
thereby favouring the status quo or the existing balance of interests in the 
network’.  That this continuity is observed, could the core policy community have 
persisted and influenced the long-term development of policy in licensing? The 
evidence that a stable policy community was in existence is compelling from the 
activity, changes and consistency. In seeking to further consider whether this in 
itself is best explained by a traditional or adversarial policy community approach it 
is somewhat restricted by the reality that alternative policy communities might 
have developed without any actual visible policy development. In considering the 
next major licensing change we have an opportunity to observe whether there is 
evidence of attempts to shift policy and whether there is actual success for an 
alternative community. 
 
3.2. The development of the Licensing Act 2003 
The legacy of the Licensing Act 1964 was a long one. This is not to say that there 
were not attempts for licensing reform and change. The Erroll Report (Erroll, 
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1972), from the Departmental Committee on Liquor Licensing, was published in 
December 1972. It included, ‘suggestions that justices should have their power to 
refuse new licences much curtailed; that the legal drinking age should be lowered; 
that children should more easily be allowed with their parents into public drinking 
places; that alcohol should be on sale in more and different kinds of premises (with 
a view towards establishing a Continental style of cafe pub); and that licensing 
hours should be extended,’ ("Liquor Licensing And Public Health," 1976, p. 359). 
These proposals, most of which never came into force – one element can be found 
in the Licensing (Amendment) Act 1976 which gave bars the same discretion on 
extending hours for special events as other licensed venues and came only from a 
Private Members Bill - can be argued to have come into consideration by the 21st 
century reviews. Whilst further minor amendments on slight extensions on 
opening hours took place, there was no single substantive piece of legislation that 
sought to redefine the licensing system for some 39 years. New phenomenon had 
appeared in this period, with a considerable increase in late-night venues as they 
gradually took advantage of the options in the 1964 Act, these being especially 
focused in city centres focused on the developing nightclub scene and the birth of 
the gastro-pub focused on food as its primary income source – known as dry-led 
pubs rather than there wet-led comparators focused on drink sales.  The brewers’ 
hold on public houses had been mostly broken by the Beer Orders (made up from 
‘The Supply of Beer (Tied Estate) Order 1989’ and ‘The Supply of Beer (Loan Ties, 
Licensed Premises and Wholesale Prices) Order 1989’), with the birth of the pub 
company or ‘pubco’ who owned large swathes of public houses with a restrictive 
supply tie but had teamed up with the brewers in an expanded British Beer & Pub 
Association (the evolved Brewers’ Society, which at the beginning of the process 
was known as the Brewers & Licensed Retailers Association). The sales in the off-
trade, a comparatively minor feature of the prior consultation, had now become a 
major factor with equitable sales to the on-trade.  
 
Starting in the House of Lords and following a long process the Licensing Act 
received Royal Assent in 2003. Further challenges, mainly disputes between the 
Home Office and Department for Culture, Media & Sport, delayed implementation 
until November 2005, much later than the original planned date of July 2004 and 
after another General Election. The Act may have been the representation that as 
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an industry, alcohol’s influence in Government may have peaked. The close 
relationship that will be outlined in this section, which began before formal 
consultations began, produced a Licensing Act with much of what they were after. 
Whilst some was modest modernisation, some radical, it found a negative media 
narrative – completely opposite to Labour’s positive pre-2001 election position. 
The alcohol lobby may have won a battle, but it certainly started a war. One highly 
notable difference to the Licensing Act 1964 was the policy framework and style 
that existed post the changes. Whilst the Licensing Act 1964 came into effect 
relatively quickly – a modernisation of an existing structure certainly but a similar 
structure remained – the Licensing Act 2003 saw its implementation delayed as 
new bodies and organisations formed to manage the new environment. Previously 
groups could argue about the hours that were right for licensed facilities it was 
agreed that some hours were inappropriate, even if there was no agreement on 
which. This no longer existed – all business types could make their case if they so 
desired for up to twenty-four hour opening (though the vast majority did not).  
Magistrates who had previously had much power over licensing now found their 
roles handed over to local authority licensing committees – who actually had less 
authority to reject licences, yet more public reaction when they did not. These 
authorities that had in the consultation been advocates for liberalisation now had 
the responsibility for it and would not necessarily enjoy it.  Many more similar 
examples can be found in this piece of legislation – more groups suddenly had an 
interest. Alcohol availability that had become an issue of interest mainly to 
industry with campaign groups on the decline would go on to see this position 
reversed. It is fair to say not all of this was directly correlated to the new Licensing 
Act, but it was a key focus. 
 
A new consultation process began in the early 21st century that would lead to a 
new Licensing Act that again redefined the nation’s licensing system. The origin of 
the narrative that the Licensing Act 1964 had become outdated was certainly part 
of the political consciousness when the Government published a new White Paper, 
‘Time for Reform: Proposals for the Modernisation of our Licensing Laws.’ In his 
foreword, Jack Straw, then the Home Secretary, highlighted that, ‘We now need 
modern laws to deal with that very old problem,’ and later added that, ‘the time 
has come to develop a better system,’ (Home Office, 2000, p. 5). Baggott (2010, p. 
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137) summarises the proposals as ‘This new system aimed to clarify the purposes 
of alcohol licensing, transfer responsibilities from licensing justices to local 
authorities, and separate the licensing of premises serving alcohol from the 
licensing of persons responsible for them. It also sought to introduce clearer 
standards for the operation of premises and explicit criteria to guide the granting, 
refusal and revocation of licences, give additional powers for police to close down 
disorderly premises, clarify legal restrictions on alcohol sales to minors and allow 
premises to apply for longer opening hours, including 24-hour opening.’ The 
proposals in the White Paper had seen consultation with a wide array of interest 
groups before their publication. They acknowledge, ‘the All-Party Parliamentary 
Beer Group, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Magistrates’ Association, 
the Better Regulation Task Force, Alcohol Concern, the Portman Group, the 
Federation of Licensed Victuallers’ Associations, the Committee of Registered 
Clubs Associations and the leisure and hospitality industry itself,’ (Home Office, 
2000, p. 7). This consultation secured a considerable level of interest, with more 
than 1,200 responses, yet this led to comparatively minor amendments to the 
proposals. The issues appeared to come to fruition in June 2001, when in a 
response to a question from John Grogan, then Chairman of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Beer Group, Mike O’Brien, then the Minister responsible said, ‘We 
have concluded that they confirm the case for comprehensive modernisation of the 
alcohol and entertainment licensing laws in England and Wales. They show that 
the White Paper proposals represent a sound basis for legislation and strike the 
right overall balance between the needs of business, the enlargement of consumer 
choice, and the interests of local residents,’ (HC Deb, 2000-01 vol. 367 col. 683). 
There was some debate still to be had on both the final licensing authority (local 
councils or magistrates’ courts) and the actual hours licensable, but headline 
principles had been set. On some issues there was consensus across proponents 
for and against the industry with the Institute of Alcohol Studies (2000) adding, 
‘We accept that the present licensing laws are outdated, overly complex and 
cumbersome and therefore in need of modernisation. We support, wholly or in 
part, some of the main proposals for change in regard to simplifying the licensing 
system, transferring responsibility for licensing matters to local authorities and 
strengthening the law on underage drinking.’ Despite many areas with consensus 
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and a Minister apparently eager to act, there was an election just around the 
corner and momentum appeared to be lost, in public at least. 
 
Similarly, to the earlier Act, the Licensing Act 2003 can find acknowledgement that 
the policy environment was turning in a more favourable direction for reform 
within a political manifesto. The manifesto stated, ‘We will tackle alcohol-related 
disorder, with an overhaul of licensing laws, greater flexibility over opening times, 
and tougher controls on rogue landlords,’ (Labour Party, 2001, p. 32) though not 
much more was added. At this point it was themed within a wider safer 
community’s narrative – indicative that it was being sold as a crime reduction 
measure. Although lacking the consensus of cross-party appearances it was very 
clear that for the Labour party this was an issue that was a vote winner. Baggott 
(2010, p. 138) noted that, ‘The government as a whole believed that the changes 
had wide public support, especially from younger adults. Indeed, so convinced was 
New Labour, that it sent a text message (‘Cldnt give a XXXX 4 lst ordrs? Vote 
Labour on Thursday 4 extra time’) to young voters prior to the 2001 General 
Election (BBC, 2004)’. Obviously this represented a tactical shift from the 
manifesto’s very crime-focused policy statements – which talked around crimes 
causes and local empowerment, ‘because we know that without tackling the causes 
of crime we will never tackle crime, we will empower local communities by 
combining resources with responsibility’ (Labour Party, 2001). With Labour 
returning to power in the 2001 General Election, accompanied by a manifesto 
commitment and seeming agreement post-election it would have seemed logical 
for rapid progression of new legislation. This did not, however, come to pass and in 
fact authority over licensing policy was transferred from the Home Office to the 
Department for Culture, Media & Sport.  This was a clear ideological shift for 
licensing – from a tool of crime management, to instead one of feature of modern 
cultural Britain. Indeed, ‘this department, which saw increased alcohol availability 
as a means of stimulating the leisure and tourism industries, was a key proponent 
of reform,’ (Baggott, 2010, p. 132). This is a further indication of the restrictive face 
of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 952), as the issue of crime prevention is 
moved off the agenda, no longer a key consideration for policy development. The 
modernisation of licensing had moved rapidly from crime reduction (although this 
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remained in the narrative) to a way to rebuild city centres, boost the night-time 
economy and as a pro-business measure.  
 
In a similar fashion to the 1961 and 1964 Act situation the areas with the most 
support, or maybe the least contention, were put through in an earlier Act.  The 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 included a range of proposals that had seen 
their first airing in the ‘Time for Reform’ White Paper. Of these the most prominent 
was the inclusion of test purchasing, whereby authorities could now send in 
under-age people to attempt to purchase alcohol, an actual responsibility for 
licensees not to sell alcohol to under-18s alongside new authority for the police to 
close down establishments which had significant problems of disorder or noise 
complaints. This left the harder issue, such as hours and the actual licensing 
authority to another debate. It is not unsurprising - Nicholls (2012b, p. 252) notes 
that, ‘From a historical perspective, the transfer of licensing powers from the 
magistracy (where they had sat since 1552) to local authorities was by far the 
most radical proposal. Despite this, however, it was the relaxation of opening 
hours that became the headline provision.’ Therefore, that these measures 
required more Parliamentary time was not unexpected – though as earlier stated 
even groups such as the Institute of Alcohol Studies was not as concerned on the 
issue of local authority oversight. It was more an internal industry dispute with the 
Independent Family Brewers of Britain being the prominent group opposed, 
supported by Tim Martin of JD Wetherspoon. There was certainly disappointment 
with the two-stage approach – Mike O’Brien MP, who as a Home Office Minister 
introduced the White Paper, being a prominent voice in attacking the lack of 
progress. He said that the Government was, ‘breaking a promise to every pub-goer 
in the land’, (A. Smith, 2001) and expressed severe disappointment that proposals 
for licensing reform had been dropped from the Queen’s Speech. An interesting 
feature in the development of the 2003 Act is the leading personnel on the 
industry side and the indications of a potential professionalisation of the lobbying 
system (something which Beer (1956) saw beginning to happen in the 1950s). In 
the 1960s whilst there was a professional secretariat within the Brewers’ Society 
this was aligned with, accredited by Government and industry alike, a Brewers’ 
Lobby of MPs who could be relied on for votes and amendments to the legislation – 
occasionally being indirectly tactically used by the government itself. By the early 
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twenty-first century this lobby had long since passed, being replaced by a different, 
in some ways more American model. For the British Beer & Pub Association this 
focused around their Chief Executive Robert Hayward OBE, a former Conservative 
MP for Kingswood, and now a Conservative Peer, who had already had some 
experience running the British Soft Drinks Association accompanied by a 
Parliamentary pass and contact book could have the conversations necessary with 
MPs across the political spectrum.  Beyond this quite obvious example Dr Martin 
Rawlings, the Pub’s Director at the BBPA, who according to the Association, ‘led for 
the BBPA in steering the industry through the Parliamentary process for the 
Licensing Act 2003’, (British Beer & Pub Association, 2012) also saw reward for his 
efforts, ‘Martin was subsequently awarded an MBE for services to the licensed 
trade’, (British Beer & Pub Association, 2012) with industry media coverage 
indicates that this was specifically for his work on developing the Licensing Act 
2003 (Foottit, 2012). These indications of close, personal relationships between 
government and groups, fit well the approach taken by Richardson and Jordan 
(1979) – the small gaps and close relationships between the governed and 
governors – with strong indications of a clear benefit from past relationships to 
maintaining this institutionalised approach. 
 
Whilst the public facing elements of the new Act’s development can be first found 
in the White Paper, it is unlikely that this was actually the starting point or even 
the initial point where evidence was being gathered, with evidence that became 
apparent in a Select Committee inquiry. The evidence, submitted by the British 
Beer & Pub Association, states that ‘Prior to the publication of the White Paper, the 
BBPA took part in a visit with Home Office officials to gather information on 
licensing regimes’, (Housing Planning Local Government and Regions Committee, 
2003). This at first seems innocuous, with discussions held with, ‘various trade 
bodies, individual operators, police departments and civic authorities’, (Housing 
Planning Local Government and Regions Committee, 2003). When it is later made 
clear that the countries visited included ‘Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Holland and Spain’, (British Beer & Pub Association, 2003; Housing 
Planning Local Government and Regions Committee, 2003) there is a specific 
indication that this is much more of a close, long-term relationship between 
government and industry. The lack of clear evidence of these study tours before 
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this point, whilst not indicating anything improper, offer an indication not only of 
working relationships, but close ones – integrated and institutionalised. That no 
evidence is found indicating other trade groups, or interest groups in general, were 
involved in these projects also highlights the insider status of the British Beer & 
Pub Association. 
 
Parliamentary engagement had also changed from the time of the apparent 
brewers lobby with certain MPs seen as available to these groups as acknowledged 
by the Home Office at that point (J. Griffiths et al., 28 February 1961). Instead an 
alternative vehicle had formed that was established in 1993 as the Parliamentary 
Beer Club, becoming the All-Party Parliamentary Beer Group, is often accredited 
with being the largest All-Party Parliamentary Group with between 300 and 400 
parliamentarians signed up. The specific role of this group is occasionally unclear 
but it declares on its parliamentary submission that is, ‘To promote the 
wholesomeness and enjoyment of beer and the unique role of the pub in UK 
society; to increase understanding of the social, cultural and historic role of 
brewing and pubs in the UK and their value to tourism; to broaden recognition of 
the contribution of brewing and pubs to employment and to the UK’s economy; to 
promote understanding of the social responsibility exercised by the brewing and 
pub industries; to support the UK's brewing industry worldwide; and to promote a 
positive future for beer and the pub,’ (Houses of Parliament, 2015). It receives a 
considerable amount of industry funding (more than £50,000 in 2015) and has a 
permanent staff member (an Honorary Secretary). The All-Party Group also joined 
the British Beer & Pub Association with a specific visit to Denmark (British Beer & 
Pub Association, 2003). The Chairman of the All-Party Group, John Grogan MP, 
asked the specific question which brought forward the Government proposals in 
2001 (HC Deb, 2001-2002). They were one of the small number of groups formally 
thanked ahead of the White Paper as a consulted body (Home Office, 2000). It is 
also worth noting that when considering industry relationships, the Honorary 
Secretary throughout the period of the Licensing Act 2003 was Robert Humphreys, 
formerly the Head of Public Relations for Bass Breweries.  
 
By the early 21st century the temperance movement had declined considerably. 
However on closer inspection there was a movement and change in the 
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organisation that was both a rebranding and a refocus, The Institute of Alcohol 
Studies had been formed in the 1970s as the research arm of the movement and 
was directly funded by the British temperance movement (under the auspices of 
the United Kingdom Temperance Alliance Limited – a company that latterly 
became a charity and subsequently renamed the Alliance House Trust). This began 
the significant shift from temperance activities having a moral backdrop to instead 
a health and scientific focus – in effect the same participants and objectives with a 
differing argument.  They were effectively joined by increasingly interested health 
groups – who had a clearer interest than previously and were much better 
organised – developing the role the temperance movement had from the 1964 Act 
– not a moral campaign alone, but more broadly an apparent evidence-based 
campaign. The Institute of Alcohol Studies (2001) submission to the “Time for 
Reform” White Paper is also interesting in the terms of argument – from the very 
acknowledgements at the start of the White Paper when only Alcohol Concern – at 
that point a small alcohol harm charity – were consulted rather than a wider 
group, led the Institute of Alcohol Studies to make numerous comments 
challenging assumptions, evidence and policy direction, but there is little evidence 
of what this achieved. That much of what the opposed was latterly introduced 
either without amendment or in some cases amended in a direction they also 
opposed is worthy of note. Whilst we lack the archival information they certainly 
did not join the trips the civil servants took with industry to various different 
nations – despite quite clearly being able to comment on these nations’ licensing 
regimes with a varying viewpoint to industry – alongside perhaps evidence to 
reinforce their assertions. 
 
It was not only the temperance movement that has adapted – with the Brewers’ 
Society now the British Beer & Pub Association with somewhat different interests 
– alongside a smaller representative base. There are some interesting observations 
in their submission namely over the changing position of the BBPA since the 
breakup of the traditional brewery and pub ownership model – with some 
indication that this has led to changing position especially on the basis of licensing 
– with economic opportunity (the so called criterion of need) not being a 
consideration for public houses - as the brewers had less interest in long-term 
viability of pubs as individual businesses than in the prior reform period, instead 
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seeing their interests in having more locations of any type to sell their products.  
Despite the closeness between the BBPA and government, other groups from the 
licensed trade also sought new influence. Concerns were expressed by groups such 
as the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers in terms of the extended hours for 
sale of alcohol in the off-trade – the BBPA now with its members having large sales 
volumes through supermarkets were less concerned by this issue. There was a 
major dispute with the Bar, Entertainment and Dance Association (BEDA) who 
represented the nightclub sector. The proposals for extended hours for other 
licensed trade institutions represented a considerable business threat to these 
businesses that had. These disputes played out in the trade press but were largely 
unseen in parliamentary debates – an indication of who had both access and 
influence. When hours were discussed morality and depravity was the focus with 
some of our more notably opinionated national papers leading the charge – rather 
than a business interest. Where the optimistic source of the so-called, ‘café culture’, 
hope for the future of the licensed trade came from is uncertain – but there were 
undoubtedly professional groups who warned against this and those who 
advocated for it. Industry groups who did not buy into the central components also 
did not get a seat at the table – the Institute of Family Brewers of Britain (despite 
all being members of the British Beer & Pub Association as a requirement of their 
membership of that organisation) failed to convince either their own association 
or the Government that licensing control should remain with magistrates not local 
authorities. On this specific point as well the Magistrates’ Association, so vital to 
the technical reforms in the 1964 Act were side-lined for a more welcoming group 
in the Local Government Association – their insider status revoked when their 
interests clashed with a more powerful member and a replacement – who would 
play by the new rules of the game accepted in. 
 
The White Paper on reforms to the licensing regime had more than 2,000 
responses from across the country with individuals and groups participating. The 
media, with a particular focus on the Daily Mail, ran a considerable number of 
pieces reflecting the impending doom of the direction of travel of the licensing 
reforms. The Institute of Alcohol Studies, alongside Alcohol Concern, cited specific 
research in regard to the potential impact of these reforms (Institute of Alcohol 
Studies, 2000). Yet the reforms, for the most part without amendment, happened. 
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The voice of industry, and primarily one industry group, won out. The closeness 
between the British Beer & Pub Association first with the Home Office and latterly 
with the Department for Culture, Media & Sport is certain. As revealed in the 
commentary to select committees they enjoyed trips abroad together, discussions 
on common directionality and agreement in the need for liberalised system 
(British Beer & Pub Association, 2003).  
 
In reality one voice was heard above all others and in effect it was a mutual one – 
civil servants and the main industry group shared a key consensus, with a mutual 
research background – they had a shared interest in the policy direction and 
success (British Beer & Pub Association, 2003; Housing Planning Local 
Government and Regions Committee, 2003). It is not unsurprising that this drove 
the Act forward in this direction.   
 
Table 3.3.: The policy communities surrounding the development of the 
Licensing Act 2003 to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy Communities Licensing and the Department for 
Culture, Media & Sport 
Membership Very limited number 
of members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Some alcohol producers and 
retailers – focused around the 
British Beer & Pub Association with 
the Local Government Association 
fulfilling the regulator/regulated 
environment. Clear exclusion of 
some groups such as the Bar, 
Entertainment & Dance Association 
who represented nightclub interests 
and opposed the direction of reform. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Clear examples of negotiated 
outcomes and close personal 
relationships with frequent contact. 
Award of an MBE for alcohol group’s 
lead negotiator in the development 
of the Act. 
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Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Agreed approach to liberalism and 
movement towards local authorities 
over licensing, rather than 
magistrates. Similar 
regulator/regulated engagement as 
seen in the prior Licensing Act. 
 
Despite the ironic public beginning point of a full consultation it is quite apparent 
that the development of the Licensing Act 2003 was very much a closed affair. 
Whilst there was much noise created in the latter part of the Act’s development, 
with headlines and media voices making pushing a case against reform with voices 
from a perspective in disagreement with the major trade group this led to very 
little in terms of practical compromise. The evidence seems to suggest, from the 
very introduction to the White Paper that launched the entire licensing reform 
process of a close relationship between industry and government.  Objectives were 
shared in terms of a liberalisation of the law, the objectives of the action and the 
mechanisms to make changes. From the research conducted by joint parties of civil 
servants and industry representatives in European cities, we see that there was a 
shared evidence base to progress on with changes. That the largest interest group 
was the closest to government is also quite clear when one considers the demands 
of the British Beer & Pub Association in comparison to other licensed trade groups. 
A clear example of this is the attempted dispute by the nightclub representatives to 
have longer hours limited to their sector failed, with the competitive impact not 
achieving any considerable level of scrutiny. As the earlier example of the hour’s 
argument with nightclubs indicates the British Beer & Pub Association was the go- 
to group for all industry-led decisions – if they had an opinion that the government 
could agree with, they did. This is in marked contrast to the experience in 1964 
where any area that was outside of the then Brewers’ Society direct sphere of 
interest or influence was fed into almost a secondary community for decision – 
such as the hours for drinking with a lunch and the role played by the British Hotel 
& Restaurant Association (Home Office, 7 August 1959a). 
 
In seeking to understand the policy community structure behind the development 
of the Licensing Act 2003, there are undoubtedly different challenges to the earlier 
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Act. The lack of archives, a wider consultation to a White Paper with thousands of 
responses, a more disparate industry lobby with cracks in the largest group and a 
less clear moral group focusing on restrictions creates a challenge not just to 
understanding development but analysing it. Against this backdrop an approach 
that looks at desires and outcomes, rather than direct conversations is the 
considerably more viable option, with influence more widely understood from 
success not minutes. Equally in seeking to compare this situation to the policy 
community environment found in the earlier licensing development it is not only 
looking for what is there and similar, but also what is not or different.  If we 
observe this case study in isolation, we can find merit in the traditional policy 
community approach – it can be used as a way to explain how policy developed – 
as indicated in table 3.3. – there was a clear, stable membership of participants 
who shared goals and desire outcome with a government department keen to 
develop this policy. There were strong, personal and integrated relationships. 
Negotiation was key to success and compromise was had from all sides. They all 
knew what they wanted to achieve and were determined to get there.  This also 
required the exclusion of how this policy community represented a clear and 
obvious break to what happened before – how could this shift suddenly happen – 
how could a government department lose control and a group, in this case the 
Magistrates’ Association, be so quickly removed from the policy community when 
to an extent it had not changed the rules or its own positioning. The traditional 
policy community approach is on a descriptive basis a useful to explain policy 
development surrounding the Licensing Act 2003 – but it offers no guidance on the 
intricacies or a real understanding of why policy changed or development.  
 
If we consider membership dimension found in both policy community 
approaches, this exclusivity of access can be found in the fractured interests of the 
different groups representing alcohol retailers. Particularly in reference to the 
divide between the British Beer & Pub Association and the Bar, Entertainment & 
Dance Association over the potential impact of later licensing on various 
businesses – with one representing a wide group who effectively closed at 11pm 
and one representing those with later licences. As earlier discussed, one group was 
in favour of greater liberalisation, whilst one was in support of the status quo. The 
Bar, Entertainment & Dance Association, seeking to maintain the current system, 
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in a very protective manner for their members, found support in the submission 
from the Institute of Alcohol Studies (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2000). Whether 
it was that they were seen to present narrow interests or indeed be irrelevant 
neither got a seat round the table – the community was closed to them on this 
point.  Other examples of this style of debate are also found, with participation only 
favoured if there was a general acceptance that influence was highly limited in any 
area where the prime participants had an opinion. In many ways the development 
process for the Licensing Act 2003 – started with an open consultation – had 
effectively been decided upon long before. The movement of departmental control 
is also an indication of this. The alternative policy community had recognised that 
from this point the desired outcome of alcohol licensing was no longer a tool of 
crime management, but instead a tool of cultural development, business support 
and tourism development. Initially it had been a cooperative partner in 
development of policy, supportive with elements of outsourcing but up until this 
point not seeking to be the core community. When it became evident that the 
priorities were not fully shared, it would no longer do that the Home Office looked 
after it – and the move was made to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 
 
Table 3.4. The policy communities surrounding the development of the 
Licensing Act 2003 compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for 
adversarial policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Licensing and the Department 
for Culture, Media & Sport 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range 
of interests represented. 
Some alcohol producers and 
retailers – focused around the 
British Beer & Pub Association 
with the Local Government 
Association fulfilling the 
regulator/regulated 
environment.  
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
Clear examples of negotiated 
outcomes and close personal 
relationships with frequent 
contact. Award of an MBE for 
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and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
British Beer & Pub Association’s 
lead negotiator in the 
development of the Act. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Agreed approach to liberalism 
and movement towards local 
authorities over licensing, rather 
than magistrates. Similar 
regulator/regulated engagement 
as seen in the prior Licensing 
Act. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
The Home Office and 
Magistrates’ Association 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Had crossover with alcohol 
producers and retailers from the 
core community – with some 
others such as the Independent 
Family Brewers of Britain and 
Bar, Entertainment and Dance 
Association. Magistrates’ 
Association fulfilling 
regulator/regulated 
environment. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation – of an 
alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Played out more in the media 
than in backrooms. Submissions 
made to the government’s public 
consultation. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of 
alternative procedures to 
approach policy problems. 
Some more liberal policies for 
the on-trade yet request for 
separation of venue types on 
hours but opposition to off-trade 
measures. Some support for 
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more significant restrictions on 
alcohol sales (outside of the 
alcohol group’s specific market). 
 
Considering the dimensions of the policy community approach as outlined by 
Daugbjerg (1998) and the amended approach for adversarial communities 
considered in chapter 2, there are clear elements where there is evidence that an 
adversarial approach can effectively describe the development of the Licensing Act 
2003. On membership, when we look at the final policy outcomes we have clear 
core community surrounding the Department for Culture, Media & Sport – with 
central participation from the British Beer & Pub Association and the Local 
Government Association providing the regulated/regulator relationship that was 
important in the development of the previous Act. There is a clear exclusivity of 
membership and evidence of those not inside this membership losing influence. 
The alternative community membership is surrounding the Home Office, with the 
Magistrates’ Association and the somewhat less influential alcohol retailer groups 
also find themselves. What is interesting is the transition from the Licensing Act 
1964 – the movement from the Home Office, the exclusion of certain retailers and 
when we consider that prior to the Licensing Act 2003 the core policy community 
had surrounded the Home Office and included the Magistrates’ Association rather 
than the Local Government Association, it gives greater perspective in how the 
policy environment shifted with the development of the policy. This appears to be 
evidence of an alternative community becoming a core community. It is also of 
note that the British Beer & Pub Association also moved with the community 
(having as the Brewers’ Society been a central part of the previous core) – the 
ability of groups to shift within communities is an important feature. Even on a 
single dimension, this shift of a core policy community becoming an alternative, as 
outlined in table 3.4., represents a clear example of policy communities existing 
and waiting for the right policy window to express influence. Considering 
integration there appears to be more evidence of a closer integration from the 
alcohol group side with the Department of Culture, Media and Sport’s core 
community but evidence from the regulator side of integration on both levels – this 
could also be to do with the shift of the British Beer & Pub Association. On 
institutionalism, there is a similar situation – and that in the alternative there was 
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not the same alignment of values and desired outcomes. This differential could also 
help explain why one became the core community, and the other ended up as an 
alternative. The Licensing Act 2003 demonstrated that different groups, excluded 
from a core policy community would, if an interest remained, seek to be part of an 
alternative policy community, including those that had no influence immediately. 
That certain alcohol producers and retailers’ groups were members of multiple 
policy communities is also of interest – effectively playing all sides, or at least 
multiple sides in an argument. They also indicate that the difficulty may be in their 
quietness – ready to appear, but in many cases only when opportunity presents 
itself – an adversarial environment, but one that is not initially apparent.  By taking 
the example of the Licensing Act 2003 we can see how instability and larger scale 
change can cause a policy community to lose its place as a core community – whilst 
representing a chance for an alternative to establish itself. It also indicates that 
some groups can almost play all sides – whilst others may face restrictions – it is 
almost being able to be in the right community, at the right time. 
 
Whilst the Licensing Act 1964 can be seen as finishing with a stable policy 
community for alcohol, the Licensing Act 2003 threatened to rip open this 
structure and develop a new entire basis for group interaction. In effect, what was 
observed in relation to the legalisation of abortion in the 1960s began to happen 
on alcohol, ‘new groups have emerged in order to challenge existing decisions’, 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 5) that have, ‘different values and beliefs and 
making quite new demands that conflicted with traditionally established groups’, 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979, p. 5). The Licensing Act 2003 was the great outcome 
of an ambitious attempt by the key alcohol-producer and retailer players in the 
core policy community on alcohol licensing shifting their engagement to an 
alternate that became the core – but in abandoning incrementalism and stability of 
the previous core community - making a giant leap to a long sought after highly 
liberal regime, it may have caused a permanent limitation in its authority over 
alcohol policy more widely, 
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3.3. The Licensing Act (Scotland) 2005 and the public health 
objective 
Scotland has maintained a different licensing regime from the rest of the United 
Kingdom since inception, although they have historically reviewed their laws in or 
around the same timeframes as for England & Wales (Northern Ireland for various 
reasons has its own regime) – although they have no direct application to each 
other and work within different legal structures. Following, and alongside, the 
development of the Licensing Act 2003, the Scottish Executive, as it then was, took 
the opportunity to update Scotland’s licensing laws with a final act passed in as the 
Licensing Act (Scotland) 2005. Primarily they focused on the four key licensing 
objectives found in the England and Wales system, however they added an extra, 
what can be considered a public health objective. This objective states that a key 
feature of licensing is the promotion of public health – with the criteria 
representing a challenge for licensing applications. The process for the 
development of this new criteria began in 2001 when Jim Wallace, then the Justice 
Minister and Leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, commissioned Sheriff 
Principal Gordon Nicholson to lead a review of the Scottish licensing laws, as the 
chair of The Nicholson Committee (2003). Yet this commission was different from 
the start compared to the England and Wales system with this new committee 
asked, ‘To review all aspects of liquor licensing law and practice in Scotland, with 
particular reference to the implications for health and public order; to recommend 
changes in the public interest; and to report accordingly,’ (The Nicholson 
Committee: Review of Liquor Licensing Law in Scotland, 2003, p. 1) – so from its 
very commissioning health was a concern of the developing legislation. In the same 
way as England and Wales had mirrored elements of prior Acts’ development this 
committee followed on from the Clayson Committee of the 1970s whose report 
(Report of the Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law, 1973) played a 
major part in the development of the Licensing Act (Scotland) 1976. The 
membership of the committee included Gordon Millar, the Chief Executive of the 
Scottish Beer & Pub Association alongside a representative of the Scottish Licensed 
Trade Association (a licensee organisation) – they were joined by two doctors 
representing medical interest, two police representatives, one legal representative, 
two members of Licensing Boards, two Sheriffs representing the judiciary, a 
representative of a children’s charity and Sir Menzies Campbell (who had also been 
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a member of the Clayson Committee).  The Clayson Committee is also of relevance 
– it occurred at the same time as the Erroll Committee in the early 1970s – 
however it actually led to some substantial changes that meant Scotland had 
already shifted on the regulator/regulated perspective at this stage but still within 
a similar framework. In effect the 1973 Report of the Departmental Committee on 
Scottish Licensing Law or the Clayson Committee formed the basis for the 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976. Alongside some hours’ changes, some regulation of 
the off-trade and an element of public health considerations, ‘the Clayson 
Committee called for an overhaul of the licensing system through the replacement 
of licensing courts, dominated hitherto by magistrates and justices of the peace, 
with licensing boards made up of elected councillors,’ (Nicholls, 2012a, pp. 4-5).  
 
The Nicholson Committee sought to investigate the potential for new alcohol 
licensing laws consulting within a two-stage process – first reaching out to 
targeted partners and then inviting other consultees in for wider consideration. 
The Scottish Executive analysed the consultation responses and process 
(Dudleston & Murray, 2004) as part of the Act’s development. This analysis gives 
an indication of the priority of the consultees – separated out between those 
whose response was sought at an early stage and those that responded at a 
secondary stage following a more general invitation to respond. Notably the 
British Medical Association was an early consultee, alongside various police 
groups, whilst from the retailer perspective the Association of Convenience Stores, 
British Institute of Innkeeping and the Scottish Licensed Trade Association were 
consulted but the Scottish Beer & Pub Association and the British Hospitality 
Association were not consulted until the second stage – whilst the early invitations 
in to the British Medical Association indicate a very different framing environment. 
Whilst the evidence indicates they had a more significant role on the secondary 
detailed level alongside their committee membership, their engagement began 
after the initial framing of the issue – with the contentious objective around public 
health effectively already established.  In understanding this framing process there 
were reruns of some of the industry disagreements from the Licensing Act 2003, 
(Dudleston & Murray, 2004, p. 22) relating to licensing structure – especially with 
relation to supermarkets and the off-licence trade, with the larger participants 
successfully arguing for consistency with England and Wales. In effect – these 
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smaller groups had sought to venue-shop but failed. They had not managed to get 
their opinions into the core environment.  This is indicative that the Scottish 
process, whilst distinct, had many similarities, with arguments made and rejected 
in the same process as the England and Wales example.  
 
The outcome resulted in a Scottish licensing system that was fundamentally 
different to England and Wales – but the alcohol producers had been involved 
closely in the debate. The liberalism of the regime was secured but at the same 
time a new principle of licensing arguably challenged the purposes and 
expectations of licensing. The core policy community had health representatives 
central within it, directly on the Nicholson Committee, having access in a way they 
did not have in the England and Wales example – with the rejection of the Institute 
of Alcohol Studies (2000) recommendations showing the comparative balance. 
Despite these efforts, they did not achieve the level of desired shift that these 
groups in England and Wales had sought – there was a public health condition, and 
still its other suggestions on lack of liberalisation on hours and access were not 
heeded. Whilst being in the community had made a difference and they had made a 
shift – but the level of the shift lacked clarity – it was a principle rather than exact 
conditions. What this does signify is that the Scottish Executive policy community 
environment and participants were enabled to have health concerns feature as 
part of the negotiated outcome, alongside enforcement, criminal and economic 
concerns.  In effect the public health objective should have seen, if the 
implementation followed the case made in previous health submissions, led to a 
licensing system that was different enough from the England and Wales system to 
have considerable impact on the consumption of alcohol in Scotland and the 
resultant health impacts. This has not happened, as argued by representatives of 
Alcohol Focus Scotland in personal communication who noted, ‘public health 
actors have had some impact in terms of influencing licensing policy. However, 
there is evidence that the public health influence is not translating fully to 
decision-making on individual applications. Subsequently, public health actors are 
finding it difficult to justify their input when there is no obvious change in 
outcomes,’ (Mahon, 2016, p. 4). In later chapters what became apparent was that 
this objective and structured intervention alone had very limited, if any impact of 
significance greater than in England and Wales. With the licensing issue now being 
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partially at least framed in terms of public health – and indeed health interest 
groups playing a considered role in policy development – they created a situation 
where an alternative policy community, in make up at the very least, had a major 
influence over alcohol policy, allowing for other areas of influence and policy 
development. They had affected the ambitions and scope of the policy community 
for alcohol licensing in Scotland – which would become more apparent in the 
greater divergence in policy affecting other areas – despite the success in licensing 
this public health objective did not lead to the level of impact or outcome being 
sought by the health groups. In England and Wales the move of oversight to the 
Department of Culture, Media & Sport could be seen as a case that cultural 
development, business support and tourism development were the key desired 
outcomes - by managing to influence the framing of the alcohol issue in Scotland 
into a scenario where health – rather than disorder or economic concerns as the 
key features they had succeeded in overcoming the core policy community in 
terms of the desirable outcomes for licensing policy. In terms of dimensions of the 
policy communities approach, there is clear membership differential – which has 
led to a different policy outcome – framed amongst different policy objectives – 
indicating the institutionalism dimension had either helped facilitate this or there 
is a clear link. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
The British licensing system has a history of comparative stability followed by 
periods of radical reform that has come over the centuries. Normally this involved 
some level of favouritism to either the alcohol retailers or their changing 
opponents that are best described in the later context as health groups, but were 
historically more concerned with social issues as organised temperance groups. 
The Licensing Acts of 1964 and 2003 in this context are possibly unusual in being 
two distinctly liberalising pieces of legislation that followed each other – indicative 
of a progressive liberalism on licensing - though with thirty-nine years between 
them. Despite this time period between them there are great similarities to be 
found. The groups who participated barely changed – names may have been 
different, a slightly different ownership model and a rebranding of temperance but 
nevertheless the interests they represented were broadly similar, even how they 
conducted themselves in negotiations and their relation to Parliamentarians.  
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There is much that can be learnt from both of the Acts’ developments and the 
intervening period. The structure of the negotiations, what access was granted, 
what influence was both enjoyed and given had a direct effect on outcomes. 
Industry bodies had always had a voice, but up until 1964 the more successful 
groups had been the temperance movement – alcohol had become harder to 
obtain, facilities were closed down and to the chagrin of many a politician (or 
tourists depending on whether the explanation is believed) one could not enjoy an 
alcoholic beverage over a late lunch.  Yet by the time the negotiations began for a 
new policy framework for licensing this movement had lost most of its influence – 
industry had regained a prime position. In many ways the presence of the 
temperance groups in meetings was a hurdle to be overcome not a serious partner 
in debate. Other groups with differing views were unhelpful in developing 
practical, workable policy.  
 
There were distinct examples evidencing that a privilege of access for certain 
alcohol groups, primarily the brewers was in existence. Their status was key and 
vital to the policy development since they influenced or owned the majority of 
alcohol retail venues so had a clear delivery role for the policy.  They had the 
power to affect policy beyond the civil service, thanks to the brewers lobby, yet 
they also found some of their policy ambitions or specifics resisted successfully by 
the civil service when they went further than government desires. Influence was 
felt, the evidence was clear, yet for the most part the negotiated structure meant 
that it was not always demonstrated absolutely. The temperance movement, still 
highly organised at this stage, also had an element of privilege of access – more 
than many smaller alcohol groups. Yet they did not effectively influence policy 
development and did not get early sight of direction or detail – this despite their 
expectations that they would. Other alcohol and regulatory groups had elements of 
early insight, as well as influence on policy but there were restrictions and caveats 
placed – occasionally even requiring the consent of the brewers. The two-stage 
solution – the Licensing Act 1960 being generally uncontroversial, with the 
Licensing Act 1964 being a larger shift also showed influence – the greater the 
controversy the more the engagement with the major alcohol producers and 
retailers.  Influence was felt, and there was certainly a main player in the Brewers’ 
Society who was the primary consultee, but this was not a homogenous sector 
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even at this stage – with privilege relatable to scale and potential to implement 
policy. 
 
The case study of the development of the Licensing Act 1964 offers evidence of a 
policy community that held tightly to the characteristics of Daugbjerg (1998) and 
showing strong evidence that the traditional policy community approach. It was 
formed of groups who gave something back and who had something to trade with 
other participants. This trade-off relationship developed slowly into a seemingly 
stable policy community with some groups having slightly less influence – 
something similar to that found by Grant, Paterson, and Whitston (1988) in 
relation to the chemical industry. At the core of licensing issues with the Brewers’ 
Society and to a lesser extent was the British Hotels & Restaurants Association, 
then a secondary grouping of other alcohol providers and the off-licences who 
acted as a subsidiary on the specialist issues. Yet if we ignore that this was a shift – 
a major change from the previous environment when the temperance groups had 
enjoyed such success and alcohol producers found themselves outsiders then the 
entire policy window is not considered. Whilst in isolation the traditional approach 
fits almost perfectly and explains much – it does not explain fully power shifts. 
Equally there is not sufficient evidence to either eliminate or confirm the existence 
of an alternative policy community – with the lack of an obvious venue being the 
most complete explanation for this lack of evidence. 
 
The reforms of the Licensing Act 2003 represented a more radical shift than its 
predecessor in the 1960s. There was privilege exercised by groups in many ways.  
This started with the venue, the established policy development in the Home Office 
was less flexible, unable to deliver the degree of policy shift that had been directed 
by the government and agitated by certain elements of the alcohol industry. The 
shift to the Department of Culture, Media & Sport, a venue more favourable to this 
more radical policy, benefitted greatly certain alcohol producer groups and 
allowed a policy outcome they desired. It also shifted influence to other groups, 
such as the Local Government Association, on the delivery of the regulatory 
structures for the licensing regime, cutting out the Magistrates Association 
entirely.  On a basic level this could be considered almost complete dominance – 
when the rules of the game no longer worked for the alcohol sector, the simply 
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changed them, showing dominance. Yet this misses key elements, it required 
government consent, other, new willing group participants outside of the alcohol 
sector – and it missed the huge divisions within the alcohol sector, such as the 
representatives of the nightclub sector or the Independent Family Brewers of 
Britain, who fiercely and actively opposed the shift being led by the British Beer & 
Pub Association. There is a complexity to influence within the Licensing Act 2003; 
it required consent or acceptance on overall policy direction, willing partners and 
an almost disunity within the alcohol sector to abandon elements that did not 
desire policy change. 
 
In terms of the policy community approach, the traditional policy community was 
in many ways found thirty-nine years later – where the incremental changes (the 
odd hour extensions here or there, removal of the afternoon closing hours) show 
an indication that this persisted. Therefore, the policy outcome had a direct effect 
on policy community structure going forward – it was a relationship where a 
policy decision had a long effect on future policy direction. Some things did change 
between these periods – mainly the groups themselves. The temperance groups 
developed into research organisations, the medical and health community became 
aligned with them. The groups changed, both in becoming more recognisably 
professional lobbying organisations and some interest differences as the off-trade 
sale of alcohol grew. Despite this the community effectively held out throughout.  
The Licensing Act 2003 started at a different point – the direction of travel, what 
the ‘facts’ were, and many other key assumptions were held mutually between the 
main participants. To achieve this radical change, in a much more obvious fashion, 
an alternative policy community was obvious and more notably came to become 
the core policy community, usurping its predecessor. A new government 
department took over – groups who did not accept the policy direction were 
somewhat ruthlessly excluded. Decades of incremental change were swept aside 
and in doing so unarguably alcohol licensing suddenly became a more prominent 
issue in the public consciousness.  Scotland also demonstrated that whilst being 
part for a policy community led to some progress, it was not without limitations. 
The previous membership – with their strict technical focus had greater 
experience of impacts and outcomes. That success has not been apparent may help 
explain their lack of membership elsewhere – that in later chapters the greater role 
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played by the health community is considered in terms of greater policy 
divergence is also worthy of consideration. 
 
The development of the Licensing Act 1964 reflected a stable policy community 
that can be effectively explained by a traditional policy community approach – 
with the spectrum that surrounded the most fundamental issues for alcohol and 
kept legislative changes to the minimum. The Licensing Act 2003 required the 
jump of the policy community to an alternative and changed the entire course of 
policy development. It also symbolised that an alternative community may be 
dormant or lack clear evidence of its existence until a policy window that give an 
opportunity to shift appears. Throughout these case studies the evidence is clear 
that without negotiated nature of the policy community approach in allowing this 
radical change to become a reality potentially this liberalisation of Britain’s 
licensing laws would never have happened – being outside of public consideration 
for much of its development facilitated the policy shift in a way a more consultative 
approach would have not.  
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Chapter 4 
Drink-driving – unacceptable or negotiable? 
The development and review of Britain’s Drink-driving Laws 
‘When the final result is expected to be a compromise, it is often prudent to start from 
an extreme position.’ 
John Maynard Keynes (1925) 
 
Alcohol consumption has many potential consequences that Babor (2010) would 
consider to be against the public good, yet none have a more comprehensive 
argument than that of drink-driving. It is a focus of considerable attention – 
publicly at least there is unity that drink-driving is something to be stopped, or 
indeed eradicated – there is little sympathy for perpetrators of drink-driving. On 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Drink-driving Act, the Department for Transport (7 
November 2014) published research that showed 91% of the population agreed 
that drink-driving was unacceptable – and a slightly greater number at 92% would 
be ashamed if they were caught drink-driving. Whilst acknowledging this 
perception, it does not stop arguments over the practicalities and technicalities of 
the policy surrounding drink-driving on which this chapter shall focus. For the 
purposes of this chapter drink-driving is considered to be an action that sees an 
individual over the legal limit of alcohol (whether by quantities in blood, breath or 
any other method) and policies introduced to enforce that limit. Whilst not the 
social taboo of the modern era, drink-driving became an issue of serious policy 
concern in the 1950s and 1960s as part of the discussion into licensing reform. 
This was not the first attempt to influence or legislate - the offence to be drunk in 
charge of a vehicle had been on the statute book since the Criminal Justice Act 
1925.  Technology played a significant role, developing at a rapid pace in the 
1960s, giving for the first time an opportunity to enforce the laws with the 
production of the breathalyser. This took policy from principle into practice and 
created an environment for reform. As a specific policy issue it is both inside the 
wider alcohol policy arena and also being distinctively different – it is an area that 
involves road safety combined with a criminal act, a settled scientific argument 
that alcohol impairs driving and it involves interested parties who are normally 
separate from the wider arena. Drink-driving is an arena of alcohol policy which 
appears to attract, at least in public, the lowest levels of interest from the alcohol 
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sector in defending their product’s consumption. This can be considered due to its 
severe negative perception, but nevertheless the development of policy in this area 
undoubtedly has a significant impact on the sector. This chapter will seek to 
understand whether they are actually disinterest, ambivalent or instead have 
influence by different means. This could include the actually framing and 
understanding of the policy issue – whether it is one of active prevention and 
avoidance entirely of risk or something somewhat softer in terms of strictly 
enforcing a deemed unacceptable level of behaviour. This understanding of 
desirable policy outcome, whether it is shared collectively, or more broadly an 
accepted limitation on policy will help better understand whether influence can be 
felt and not seen within drink-driving. 
 
The first section will consider the initial development of drink-driving laws that 
effectively began in the 1960s when interest peaked due to a combination of 
statistical evidence and media pressure – becoming an area where Ministers 
effectively demanded action. It will analyse how the policy came from a concept to 
a regulatory measure that could be enforced, the policy community or 
communities that played a role and the original settlement on the crime of drink-
driving. The second section will consider the various parliamentary inquiries into 
drink-driving law, alongside departmental reviews, with a major focus on the large 
scale Blennerhassett and latterly the two North Reviews of drink-driving. In 
analysing these examples it is seeking to understand the role policy communities 
have played in the shaping of drink-driving laws in the United Kingdom and 
whether these communities are more traditional or adversarial in behaviour. It 
will also seek to consider what positions are taken by groups in this difficult area 
where there are not public advocates in favour of drink-driving, instead seeking to 
understand what positions and strategies are taken to influence and manage policy 
development. 
 
The final section looks at the devolved Scottish Parliament and Government which, 
in the same timeframe of the North Review, went in a different direction with a 
reduction in the drink-drive limit, arguably making it almost impossible to 
consume any alcohol and drive. It will seek to understand if the evidence base was 
different, whether the groups were different or whether the policy communities 
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were different – or a combination of the three that led to a different policy outcome 
on an area with less partisan positioning. It will consider if the effective creation of 
a policy community by design gave space for public health interests, or if a better 
explanation can be found by an understanding of adversarial policy communities. 
The conclusion will give an overview of how policy communities have influenced 
policy on drink-driving alongside how devolution and the establishment of new 
network structures have had an influence on policy development. It will seek to 
understand whether a policy community exists for drink-driving policy and of 
what style; and whether decisions made in a devolved setting offer further 
considerations of policy communities that either support or challenge the 
adversarial policy communities approach.  
 
4.1. The development of drink-driving policy 
By the 1960s previous attempts at policy interventions on drink-driving had 
generally been seen as, at best, limited. The situation was serious enough that in 
the Commons the Home Office Minister stated in a licensing debate that, ‘The 
whole country is deeply shocked by the increasing carnage on the roads. It is 
impossible to say to what extent this is aggravated by drunkenness whether in the 
case of a motorist or a pedestrian,’ (HC Deb, 1959-60c). The challenge of 
enforcement was serious and not an easy issue to overcome. It was a crime to be 
drunk in charge of a motor vehicle from the Criminal Justice Act 1925, with the 
more specific crime of drink-driving, which related to being in proper control, 
coming with the Road Traffic Act 1930. There was no clear method of assessment 
nor was there a clear, scientifically accountable, measure of drunkenness. This 
began to change in the 1960s, when effectively the modern strictly negative 
understanding of drink-driving appeared, as national statistics showed a 
significant level of casualties from drink-driving, without the accompanying level 
of prosecution. It was a crime to which arguably many would escape punishment 
and this focused political attention on it – giving Ministers a political arena that 
needed a policy solution. At the same time there was active positioning to focus 
this as a transport, and criminal, issue rather than one for alcohol-related groups 
and their existing policy communities.  
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The two Road Safety Acts of the 1960s and how they developed, have had a lasting 
impact on policy outcomes. The issue of drink-driving appeared prominently in the 
Parliamentary debates that led to the Licensing Act 1961. Provisions were made in 
that Act that were cited as specific discouragements to drink-driving – namely 
surrounding the uniformity of closing times to discourage people driving from 
venue to venue to find a later drink service. Drink-driving was also identified as an 
area that could not adequately be addressed by licensing measures in their totality. 
The position and tactical positioning was neatly surmised by Lord Balniel, that ‘I 
think the remedy lies in penalties under the Road Traffic Act for drunken motorists 
and not in the licensing laws. The majority ought not to be penalised because of the 
criminal folly of the few. I do not think we should get the right result by proceeding 
in that direction. Of course, a discussion on the adequacy or otherwise of the road 
traffic legislation would be outside the scope of this debate,’ (HC Deb, 1959-60b). 
This position was emphasised in private discussion by groups representing alcohol 
interests such as the Brewers’ Society (Home Office, 1 December 1960c), whilst 
being discouraged by the temperance movement (Home Office, 28 July 1960). The 
active shifting of an issue from one established policy community to another, 
directed by the major participants, offers an insight to the challenge of drink-
driving. Whilst an interest remained, the negative light in which drink-driving was 
seen was too risky to pollute negotiations in other areas if it was not separate and 
effectively isolated as a unique issue for solitary negotiation. This is indicated by 
the change in tone; whilst the alcohol groups had historically taken a firm position 
against attempts to further regulate drink-driving (see Luckin (2010a, p. 1542)), 
the major participants had by the early 1960s decided this was an area to have a 
more nuanced influence over, so took a step back from direct involvement.  The 
groups who appeared to lead in this policy community can be found within cabinet 
minutes (Cabinet Office, 1962-1965) which demonstrate that the major 
participants were motoring groups – led by the Royal Automobile Club (RAC), 
Automobile Association (AA) and the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, 
alongside those with a medical interest such as the British Medical Association 
(BMA) and the Medical Research Council. The Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents (RoSPA) was also involved but were seen to be more on the side of the 
motorist lobby (see Luckin (2010b, p. 357) and Greenaway (2003, p. 167)), 
working with these groups in securing negotiated, incremental outcomes rather 
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than major changes. A new interest group, which would soon play a significant role 
also appeared, the Pedestrians’ Association. They had found a parliamentary 
champion in Sir Graham Page MP who would become progressively more involved 
in this issue. They were, ‘more of an outsider group and had poor relations with 
RoSPA, which it saw as too pro-motorist and too closely linked to the MoT’, 
(Greenaway, 2003, p. 167). 
 
At the same time as the first attempt at alcohol licensing reform was passing 
through Parliament (what became the Licensing Act 1961) progress began on a 
new Road Safety Bill that would subsequently become commonly known as the 
Marples Act, after the Minister for Transport at the time, Ernest Marples. Marples 
certainly took on personal responsibility for the new legislation – ‘he told the 
Observer that he would now stake his career on reducing the incidence of drink-
driving,’ (Luckin, 2010a, p. 1541). Various groups began showing an increasing 
interest in the area – with a shift in BMA policy from recommending a doctor’s 
assessment for whether someone was incapable of driving to a more scientific 
methodology – the use of either blood or urine to measure a level of alcohol. 
Equally the Magistrates ‘Association was seeing an increased level of court activity, 
without the capability to actually set punishments or see convictions (British 
Medical Association & Magistrates Association, 1961). Whilst enthusiasm for 
measures was increasing from interest groups on the side of the medical 
community and judicial environment, there was still significant resistance from 
motoring groups, which given the close relationships they had with the Ministry 
would be challenging to overcome (Cabinet Office, 1962-1965). The differing 
positions of the Pedestrians Association and RoSPA are also indicative – with the 
Pedestrians Association despite strong machinations from their parliamentary 
champion including private members bills – not finding themselves within the 
policy community (Cabinet Office, 1962-1965). 
 
The Bill, as proposed by the Minister, looked to take on board the concerns of the 
groups pushing for a stronger regulatory environment with a range of proposals 
that would later appear in legislation. Yet in this circumstance the Bill was severely 
watered down – primarily by other Government departments fearful of negative 
publicity and legal challenges (Otton, 2 December 1960). It had some important 
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elements – refusing to give a sample on request could be used against you in court, 
‘impairment’ to driving rather than ‘incapability’ became the legal test and an 
actual limit of sorts did appear – with 150mg of alcohol per 100ml of blood being 
seen as definitive proof of impairment though, ‘this was a very high level (roughly 
equivalent to two thirds of a bottle of whisky)’, (Greenaway, 2003, p. 170) yet this 
was not the level for prosecution – it was up to the courts to decide if someone was 
impaired at a lower level. The Marples Act itself has many forming elements that fit 
within an analysis of the traditional policy community approach. Yet the addition 
of the Pedestrians Association into the policy environment clearly disrupted 
relationships and the external voice of the BMA caused the profile of the issue to 
increase. Overall the Act, again in a similar paradigm to licensing, was in many 
ways groundwork for a later Act that set forth more wide-ranging changes. 
Somewhat disappointingly for Marples his Labour opposition made the same 
arguments as he had been making across the Cabinet, yet could not secure support 
for. When the General Election of 1964 saw Labour come into Government there 
was immediate pressure for a new policy – with Tom Fraser, the new Minister, 
‘had rather rashly hinted at legislation before Christmas 1965 in an ITV interview’, 
(Greenaway, 2003, p. 170). Soon Barbara Castle replaced Tom Fraser as Minister 
and sought to progress with drafting a Bill. There had been major changes in this 
period in terms of the positions of groups with the Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Accidents, previously an ally of motoring groups opposing a legal limit, shifting 
to support after pressure from their membership (Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Accidents, 1964). The Government sought the advice of the Medical Research 
Council on what would be an appropriate limit for blood alcohol (Road Safety (C. 
(65) 136), 27 October 1965) and accepted a recommendation of 80mg per 100ml, 
which the BMA had also highlighted as appropriate in its own research (British 
Medical Association, 1965). At the time this limit was described by Barbara Castle 
as, ‘If they have had a good meal and are drinking in a leisurely way, and are used 
to drinking, it could take six pints of beer or six large whiskies to produce the 
prescribed limit,’(HC Deb, 1965-66). This limit was consulted upon with the 
motoring organisations (Drink and Driving (H.(65) 107), 31 December 1965). In 
effect this was a negotiated position with groups and most opposition had 
evaporated.  
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On the breathalyser there was some minor conflict regarding reliability, but the 
requirements for blood or urine for prosecution to an extent overcame these 
concerns. There was a pause with the April 1966 election that created more 
conflict. There were some outsider groups who took more stringent positions – 
indeed, ‘during the election of April 1966, which separated the two debates, the 
minister was subjected to vitriolic personal abuse. In addition, a bizarre, 
alternative ‘Barbara Castle’, representing a splinter-group violently opposed to all 
forms of testing, unsuccessfully attempted to confuse the loyal voters of 
Blackburn,’ (Luckin, 2010b, p. 369).  This external, somewhat extreme attempts for 
influence was uncommon but other elements were firmly opposed by the major 
motoring groups – specifically a provision for random testing – where the police 
could stop any car, for any reason and request a test. Whilst this was popular with 
most groups, and found support within the wider Government, motoring groups 
vehemently opposed it and opposition MPs took up the charge as well. Their effect 
was certain – this provision was dropped between readings of the Bill.  Alcohol 
groups had remained quiet throughout this process, with the issue having public 
popularity and indeed being an area of high negative media coverage – a solution 
would obviously be useful as it interfered with arguments elsewhere, with a 
specific desire to disengage drink-driving from licensing policy. Alcohol-producer 
bodies even, ‘had circulated [materials to] licensees about the dangers of drunken 
driving and had offered cooperation with RoSPA on the issue’, (Greenaway, 2003, 
p. 174). The realisation of this level of passionate disinterest from alcohol-
producers, even trying to negate other elements of the alcohol industry who 
attempted to campaign against the policy - ‘in 1967, the breathalyser caused 
divisions between the licensed victuallers and the brewers; the latter tried hard to 
prevent publicans from launching a campaign to get the public to write in protest 
to MPs,’ (Greenaway, 2003, p. 174). 
 
There had been a lack of a sustained public interest in the issue of drink-driving – 
it was on the edges of public discourse, not a focus or major concern. It was only 
when the issue came to the fore in terms of media coverage and new groups, 
accompanied by an ambitious new minister, which suddenly created a window for 
more radical policy development.  When considering what this tells us about policy 
communities, considering the Daugbjerg (1998) typology and as table 4.1 outlines, 
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the environment shares many characteristics in line with a traditional policy 
community. Looking first as the membership, there is a limited membership that is 
very focused on transport interests – road users, accident or health and safety 
groups and larger transport lobbies. This also included participants who have 
sought engagement on licensing such as the BMA and Magistrates’ Association but 
were in general separate and distinct from the policy community membership 
observed within licensing. In terms of integration, there was engagement with the 
Department for Transport that was close and a two-way exchange of information – 
it fits the traditional policy community typology in many ways, although obviously 
the policy was not incremental – that in itself does not discount a traditional 
approach although it would normally have been expected. It was also apparent 
that on an institutional basis there was a clear consensus on the necessity for 
action, as well as an understanding that a more scientific means was needed to 
regulate the issue of drink-driving. 
 
Table 4.1.: The policy community surrounding the development of the laws on 
drink-driving compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy 
communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
Development of the Drink-
driving Laws 
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Whilst there was a wide level of 
group consultation, the 
membership was limited. 
Primarily drivers’ group and the 
safety group that generally 
aligned with drivers’ interests. 
Alcohol-producer groups 
excluded. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Frequent meetings with the 
drivers’ groups and RoSPA. 
Drafts and concepts shared 
between groups and 
Government. 
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Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Surrounding the Department of 
Transport, there was clear 
agreement that a new law was 
required and use of technology. 
Two-way negotiation on policy 
challenges. 
 
The changes made in the development of the drink-driving laws were more than 
incremental. They represented a shift in attitudes, enforcement and the criminal 
regime that compared to the very limited levels of prosecution previously in place, 
which was on this basis almost radical. This more extreme shift in policy would 
arguably fit more closely with the conceptualisation of adversarial policy 
communities.  The argument would follow that the radicalism creates the potential 
for an adversarial policy community to come in and take over the issue – yet the 
observable environment appears to follow more closely model the traditional 
approach, with no clear core and alternative with the existing, or arguably only 
policy community leading. Considering table 4.2. that considers the developments 
alongside the typology for adversarial approach, there is a clear discernible core 
policy community that mirrors the traditional approach and the focus on the 
Department of Transport is very important. The split between the victuallers and 
brewers on this indicates that to an extent what can be framed as toxicity of the 
issue may have prevented a more aggressively anti-legislation adversarial policy 
community coming to prominence or being more obvious. On the other side the 
split between RoSPA and the Pedestrians Association on the level of action 
required, with one group not part of the core conversation also indicates that an 
adversarial community on the other side could also be considered but again 
evidence was lacking.  
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Table 4.2. The policy communities surrounding the development of the laws on 
drink-driving compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial 
policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Development of the Drink-
driving Laws 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
As table 4.1. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
The observable policy 
community is centred around 
the Department for Transport 
that leads on the policy area. As 
in table 4.1 same characteristics 
apply. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
As table 4.1. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Development of the Drink-
driving Laws 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
There are two sets of groups 
(victuallers and groups such as 
Pedestrian’s Association) 
excluded at either side of the 
policy – one calling for more 
radicalism, one less. Yet no 
indications that these are in 
identifiable alternative 
communities. 
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
Some indications that 
Pedestrians Association and 
victuallers using parliamentary 
advocates. 
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alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Attempts by the Pedestrians 
Association to amend policy 
within parliament and more 
direct advocacy. 
 
Indeed the traditional policy community approach appears to hold true - the shift 
of position by motoring groups and RoSPA ahead of the 1967 Act to fit the new 
public consensus indicated that it may have adapted and survived in a similar 
fashion to the M. J. Smith (1992) example of the agricultural policy community, 
where a community sustained itself by incorporating a new public consensus, 
whilst still limiting other shifts on policy. The typology also fits closely with the 
adversarial core policy community, especially its extreme focus on the Department 
of Transport. The identification of a clear alternative policy community is the 
clearest way to identify it, however the attempts by the victuallers and Pedestrians 
Association do indicate that the groups interest in being parts of alternatives do 
exist. The final consideration is the opting out of the Brewers – could there be an 
alternative policy community that is choosing not to actually activate their own 
policy influence, as right now the core policy community is delivering as desired? 
What is clear is that there is satisfaction in not being part of the decision or 
development from the Brewers perspective, and that this is an intentional 
disengagement. In the previous chapter the reforms indicated that some groups 
could switch between policy communities to their own advantage – this may 
identify that on some occasions the advantage is found in being in a quiet 
alternative, rather than a prominent core. Later developments in drink-driving 
policy provide further opportunities to investigate this possibility. 
 
4.2. Review and development of the drink-driving laws 
At first the new measures in the Licensing Act 1967 met with some success and 
become established, stable policy. In 1968 new technology, the breathalyser, was 
introduced improving the practicality of enforcement. It was accompanied by a 
new, nationwide advertising campaign and followed by increased public interest in 
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the topic. Yet within a year of this introduction the number of accidents and 
fatalities had begun to rise once again ("Road safety and the law," 1980). For the 
policy community surrounding drink-driving, comparatively little changed. The 
considerable shift that had been made to introduce a specific alcohol limit and the 
technological development of an enforcement mechanism had appeared to have 
effectively put the issue to bed - with the odd incremental change having limited 
effect on the wider policy outcomes. This status quo eventually become 
unsustainable as media and public interest once again focused on the rising 
casualty rates ("Road safety and the law," 1980). The next stage of this interest was 
a new, expert investigation in this circumstance chaired by Frank Blennerhassett 
QC. Rather flamboyantly the committee included the two-time Formula One World 
Champion Graham Hill, though he died midway through the report’s development. 
The committee would go on to produce the Blennerhassett Report that made a 
serious of recommendations on policy in relation to drink-driving. The outsourcing 
of policy research and recommendations to experts was a seemingly logical 
position. The process of implementing these recommendations was conversely 
convoluted and challenging. What the role of the drink-driving policy community 
in both the report’s development and the subsequent changes in policies will be 
considered in the section. Further reviews were commissioned on drink-driving, 
two of them led by Sir Peter North decades apart in the late 1980s and the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, with the second having impacts both in the 
wider UK, which will be considered in this section, and the Scottish context, which 
shall be considered in the following section.  In essence this section will consider 
the period from the early 1970s until the twenty-first century, looking at both the 
specialist commissions and reports, alongside the reaction to these 
recommendations whilst considering the policy community approach.  In 
considering the outcomes, views and development of policy it will also seek to 
understand whether it can be better understood by the traditional or adversarial 
policy community approach. 
 
At the introduction of the drink-driving laws, there were almost around six 
definable areas of interest – the drivers’ groups who were generally protective of 
drivers’ rights and against elements such as random testing with a propensity for 
softer measures on enforcement; the road safety groups who at that stage had 
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been divided into those who wanted more aggressive measures and those who 
worked more closely with the driver interests; the police and legal groups who 
wanted a clear enforceable system; the medical groups whose concerns related to 
driving down the harm caused by drink-driving whilst also providing some 
scientific analysis; and the two separate alcohol groupings – the alcohol producers 
who were actively avoiding the issue, but supported random testing, and the 
alcohol retailers, mainly those within the on-trade, who were generally conflicted 
but not actively opposing measures that allowed their customers a certain 
proportion of alcohol consumption before they were classed as a drink-driver.  By 
this stage there had been movement – the drivers’ groups were becoming 
increasingly hardened against drink-driving, the road safety groups were 
becoming more aligned and the medical community was taking an increased 
interest in the topic. These movements led to developments within the policy 
community relationship, which affected the wider policy environment within 
drink-driving. 
 
Following the initial introduction of the new drink-driving laws, there were 
initially policy outcomes that followed the stated policy objectives for drink-
driving policy. Deaths and accidents were down – with the public generally 
acknowledging that drink-driving was not only illegal, but clearly a taboo as well. 
This was not to last - as H. L. Ross (1988, p. 863), a prominent sociologist on 
alcohol issues, notes that ‘within a numerous evaluators agree that the results 
were temporary and that the savings disappeared within 2 to 3 years’, (H. L. Ross, 
1988, p. 863). He goes on to add that, ‘my interpretation of the reasons for the 
success and failure of the Road Safety Act is that its provisions, being widely 
publicised because of their controversy and newsworthiness, were taken as 
evidence that the likelihood of punishment for drink-drivers had been importantly 
increased. Although arrests did increase, the level of actual law enforcement was 
far lower than initially imagined, and the public over time learned that the threat 
had been exaggerated.’ So as public understanding of the costs to drink-driving 
changed, with apparent less threat of enforcement, their obedience and effective 
endorsement of the policy dropped. This also contrasted with what the public 
appeared to actually want - that ‘a public opinion poll taken at the time of the 
passage of the 1967 Road Safety Act, which introduced breath testing and the legal 
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limit for drivers, showed that 71 per cent believed that the measures introduced 
by the government were not strict enough,’ (Baggott, 1986, p. 484). There was 
potentially significant support for firmer measures, whilst also an apparent form of 
contempt for the existing measures that had been put in place.  
 
In the debate over what became the Road Traffic Act 1974, drink-driving appeared 
as a point of argument, yet not an issue that the government was in the process of 
developing policy on (HL Deb, 1973–4). This led to the issue effectively being 
moved to a different venue with the Minister for Transport, Fred Mulley 
announcing a new committee, stating that  ‘The terms of reference of the 
committee will be; To review the operation of the law relating to drinking and 
driving and to make recommendations,’ (HC Deb, 1973-74).  It was generally 
agreed that this committee, to be led by Judge Frank Blennerhassett QC, would 
have a relatively broad scope to consider issues surrounding drink-driving policy, 
consulting with all interested parties and making formal recommendations to 
government on policy. It was expected that the report would be completed by the 
autumn of 1975. The committee set about its work with a number of oral evidence 
sessions – organisations represented at these sessions included the Association of 
Chief Police Officers, the BMA, the AA, the RAC and the Royal Scottish Automobile 
Club alongside individual legal, scientific and transport experts. Notably neither 
the Pedestrians Association, nor RoSPA, were called for oral evidence – though 
both provided written submissions. RoSPA had moved position to one very similar 
to the Pedestrians Association – it appears this led to less incentives for its 
participation in the policy community. Notably, and in a similar fashion to the 
earlier 1960s examples, there was limited presence from the alcohol groups – the 
Brewers’ Society submitted no evidence, nor any other alcohol producer group. 
The only representation came from the National Association of Licensed 
Victuallers, the same grouping who had attempted to run a poster campaign 
against breathalysers in the earlier development of drink-driving policy. In this 
circumstance they were seeking to have no change to the drink-driving limit. 
 
The report was delivered to John Gilbert, the new Transport Minister, in February 
1976, following a considerable inquiry that had considered all of the submissions, 
datasets and completed some international research. As a primary point it 
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recommended maintaining the 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood that was set in 
the 1967 Act, which had previously been the red line of motoring organisations 
and so received their consent. Interestingly the AA also provided evidence that 
drivers were becoming more favourable to random testing (Blennerhassett et al., 
1976, p. 21) which had also previously been an area where motoring organisations 
had been in an active dispute with government. Whether this was a full move to 
acceptance, or a targeted concession is uncertain, however the report, whilst 
acknowledging this issue as something that could be progressed, did not make it a 
recommendation. Formally it made a further five full recommendations and then 
two related recommendations. The first change is that a breath test should be the 
primary evidence basis to make the process easier (at the station, not the 
roadside) to make the process easier. It also reinforces that a police officer should 
be able to request a breath test, whilst also relaxing procedural requirements.  The 
next two recommendations demonstrate policy shift – introducing a new 
punishment should exist for high-risk cases - those considerably over the limit and 
repeat offenders – where a licence will only be returned when a court is sure that 
the individual does not present an undue risk as a driver. The final 
recommendation is for a continuing programme of publicity, which had previously 
been based on whether a successful bid for funds from the Treasury had been 
secured. These recommendations were encapsulated with two others – that all of 
these measures should be implemented concurrently with maximum provision – 
and that licensing of premises in relation to road location should be looked at again 
more closely. 
 
The report, though welcomed by the government (HC Deb, 1975-76), to an extent 
was passed over for further action for a considerable time. The tensions 
surrounding the later years of the Callaghan government certainly played a role 
with one senior civil servant writing in a letter to the Department of Transport 
that, ‘there is much to be said for fresh thought about the wisdom of legislating 
drinking and driving at the present time’, (Trafford-Owen, 11 May 1977). The 
concerns surrounded the actual legal practicalities of random testing and the 
equipment purchases necessary for breath testing. High-risk offenders presented a 
different issue with uncertainty on how to assess when they no longer became 
high-risk. The implementation of the now well-known Christmas advertising blitz 
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on drink-driving was however approved as a long-term commitment. When 
considering what this means for the policy community approach, the evidence and 
examples can be considered in a manner that fits the traditional approach. As 
outlined in table 4.3, the membership was refined slightly, with RoSPA - that had 
changed to a more negative, less conciliatory tone in terms of being much more in 
favour of new measures, tougher limits and greater actions, ejected. Alcohol 
groups had remained excluded, yet there was very little evidence indicated that 
they had desired inclusion or involvement in this debate beyond the victuallers. In 
effect, it had become even more tightly aligned with the typology within the 
traditional approach. This stability is telling – recommendations made within the 
Blennerhassett report were then effectively negotiated, in a highly integrated 
fashion with those who had to implement them and became more incremental and 
less fundamental. As advised by the civil servants, the Government recognised that 
it was not time for more dramatic or radical policy transitions – there were instead 
better methods or more stringent implementation of existing measures available, 
which were deliverable through the members of this policy community. On a basic 
level – both sides were in consensus on the principles in approaching the problem 
– this was not about radicalism, but in effect, populism, with considerable shift 
undesirable. A potential argument can be made about low-hanging fruit being the 
target – this was an issue of policy implementation rather than policy 
development. 
 
Table 4.3. The policy community surrounding the recommendations of the 
Blennerhassett Report compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy 
communities 
Dimension Policy Communities Response to the Blennerhassett 
report 
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
The consultation was narrower than 
previously, focused on drivers’ 
groups. Limited participation from 
other groups and alcohol-producer 
groups involved only at a distance. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Government and groups worked out 
options – often watering down 
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Frequent 
interaction. 
report recommendations, with 
coordinated responses. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Clear consensus on need for gradual 
progress and public facing items 
such as advertising campaign. 
 
An alternative analysis, which to an extent is indicated through the report’s policy 
recommendations, can be made for the adversarial policy community approach. In 
this circumstance the core community fits the traditional narrative, with groups 
surrounding and participating in the departmental committee that drafted the 
Blennershassett report being an alternative committee. In this circumstance the 
core committee, as outlined in table 4.4. surrounds the Department for Transport, 
it is increasingly exclusive and integrated within the department. In effect, it is an 
arm to limit the scope of policy down to principles considered agreeable - more 
populist measures like an advertising campaign were actively engaged with and 
supported by all. Even when concessions were offered, they appear to have been 
negotiated back to de minimis or light touch measures as practical implementation 
measures took hold – ease and cost being major concerns. The departmental 
committee represented an alternative venue around which a policy community 
formed – this community also had a narrow membership, with slight crossover 
with the core, but effectively dominated by the safety groups in contrast to the 
drivers’ group domination of the core. That an alternative community could be 
seen to have formed around the first alternative venue of note also indicates that 
other alternatives may have existed – it is unlikely that this was purely 
spontaneous – but on a basic level it gives merit to the adversarial approach. 
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Table 4.4.: The policy communities surrounding the recommendations of the 
Blennerhassett Report compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for 
adversarial policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Response to the 
Blennerhassett report 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range 
of interests represented. 
Narrow membership focused on 
drivers’ groups and represented. 
Previous members now 
excluded. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Department for Transport and 
groups worked out options – 
often watering down report 
recommendations, with 
coordinated responses. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Clear consensus on need for 
gradual progress, contrasting 
with firmer report 
recommendations and public 
facing items such as advertising 
campaign. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Response to the 
Blennerhassett report 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Still narrow but focus more on 
safety concerns and harm from 
drink-driving. RoSPA, with a 
changing view, moving to an 
alternative committee. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation – of an 
alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
Still a bargaining structure, 
based around a transport 
departmental committee – 
separate from the main 
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alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
department and core 
community, 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of 
alternative procedures to 
approach policy problems. 
A more radical approach to 
drink-driving policy and 
changes to areas which go 
beyond the principles of the 
core community – such as 
lowering the legal limit of 
alcohol in blood. 
 
After the change of government in 1979, the Blennerhassett report was once again 
considered. A significant factor in this may have been the continued activities of 
Judge Blennerhassett himself whose series of direct engagements with Ministers 
played a considerable role – with letters being sent up until 1989 (Atkins, 26 
September 1989).  The focus of these changes saw the dropping of the random 
sample issue – generally speaking it was eventually acknowledged they had 
considerable authority to stop a driver on a number of related issues and this was 
not a primary consideration in terms of policy weakness (H. Woodhouse, to 
Randall, J. J., 19 May 1977). There was in turn a renewed focus on the high-risk 
offenders and breath testing considerations. Progress was made rapidly on the 
issue of breath testing with procedures developed, costs of equipment scoped, and 
training considerations clearly outlined. On high-risk offenders some problems 
were encountered. When looking at practical implementation of the policy they 
approached the BMA for guidance on assessing whether someone was high-risk. 
The BMA identified significant problems in releasing medical records or personal 
medical information to a judge, at the same time as making it clear there were 
difficulties with a medical recommendation alone for a doctor. Equally informing a 
first-time offender of the risk of offending for a second time was also an issue – the 
initial plan to ask the Magistrates’ Association and the Justices’ Clerks’ Society to 
distribute a new leaflet on the scheme was not well received. Eventually a decision 
was made on making the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre distribute them at a 
considerable cost. The Transport Act 1981 saw these two new measures 
introduced – although the high-risk offenders’ scheme saw criticism from Judge 
Blennerhassett as being inadequate in further letters to the department.  
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Whether it was because of this lack of progress or indeed to continue to gradualist 
approach the then Dr Peter North was asked by the government to carry out the 
Road Traffic Law Review (Department of Transport and Home Office, 1988) which 
would look at offences, enforcement and punishments. Like Frank Blennerhassett 
before him Dr North was a Queen’s Counsel, who would go on to chair several 
government inquiries and be Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford.  Whilst 
not specifically targeted at drink-driving it did find that drivers who were over the 
limit and caused a fatality were often not charged with causing death by reckless 
driving, instead often being charged with a lower alcohol-related offence as this 
was easier to prosecute. This issue was taken up by the Government in its White 
Paper, ‘The road user and the law’ (Department of Transport, 1989) where it 
sought to make a specific offence of causing death by careless driving while 
affected by drink or drugs. This became law in the Road Traffic Act 1991, with 
wide support across the political spectrum – and within the policy community that 
surrounded the Department of Transport. The next major review of drink-driving 
laws began in 1998, with a recently elected Labour government looking at a data 
set that showed a consistent level of deaths from drink-driving. The Department of 
Transport published a new consultation ‘Combating drink-driving – next steps’, 
which included a range of potential policy options and an indication of the 
Government’s position. The consultation looked at three main areas in which 
Government policy could influence a reduction in drink-driving incidents - 
improving enforcement, improving the system of offences and penalties, alongside 
education, publicity and information. These wider headline points in effect meant 
giving extra powers to the Police to breath test, a streamlined court process, a 
lowering of the drink-driving limit to a blood-alcohol level of 50mg and increased 
education on the level of units in alcohol. The central tenet of this consultation, the 
most significant proposed change certainly, was the reduction in the drink-driving 
limit. The consultation noted, ‘It has been estimated that about 80 road users per 
year are killed in accidents where at least one driver had blood alcohol over 50mg 
but no driver had blood alcohol over 80mg. Perhaps 50 of these deaths could be 
saved each year if the legal limit were reduced to 50mg and enforced as effectively 
as the current limit. Some 250 serious and 1200 slight injuries per year could also 
be saved,’ (Home Office, 1998a). Crucially the consultation also noted that, ‘The 
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Government therefore is minded to lower the drink-drive limit to 50mg,’ (Home 
Office, 1998a). Intentions were in general clear – this measure would, it appears, 
save lives and the Government was of the opinion it would be an appropriate 
measure to follow through with.  
 
The consultation solicited a variety of responses from individuals and groups with 
an interest in the policy environment surrounding drink-driving. Of interest there 
was significant support for increased breath testing powers for police, however 
less support for this to extend to unlimited powers or to introduce random testing. 
The current campaigns were supported and increased education thought useful. 
The consultation had a relatively clear response on the initial of a lower drink-
drive limit, ‘Of those who responded, 79% were in favour of a lower limit, 14% 
were against and the remainder expressed no clear view,’ (Home Office, 1998b).  
There was a clear divide between groups on the blood alcohol limit issue, with the 
medical community, road safety groups and the police on one side - ‘those in 
favour of a 50mg limit included such bodies as the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (and Scottish counterpart), the Magistrates’ Association, the Justices’ 
Clerks’ Society, the British Medical Association, the Honorary Medical Advisory 
Panel on Alcohol, Drugs and Substance Misuse and Driving ("the Medical Advisory 
Panel") the Automobile Association, the Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents, the Transport Research Laboratory and the Parliamentary Advisory 
Council for Transport Safety,’ (Home Office, 1998b). They were opposed by the 
alcohol industry, some business groups and local councils – whose responses on 
this issue were evidently quite clear and firm. ‘There was particular opposition to a 
lower limit from those representing the drinks industry, such as the Brewers and 
Licensed Retailers Association (BLRA), the Portman Group and various individual 
brewers, distillers and other drinks manufacturers. Other organisations against a 
lower limit included the Federation of Small Businesses, the Road Haulage 
Association, the Association of British Drivers, The Law Society and the National 
Association of Local Councils,’ (Home Office, 1998b).  The government response to 
this is somewhat unclear – they continued with their initial positioning on all other 
areas but had a convenient get-out on the blood-alcohol level issue, ‘Since the 
consultation paper, the European Commission has indicated its intention to bring 
forward new proposals for harmonisation of the blood-alcohol level throughout 
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the European Union. In view of that, the Government will defer any further 
decision on the matter until the EC proposals are known,’ (Home Office, 1998b). 
This position would not hold, as the proposals were to fall within the European 
sphere – meaning the Government would need to make a policy decision. 
 
A new participant appeared when a variety of alcohol producers created the 
Portman Group, which had latterly become central in licensing reform. ‘The 
Portman Group was established in 1989 by the UK's leading alcohol producers. Its 
role was to promote responsible drinking; to help prevent alcohol misuse; and to 
foster a balanced understanding of alcohol-related issues,’ (Portman Group). Their 
participation in the drink-driving issue was interesting – somewhat set apart from 
the previously major alcohol trade bodies they had a different role – yet were still 
funded by, and took headline direction from, the alcohol industry. What happened 
next was of note in considering policy – appearing at the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union, the Minister made a U-turn. ‘Mr Jamieson, 
when giving evidence to the committee, repeated a hypothetical line of argument 
put forward by the Portman Group that there might be a public backlash against a 
lower limit which could lead to drivers ignoring the law,’ ("Government 'under the 
influence'," 2002, p. 2). The Committee’s report (House of Lords Select Committee 
on the European Union, 2002, p. 15) noted that, ‘We note that the Department’s 
position coincides with that of the alcohol industry but is opposed by local 
authorities, the police, the British Medical Association, the Automobile Association, 
the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, the Transport Research 
Laboratory, and the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety.’ In 
general the report was particularly scathing to the Government’s turnaround on 
this issue and rejected the arguments put forward by the Portman Group. Yet, the 
policy stood – indicative that when the existing policy community had begun to 
either fail, or be seen as now against the interests of another policy community 
who had previously sat idly by, they had intervened and sought to take control of 
the issue. This semblance of a new policy community for drink-driving with 
alcohol-producers suddenly now having a central role also mirrors the changes in 
licensing when a new consensus away from the traditional participants was sought 
by the sector in the late 1990s and early 21st century. 
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In December 2009, Lord Adonis, then the Transport Secretary commissioned the 
now Sir Peter North to complete a specific review of drink- and drug-driving laws. 
This review differed from the earlier North Review thanks to this targeted focus – 
where beforehand drink-driving was an element of the inquiry; on this occasion it 
was the only item of discussion. Speculation at the time indicated that he was 
minded to impose tougher laws (see Milmo, 2009), with a specific reference to a 
lower drink-drive limit. The position of the motoring lobby had also definitively 
changed with Edmund King, president of the AA, being quoted as indicating, ‘more 
than two-thirds of the organisation's members favoured a lower limit’, whilst at 
the same time warning ‘that imposing a 50mg rule could be the wrong answer, 
however, because the majority of drivers killed in alcohol-related accidents were 
significantly over the limit’, (Milmo, 2009). The report was set to be rapid – with a 
desire for initial advice by the end of March 2010. Once again an election would 
appear between advice being commissioned and potentially implemented with the 
final report being delivered to the new government in June 2010.  The North 
Review (North, 2010) saw a much wider array of witnesses than his predecessor’s 
Blennerhassett’s report of some thirty-four years previously. Alongside the prior 
representatives, who were also seen, the inclusion of alcohol industry 
representatives, including the British Beer & Pub Association and the Wine & 
Spirits Trade Association; and the inclusion of a wide array of road safety groups 
including RoSPA, Brake and RoadPeace was highly noticeable. The lack of any 
appearance of the Portman Group, so prominent in the previous review as an 
umbrella group for the industry, was also worthy of note. The report made a series 
of technical recommendations, with the primary focus being on a reduction in the 
drink-drive limit to 50mg of alcohol per 100ml of blood and the introduction of 
random testing. The review did note the potential for impact on the licensed trade 
but felt that both effects would be limited to specific premises and the benefits 
considerably outweighed these costs.  
 
Following the publication of the review the Transport Select Committee sought to 
investigate the recommendations ahead of a decision by the Department of 
Transport on implementation. Hearing witness evidence from Sir Peter North, 
various road safety groups and driving organisations they developed slightly 
alternative proposals. Similarly to the AA in the Blennerhassett review, the British 
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Beer & Pub Association, alongside other alcohol groups, positively promoted 
random testing as a better method than reducing the alcohol limit. Interestingly 
the evidence submitted both by the RAC (House of Commons Transport 
Committee, 2010, p. Ev 57) and AA (House of Commons Transport Committee, 
2010, p. Ev 77) showed them in favour of the lower limit alongside the Road 
Haulage Association – whilst the Alliance of British Drivers, a much smaller body, 
was opposed.  This investigation came up with a different analysis calling for the 
eventual implementation of an even lower limit of 20mg of alcohol per 100ml of 
blood – yet did not think the North Review’s recommendations were a useful 
staging point causing confusion over what was the legal limit. 
 
The Government responded (Department of Transport, 2010) to both reviews 
simultaneously. To an extent playing reviews off against each other they 
eliminated the headline items of random testing and the lower alcohol limit, whilst 
broadly committing to the rest of the recommendations. There were some caveats 
with potential for reassessment in the future and the investments in improvement 
in data collection that could lead to a rethink.  Justification was sought through the 
potential for public confusion, the limited impact on casualties and the economic 
impact on business. The policies that were to be implemented would be targeted to 
limit these negative issues, whilst noting drink-driving was falling at a high rate in 
Britain already, which North himself had clearly noted. In effect the government 
took on board policy positions from the alcohol-producing representatives in a 
similar fashion to their predecessors in the late 1990s. Interestingly they still 
struggled with random testing despite it now appearing to have wide support 
across groups. When making a similar assessment to earlier reviews it is clear 
firstly that new participants have appeared – namely the alcohol producers – first 
in the guise of the Portman Group and latterly more openly. Part of this was due to 
a clear shift in motoring organisations – groups that had previously sat on the 
opposite side of the debate to the safety groups now joined them (House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2010, p. Ev 77).  The recommendations of the 
North Review were in line with the interests of the motoring organisations and 
safety campaigners – arguably a group similar to either the original traditional or 
core community. When the parliamentary select committee became involved 
recommendations were watered down and when the government responded the 
 125 
recommendations opposed by the alcohol producers, yet backed by most others, 
were gone. There is an argument that the resources provided by alcohol 
producers, in terms of support for drink-driving campaigns, was now of more 
value to government than the motoring organisations. The outcome suggests 
power focused around alcohol producers rather than the collected other groups. 
Once again there was remarkable stability in policy despite external factors, with 
incremental changes that were commonly agreed. Considering that many 
questions asked by both reviews, and cited by Sir Peter North, surrounded the 
potential economic impact of the new measures on the licensed trade professional 
knowledge and technical expertise of this area was seen as important. Equally the 
wider groups also played a significant role in providing knowledge and expertise 
to the reviews. The end outcome was incrementalism, with a slowly increasing 
amount of law appearing regarding drink-driving. Despite this incrementalism 
there was a trajectory of change in policy that had momentum at key points for a 
faster pace. With the exception of the 1967 Act, this movement was gradual and 
did not move beyond the acceptable compromise between the alcohol-producer 
groups and other members of the policy community – there was a casual 
acceptance of the institutional elements of the community, a common consensus. 
The shift back of influence, the removing of recommendations on reducing the 
drink driving limit, could also be an unusually public example of the restrictive 
power outlined by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p. 952) – limiting the scope of 
reference, whilst somewhat late in the process, it is indicative of the alcohol 
sector’s wider influence. 
 
When considering the role of policy communities in both the North Review and the 
policy outcomes, there are difficulties for the traditional policy community 
approach. In table 4.4. considering the Daugbjerg (1998) typology, on the 
dimension that considers integration we can find multiple elements that fit with 
the traditional approach – there is clear bargaining and negotiation of policy, 
alongside close and frequent interaction. This interaction is clear from letters, 
meetings and genuine two-way communication – the similarity in language used 
being a clear example of this environment. In the institutionalisation dimension, 
there became consensus on policy principles, but only after a shift from the 
government side to more closely match with the alcohol producer and retailer 
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groups’ considerations. At first there seemed likely to be a move from the 
government, with the drink-driving limit being changed – lowered to a point 
beyond the long-term compromise. The engagement with the policy community 
focused on these alcohol interests brought the government side back to this longer 
term, institutionalised value.  On membership there was certainly, eventually a 
very narrow involvement from alcohol groups – but it had become almost entirely 
unrecognisable from its membership at the time of the Blennerhassett report. It 
also clearly changed – pushing out the prior members such as RoSPA and 
integrating the Portman Group to a more central role – with clear, direct access to 
the government. 
 
Table 4.5.: The policy community surrounding the North Review compared to 
the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
Response to the North Review 
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Unclear – appears to be a step 
away from previous groups 
engaged in the community, with 
new participants. Rise of the 
alcohol groups in engagement on 
drink-driving. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Government and alcohol groups 
worked out options – watering 
down report recommendations, 
with coordinated responses.  
Institutionalisation Consensus on 
policy principles 
and procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Consensus appeared on need for 
incrementalism and slow shift, 
with no major changes – yet this 
was a shift back from an earlier 
position. 
 
Given the challenges to the traditional policy community approach, there is also an 
imperfect fit to the adversarial policy community approach. Within table 4.6. the 
core community is outlined as being  the one that surrounds the North Review 
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itself, but depending on the exact focus of the case study it could be considered to 
be either this or the alternative that surrounded the Transport Select Committee 
and potentially the Department for Transport itself. The shift in authority and the 
sudden interest from the alcohol groups in this policy area is telling. That they 
could come in as an alternative policy community and effectively become the core 
group so quickly indicates that may have always been in a position of dominance 
yet had almost outsourced the responsibility to another community that still 
fulfilled its objectives. The evidence indicates that rather than with licensing when 
an alternative policy community appeared to create an environment for more 
radical change, in drink-driving an alternative policy community came to challenge 
the core to allow for continued incrementalism of policy. In effect, this shows a 
potential dimension to the adversarial policy community approach that had not 
been fully considered – being the core community may not necessarily be directly 
related to being the most influential, instead be an element of delegated authority 
from an alternative policy community that has chosen not to be core whilst their 
policy objectives are being satisfied. The alternative policy community, seeing 
policy developments that did not satisfy their outcomes moved the venue of 
development to an area where they could have greater influence. It gives the 
impression more of a wayward child being brought back into line, rather than a 
clearer cut battle – as the influence was considerable as well as rapid. 
 
Table 4.6.: The policy communities surrounding the North Review compared to 
the adapted Daugbjerg Typology for Adversarial Policy Communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Response to the North 
Review 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Made up of the groups who 
once surrounded the 
Department of Transport – 
now surrounding the North 
Review – drivers, motoring and 
safety groups. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any specific 
They were closely integrated 
with the North Review, which 
in theory had the authority to 
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point. Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
set policy direction. The 
policies were closely debated, 
considered and detail 
negotiated. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Importance of action made 
clear, outcomes based 
approach in relation to 
reducing harm from drink-
driving, not considering related 
incidents. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Response to the North 
Review 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Effectively the Portman Group 
representing producers and 
retailers of alcohol. 
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
The venue became the 
Transport Select Committee 
who were considering the 
policy. Evidence of frequent 
interaction. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Consensus on delivery of drink-
driving messaging and 
enforcement of regulation, 
effectively without significant 
negative impact on the on-
trade retail of alcohol. 
 
4.3. Scotland – a different road travelled? 
By 2010 Scottish devolution had allowed for considerable policy divergence with 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) government was progressively following a 
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differing cause to the rest of the United Kingdom across many policy arenas. 
Various examples are available to demonstrate their policy differences, with a 
useful example being their position on drink-driving. Following the publication of 
the North Review, they in turn took policy in a different direction – with Scotland 
seeking to follow the recommendation of a lower limit for drink-driving. This shift 
from the rest of Britain may well be argued to be caused by many factors, but a 
potential consideration is the differing structure of policy communities in Scotland 
compared to Westminster. Could what Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn (2009) 
define as territorial policy communities exist for this issue – helping to understand 
the reasons behind policy departures? Could these territorial policy communities 
be the alternative to a United Kingdom core? This section will look at the process 
leading up to Scotland’s policy cleavage with the rest of the United Kingdom, 
seeking to understand the more appropriate policy community approach to 
understand the Scottish divergence. It will also consider whether this territorial 
model is a reflection of the Dudley and Richardson (1996) adversarial policy 
communities who effectively venue shop to get their desired policy outcomes, as 
outlined in the operational typology. 
 
In Scotland many of the wider national alcohol producer groups have a presence, 
though for the most part they have no specific offices – the obvious exception 
being the Scotch Whisky Association and the Scottish Beer & Pub Association, until 
it closed its offices in 2014. Equally the structure of the Scottish market is very 
different with most licensed establishments being independent – especially public 
houses (see Sheen (2014)) and as such unlikely to be corporate members of the 
major associations.  The Scottish Licensed Trade Association is a body that seeks to 
represent these independent businesses and has worked with the Scottish 
Government on the issue of minimum unit pricing – however it is not an interest 
group organised primarily for political representation – instead being more 
focused on the implementation regulatory measures and support on licensing.  
Alongside their counterparts in Westminster the Scottish Government received the 
North Review in June 2010. As the review in Westminster of the proposals took 
place there was a comparatively warm welcome in Scotland (Scottish Government, 
2014). Subsequently with the Westminster government’s decision not to lower the 
limit, a request for devolved powers was made to be able to lower the limit in 
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Scotland. This request was answered in the Scotland Act 2012 when specific 
authority to lower the limit was included – though further variation on the drink-
driving scheme was excluded. The Scottish Government soon put out a 
consultation that in effect consulted on lowering the drink-drive limited to 50mg of 
alcohol per 100ml of blood. The news release accompanying the consultation 
(Scottish Government, 2012a) included supportive quotes from the Association of 
Chief Police Officers Scotland and the Lord Advocate. The short consultation saw 
138 responses with some 74% in favour of the proposed reduction in the drink-
drive limit (Mulholland & Granville, 2012). On the background of this a further 
news release from the Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 2013), 
welcomed this result with further praise for the policy from the Justice Secretary, 
NHS representatives and RoSPA. To an extent the issue then stepped back slightly 
from urgent Scottish Government promotion, with intent still out there, but limited 
public commentary or commitment in the run up to the independence referendum. 
 
Not long after the referendum took place a new measure was laid by the Justice 
Secretary - The Road Traffic Act 1988 (Prescribed Limit) (Scotland) Regulations 
2014 – that required only minimal Scottish Parliamentary time. The 
announcement was again made by press release with another supportive quote 
from RoSPA. The ability to make this change via statutory instrument led to a rapid 
implementation date – with the limit dropping on 4 December 2014. To an extent 
in line with warnings from the Scottish Licensed Trade Association the licensed 
trade sector saw significant declines. Their Chief Executive Paul Waterson 
indicated that, ‘the rate of pub closures has gone from three a week to seven since 
the new drink-drive limit,’ (Silvester, 2015). More dramatically the Bank of 
Scotland’s economic department reported that, ‘Scotland’s tough new drink-
driving law is proving so successful at stopping people from indulging that it is 
damaging financial growth,’ (Green, 2015b). Beyond the economic effects of the 
proposal it was reported as to having no impact on the rates of offending (Green, 
2015a) based on police statistics – the Scottish Government did state that the very 
slight decline despite a lower limit showed that the policy was actually working – 
something that was disputed by other commentators. Certainly outcomes are very 
different within the devolved scenario.  The entirely different reactions to the 
North Review would indicate a different policy community, yet when the 
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participants are considered similar groups were consulted and considered. It could 
appear to be evident that alcohol groups are less influential - this could be because 
they are less organised due to market structure. Yet to an extent those that were in 
place – such as the Scottish Licensed Trade Association - were more publicly vocal 
than their UK counterparts. In contrast outcomes were accepted, positively 
welcomed by safety, police and medical groups. RoSPA and others clearly offered 
support for the Scottish Government – in terms of survey response, even if it was 
low, and also key public support for measures. This was a major shift and 
potentially an area where the Scottish policy could go further – in a similar way to 
the shifts seen in licensing in the UK. 
 
Considering a traditional policy community approach, there is a firmer evidence 
for this approach in Scotland than in the wider United Kingdom – partially as the 
membership remained more consistent with the pre-devolution examples from the 
wider United Kingdom. As outlined in table 4.7. these groups took on the task of 
finding methods to implement the proposals put forward within the North Review, 
this was almost a maintenance of the evolving policy community position that had 
occurred since the 1960s – rather than being a radical shift it had instead followed 
a continued direction. The reverse of this is considering arguments made that 
Scotland by authors such as Hawkins and Holden (2014) that Scotland gives room 
for public health advocates, in this case the safety groups, to lead, rather than be 
left outside the community in place of the alcohol interests. That RoSPA was 
excluded from the stage of the Blennerhassett report in the United Kingdom’s 
policy community yet had appeared as a lead member in Scotland seems to fit their 
narrative. That may have some justification, but it is also potentially simplistic – 
that Scotland fits a more traditional approach better than the wider United 
Kingdom is an indication that potential rather than be more radical, it is instead 
less developed. 
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Table 4.7.: The policy community surrounding the North Review in Scotland 
compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
Response to the North Review 
in Scotland 
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Whilst there was a wide level of 
group consultation, the 
membership was limited to 
medical, police and safety 
groups. Conscious exclusion of 
alcohol groups. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Frequent meetings with the 
RoSPA, alongside regular 
meetings with other, supportive 
groups. Drafts and concepts 
shared between groups and 
Government. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on 
policy principles 
and procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Clear agreement on direction of 
travel and the North Review 
recommendations as an 
objective. 
 
In considering an adversarial approach, there is a clear core that surrounds the 
issue within the Scottish sphere, as outlined in table 4.6. there is a clear core policy 
community, which fits closely on the three dimensions.  As for an alternative policy 
community it is worth considering that Keating et al. (2009) put forward three 
potential impacts that a devolved environment can have on policy communities. 
The first of these is in effect nothing, with a similar arrangement persisting in the 
new environment. The second sees a partial exit of groups – as they look for an 
arena that will best suit their interests. The final option is what is called new 
regionalism where policy communities emerge at this new level. Looking at the 
example of drink-driving we can find examples of options two and three. 
Organisations such as RoSPA, having failed at the UK level, are suddenly seeking 
influence in an environment that is much more welcoming. The policy outlook is 
 133 
positive for them in Scotland and therefore they are active participants. Arguably 
we could look at alcohol producers in the reverse – the UK government may 
represent a better bet in terms of influence, whilst Scotland is limited in its impact 
compared to the resources required to influence policy. There is evidence of an 
alternative policy community the major cleavage with the United Kingdom is that 
it did not shift the core policy community and replace it. Whilst policy communities 
have been found to organise around departments, commissions and committees in 
Scotland there is arguable limited scope – this was a Government consultation not 
a Department for Transport one – there seems to be less opportunity to organise 
around ministries. The narrowness of the Scottish system could indicate that the 
value of being core is much greater than in the wider United Kingdom – there are 
fewer venues in the Scottish context for policy communities to form around. The 
climate has fewer opportunities for policy to shift from venue to venue – as there 
simply are not a wide enough variety of commissions or departments to build 
around to start off with. Whilst in the British context adversarial communities had 
alternative venues to at least establish themselves, this appears not to be a feature 
of the Scottish system. 
 
Table 4.8.: The policy communities surrounding the North Review in Scotland 
compared to the adapted Daugbjerg Typology for Adversarial Policy 
Communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Response to the North Review 
in Scotland – Core 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Membership limited to medical, 
police and safety groups.  
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Frequent meetings with the 
RoSPA, alongside regular 
meetings with other, supportive 
groups. Drafts and concepts 
shared between groups and 
Government. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
Clear agreement on direction of 
travel and the North Review 
 134 
to approach policy 
problems. 
recommendations as an 
objective. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Response to the North Review 
in Scotland – Alternate 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Combination of alcohol 
producer and retailer groups 
with other groups such as the 
Road Haulage Association. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation – of an 
alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Interaction at a consultative 
level, some levels of interaction 
but with limited evidence of 
negotiate on specific topics. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Consensus that reduction of 
alcohol in blood limit was 
inappropriate but willing to 
negotiate in other areas. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Whilst legislation on drink-driving had existed prior to the 1960s it was during this 
period that the formative relationships began with a variety of groups and policy 
principles that are recognisable today, were developed. What caused it to rise as an 
issue appears to be a combination of public interest driven by the media and 
ministers taking it upon themselves to drive the policy forward – a solution was 
demanded and groups were engaged to deliver it. Limits on alcohol in blood, 
testing and enforcement became actual policy. Yet this was also a policy framed in 
the sense of individuals taking things to far – and in the early framing especially a 
very narrow group who were effectively beyond the scope of acceptable 
behaviour. It was not a societal issue as such – one that was an individual problem 
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with slightly wider impacts. This framing of the issue was vitally important for the 
alcohol sector, and whilst it is difficult to evidence their direct role in framing it, 
they certainly benefitted from it. The alcohol industry also demonstrated an ability 
to take back influence and authority when this framing was challenged – keeping 
the key elements of the status quo. In Scotland, with a policy environment where 
access and influence for alcohol was more challenging, the key shift they were 
trying to avoid took place. That the economic interests of the sector were 
significantly affected by this, whilst there was minimal impact on the rate of 
offending, does indicate that there was an argument for their framing of the issue 
which could explain it to some extent – but their lack of ability to influence in the 
environment where the frame shifted does indicate they may have had a longer 
term significant role elsewhere. 
 
The establishment of the policy in the 1960s seems to be most compelling 
understood through a traditional policy community approach – there were 
excluded and included groups, who negotiated and bargained around a 
government department that had near complete authority over the policy. When 
interest piqued again, the policy community’s opposition to a change in the drink-
drive limit, made sure that this stayed off the policy agenda. Other areas where 
they offered to concede – such as random testing – were unpalatable to the 
government so they were dropped in a two-way negotiation. Arguably by offering 
a relatively large policy shift, which was also requested by the safety groups, they 
had the flexibility to be firmly against other measures. 
 
This was a powerful position that kept drink-driving policy relatively consistent, 
with some participants dropped as they no longer shared the institutional 
agreements – mainly RoSPA which went from being a position of considerable 
influence to almost none as the responses to the Blennerhassett report developed. 
Scotland provides an interesting case study in terms of regionalising policy issues 
– the differing environment and lack of major alcohol presence being factors. This 
was also coming to pass in a period when motoring organisations had shifted to be 
more in line with the safety groups – arguably the existing core policy community 
had shifted and whilst this led to the alternative policy community on the alcohol-
 136 
producer side taking control in the UK, in Scotland the status quo of membership 
was maintained. 
 
How the policy community at first changed with the previously acceptable safety 
organisations dropping out, and then diverged in two directions offers an 
indication that a shift in ability to deliver does not necessarily deliver a consistent 
response.  At first we have a central role for RoSPA when it was probably best 
framed as cooperative – as their membership moved the leadership to a different 
agenda they were gradually moved out of the community. The Pedestrians 
Association continued to disregard the policy community environment – its 
activism was not of a negotiated style. Then came the 1990s and the movement of 
motoring organisations. They became a consultee, rather than the consultee on 
drink-driving – and arguable found themselves outside the core policy community 
in the United Kingdom context. The gradual progress towards accepting a shift in 
the drink-driving limit led to engagement by new participants, who had previously 
actively sought not to participate. The alcohol industry quite suddenly had to play 
a major role, with the previous arms-length supporters in the driving lobby 
deciding to switch sides. After a period of apparent frustration in developing the 
policy within the existing community it shifted to an alternative, an alternative that 
was effectively an adversary to the initial one – although reflected the institutional 
ambitions of the original community when it was formed. The traditional policy 
community approach becomes less useful in explaining policy outcomes and 
relationships, as the policy developed on drink-driving. 
 
Drink-driving demonstrates that alternative policy communities can become the 
core policy community, and yet in another venue, with similar arguments or 
relationships do not reach that core status.  It showed that policy communities can 
potential exist within a major area of alcohol policy both with and without the 
participation of alcohol-producer groups. That an alternative policy community, in 
this context the alcohol-producer and retailer-led community, can limit its 
involvement by choice when outcomes working for it – yet also take control and 
become the core when needed adds a dimension to the adversarial approach.  The 
alcohol-producer-led groups were accepting of a drink-driving policy environment 
that saw high levels of prosecution, supported random testing and public 
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campaigns targeting the behaviour, as long as it came with an alcohol limit that 
allowed some level of alcohol consumption before driving. Whilst the other groups, 
provided this environment and did not represent a threat to this level of alcohol 
consumption, there was limited competition from the alternative policy 
community. The only struggle was largely an internal one over random testing, 
which found political disfavour, despite being acceptable to both the core and the 
alternative communities. Once they sought to intervene in an area seen almost as 
essential, the alternative policy community successful emerged as the core in the 
United Kingdom environment. In Scotland, the same attempt was made but 
without success – the alcohol limit was cut to a level below that the alcohol-
producers found acceptable. Control and influence outside of Scotland seemed to 
be given under delegation, which could be recalled. It highlights that there may be 
multiple alternative communities in existence who can all find success in the right 
climate – with the difference between core and alternative, the adversarial 
relationship being more complicated than simply having different viewpoints.  
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Chapter 5 
Alcohol price 
Too high or too low? From monopolies to minimum unit pricing 
“You must have seen great changes since you were a young man,” said Winston 
tentatively. The old man’s pale blue eyes moved from the darts board to the bar, and 
from the bar to the door of the Gents … “The beer was better,” he said finally. “And 
cheaper! When I was a young man, mild beer – wallop we used to call it – was 
fourpence a pint.” 
George Orwell (1949) 
 
There is evidence of historic policy interventions that seek to affect the price of 
alcohol going back centuries (see Annex A, table A.1. for examples), indicating this 
has been an area that has long sustained the interest of policymakers. Outside of 
interventions in the First World War most prominent attempts at price control in 
the modern era appeared in Britain within the late 1960s and continued on into 
the early 1970s. This was a time when fears of inflationary pressures were rife and 
national pricing policies in place, therefore balancing of the price of beer at a point 
that was considered reasonable, stable and affordable for the masses was 
considered vital.  This is in direct contrast to the focus in the 2010s on what was 
perceived as a dangerously low alcohol price (see Plant and Plant (2006) and 
Gilmore (2015)) – instead the Department of Economic Affairs (1965) focused on 
consumer detriment through excessive price increases and abuse of the breweries’ 
power over publicans. The journey between these two positions on price allows 
for consideration of the policy community approach when government and 
external pressures were effectively at two ends of a scale. 
 
Price is an area where the economic interests of the alcohol sector should be most 
relevant. Whilst licensing gives access, price is an area where the most dedicated 
interest has existed from the alcohol sector and an area with the most regularity of 
change through Budget statements on taxation. Therefore, it should be an area 
where there is clear evidence that the industry, if it is dominant, has a clear line of 
influence on the process. The twin complexities of an earlier focus on price 
limitation, then followed by a latter focus, with a specific Scottish element, of 
minimum unit pricing, with various tax changes also playing a key role. It will also 
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test whether the role of groups in general within this area is as of much 
significance as an assumption of dominance would indicate. Could other 
participants – specialist government departments such as the Central Policy 
Review Staff, the Treasury itself or wider economic concerns overtake a policy 
community environment? The chapter will also consider the increasing attempts 
for influence being sought by the public health interests – and whether their 
influence can be felt, or indeed if they could be a distinct alternative policy 
community. 
 
In delving into the case study surrounding price the first section will consider are 
the interactions in the 1960s during the period of the first Wilson government that 
surrounded investigations by the National Board for Prices and Incomes and the 
Monopolies Commission. This is when pressure to contain price rises was most 
prominent and the challenge was whether prices had effectively risen to an 
inappropriate level.  This also reflected apparent departmental differences 
between the Department of Economic Affairs and the Ministry for Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries.  Considering the approaches and positioning from both of 
these departments their policy communities and whether a traditional or 
adversarial approach offers a clearer explanation of developments. The second 
section will look to the late 1970s and early 1980s when following a report by the 
Central Policy Review Staff consideration on price and taxation became issues 
where health concerns played a new, more significant role. It will again consider 
how departments, and their associate policy communities, that had historical 
control over these areas reacted to this attempt to shift both policy and authority.  
 
The third section will look at the later years of the New Labour Government and 
the development of the Alcohol Duty Escalator, alongside the research 
commissioned by the Department of Health from the University of Sheffield that 
led to the Chief Medical Officer calling for a Minimum Unit Price for alcohol. It will 
also consider how this concept became Government policy under the coalition, 
then was dropped alongside the Alcohol Duty Escalator with the first cuts in 
alcohol duty made for decades. The final section will look at Scotland’s Minimum 
Unit Pricing proposal, how it has challenged and influenced the development of 
policy communities in the devolved region, alongside the impact of policy failure 
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when delivery became a prolonged legal battle – and the impacts this also had on 
progressing alcohol policy forward. 
 
5.1. Brewers’ monopolies and pricing for increased profit 
There are historical examples of the price of alcohol of being of notable concern to 
the population as far back as the maximum cap on the price of ale within the Assize 
of Bread and Ale 1266 (see Annex A, table A.1.). As Yeomans (2019, p. 7) argued 
‘for many centuries these interventions were designed to support public 
consumption, in stark contrast to contemporary proposals, by creating maximum 
prices for some alcoholic drinks.’ The last notable attempt of this style of 
intervention was in the 1960s under the first Wilson Government when the 
Department of Economic Affairs began to take an interest in the price of alcohol. 
This section will outline the way they focused their concerns on what was termed 
as profiteering by the brewers, with attached tenant and consumer detriment. The 
combined tenant and consumer detriment, as outlined in the Department of 
Economic Affairs (1965) background note reflected the concerns found through 
the route of sale - the majority of alcohol in Britain was sold via public houses, 
which for the most part were run by tenants with ownership and supply under the 
control of a few large breweries – price control was out of the hands of the end 
retailer. 
 
The first part of this section will look at the background to interest in this issue 
following the launch of the Department of Economic Affairs and the National Board 
for Prices and Incomes. It will also consider the clash of policy communities 
between the Department of Economic Affairs compared to the established Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries network.  It will then consider the rising public 
and political concern exhibited at rising beer prices, plus the challenge of 
investigating these changes at arm’s length, with a network a step away. The final 
section will consider the reaction to this both from the Department of Economic 
Affairs and its successor departments following the change of government – 
considering what effect this had on networks and how networks played their part. 
The formation of the Department of Economic Affairs, under George Brown then 
the Labour Deputy Leader and First Secretary of State, represented a new 
challenge for interests within alcohol. Alongside the National Prices and Incomes 
 141 
Board a new pressure was exerted on various production interest groups, with 
beer considered a key commodity where inflationary pressure was to be resisted. 
This represented a different challenge from relationships with Home Office or HM 
Treasury, alongside headline production concerns with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food. The lack of formed or established policy communities 
represented a challenge with no status quo and objectives that had not yet been 
fully formed. At this point there was comparatively little variance in price between 
establishments belonging to the same brewery (Department of Economic Affairs, 
1965) – and with the clear majority of public houses owned by a few major 
breweries there was clearly a considerable level of influence that could be exerted 
by these organisations on the final price paid by consumers. 
 
The Labour government had come into power promising, ‘not to dictate prices, 
wages and salaries - but to give, in selected cases, the opportunity for objective 
consideration of claims before either prices are fixed or collective bargains struck’, 
(Labour Party, 1966). This promise was realised with the establishment of the 
Department of Economic Affairs, alongside the powerful National Board for Prices 
and Incomes, had created almost a new framework or terms of policy debate – 
price was a policy concern at a national political level. In a wider context this was 
part of the scheme that sought to manage inflation as part of government policy. At 
the beginning a semi-formal establishment of what had close similarity to a 
traditional policy community was evident with alcohol-producer groups, with a 
primary role for the Brewers’ Society and a community centred around alcohol 
producers, called in to effectively represent the industry in a negotiated 
framework and also act as a delivery agent of government policy.  The initial 
meetings, which were led by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, 
stressed the requirements of the government that price rises were restricted – 
with a freeze the preferred outcome. Meetings took place in January 1965 
(Department of Economic Affairs, 1965) between representatives of the 
Department of Economic Affairs and the Brewers’ Society, alongside some 
unspecified others, to discuss the issue of price. The Brewers’ Society offered 
assurance that, ‘they would do their utmost to absorb cost increases without 
putting up prices’, (Department of Economic Affairs, 1965, p. 1). This was caveated 
that occasional changes would be likely with changing commodity costs and 
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occasional new decisions on strength. It was also widely understood that duty 
changes, whilst attempts would be made to absorb some of the costs, would likely 
end being partially reflected on the final cost. The expectation was that the policy 
community, which at this point had the Brewers’ Society as its most influential 
member, could and would deliver action by its membership in terms of price 
control.  
 
Whilst there was a clear commitment for price control within the policy 
community, there were some indications that this commitment may not have been 
fully honoured. Letters began to appear in MPs and departmental mailboxes from 
members of the public concerned by price increases at their local public house 
(Burton, November 1965; Laws, 10 November 1965, 30 November 1965). The 
Brewers’ Society may not have been able to deliver its members as promised. Early 
letters from individuals such as Tom Driberg MP, who at the time was still a 
member of the Labour Party National Executive Committee and former party 
chairman, expressed their concern. In a letter to George Brown he enclosed two 
further letters from brewers noting cost changes and encouraging retail price 
rises. He stated that, ‘I hope that you can intervene to protect the interests of the 
drinking public,’ (Driberg, 20 March 1965). The evidence seemed to illustrate a 
brewer encouraging publicans to increase their margin on a product beyond the 
proportional increase in cost price – in effect to increase their profit margins. This 
also hit a departmental priority clash – despite the Department of Economic Affairs 
leading on pricing, it came under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries. 
Tom Driberg MP kept up his campaigning on this issue, raising further questions in 
Parliament. His question, which called on the Ministry to, ‘draw the attention of the 
appropriate trade organisations to Government policy in this regard’, (HC Deb, 
1964-1965a). Responding Fred Peart, latterly Lord Peart, stated that, ‘[I] am sure 
that all responsible members of the trade concerned will wish to honour these 
assurances, but I am keeping a close watch on the position.’ This was not enough 
for Driberg – he followed up with, ‘Has my Right Hon. Friend looked into the 
particular cases and the circulars which were sent to him in which Messrs. Courage 
and another firm claimed deliberately to have taken advantage of wholesale and 
retail increases to increase also the profit margin? Is this not a clear sign that they 
are not keeping their promises to my Right Hon. Friend?’ The answer to this 
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reconfirmed the previous position but offered some indication that this was an 
issue that was getting increasing political attention outside of the network 
environment. Parliamentary pressure continued to rise, with a direct question 
from Emrys Hughes MP in June 1965 whether, ‘in view of recent high beer 
production, he will ask the National Board for Prices and Incomes to investigate 
the income of the brewers’, (HC Deb, 1964-1965b). The request was denied, but it 
was noted that this was an area of concern. Pressure further built when the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union’s (AEU) Birmingham branch called for an 
investigation, with the Daily Mirror ("Beer up 2d - Probe demanded," 1965) and 
Daily Express (Express Staff Reporter, 1965) covering the forwarding of this 
concern to the Trades Union Congress for a reference to the National Prices and 
Incomes Board. Their parliamentary constituents were sending letters to Ministers 
and local concerns were being raised with them directly. Department officials from 
the Department of Economic Affairs sought increasing guidance from the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, sending over complaints for investigation. 
These communications noted that, ‘the increases are said to be in some cases of a 
substantial nature’, (Laws, 10 November 1965) and were becoming increasingly 
frequent. Latter communications indicated they would be, ‘grateful for your advice 
on how to reply’, (Laws, 30 November 1965) and also highlighting the breweries 
where complaints had been made.  
 
Whilst letters were coming into the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 
from MPs and fellow government departments, they in turn were writing out to 
breweries and their representatives (Burton, November 1965). There was also 
confirmation that thanks to the establishment of the new ‘early warning system’ 
for price increases, situations like this with the government comparatively 
blindsided should be avoided. They also, to an extent, defended the negotiations 
between government and the alcohol-producer groups noting that, ‘at the meeting 
they did make clear that there was a possibility that the pressure of cost increases 
would lead to a rise in prices of some brews from time to time’.  The potential for 
action, which being a request for referral to the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes, was effectively discouraged. A clear final statement that, ‘In general of 
course there is still plenty of competition in this business and it is normally 
possible for a dissatisfied customer to switch somewhere else,’ (Department of 
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Economic Affairs, 1965). Alongside requesting formal research and guidance from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries the Department of Economic Affairs 
was also meeting with industry participants on its own.  In a meeting with Allied 
Breweries it was indicated that a more general price rise would have happened 
without the government’s pricing policy (Cairns, 10 November 1965) and that, ‘it 
is certainly true that while a few grades of beer here and there have been advanced 
in price, there has been no general movement’. 
 
It would appear that despite increasing concern in the Department of Economic 
Affairs a combination of pressure on the workload of the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes and the position against a full referral from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries effectively limited a referral on the price of beer. 
Yet, another participant had an interest with the President of the Board of Trade 
taking a different route. This was for the consideration of the referral of the ‘Tied 
House System’ whereby tenants paid both a rent and were fully supplied by a 
brewery for their public house, without the ability to buy products from other 
sources.  This referral was supported as a starting point by the Department of 
Economic Affairs, and to an extent was more difficult for the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries to challenge. It began its work and eventually 
reported back calling for major changes, with the President of the Board of Trade, 
Tony Crossland, stating in his introduction of the final report to Parliament, ‘The 
retail trade is generally more uncompetitive than it would be in any event under 
current licensing conditions and, in particular, price competition is practically 
absent as between public houses. The Commission found few positive advantages 
that appeared to flow from the tied house system to offset these disadvantages, 
and therefore concluded that the monopoly conditions operate, and may be 
expected to operate, against the public interest,’ (HC Deb, 1969-1970). 
 
Eventually there was referral of limited scope to the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes, following increases in excise duties at the Budget and rumours of 
brewers taking advantage of this to increase profit margins once again.  This 
seemed to cause more embarrassment than success for the government when it 
became evident that the ‘Carlisle experiment’ of government owned public houses 
(which had been in place since the First World War) had raised their prices, due to 
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cost increases. The impact of this report was also somewhat limited by the 
abolition of the National Board for Prices and Incomes shortly after its publication 
– with no notable referral to its recommendations coming at all from the new 
government. Whilst the National Board on Prices and Incomes found some issues 
and concerns regarding industry structure (National Board for Prices and Incomes, 
1969), the Monopolies Commission recommended significant action in terms of 
the vertically integrated tied-house system. It also recommended licensing reforms 
that would increase competition and improve the market environment. These 
recommendations came at the same time as a change of government and the 
reorganisation of departments that realigned policy networks back to their 
previous structures where alcohol-producer groups were more comfortable. 
Unsurprisingly very little happened on this until the Beer Orders of the late 1980s 
(following another Monopolies Commission investigation), further indication that 
the restrictive second face of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) played a role in 
limiting what issues could actually appear as areas of policy development. 
 
Despite clearly not desiring or believing it necessary, alcohol-producers did seem 
to cut prices, or at least give the illusion of cutting prices to the public ("Cheaper 
wine," 1967; "Firm cuts drink prices," 1967; "Sherry prices cut," 1967) whilst 
equally in some cases privately increasing them to retailers (Richards, 1970), and 
encouraging them to increase their prices also. The Department of Economic 
Affairs noted this and sought further evidence, but the file was closed. A new 
government had new issues of concern, with a focus away from the methods of 
price influence and so the Department itself was abolished. 
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Table 5.1.: The policy community surrounding the complaints of brewery 
profiteering compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
1965-1970 
Alcohol and 
Economic Affairs 
1965-1970 
Alcohol and 
the MAFF  
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. 
Narrow range 
of interests 
represented. 
Newly interested 
Government 
department, some 
alcohol-producer 
groups. 
Long term 
relationships 
with alcohol-
producer 
groups. Major 
participants, 
such as the 
Brewers’ 
Society and the 
largest brewers 
at the core of 
the 
membership. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Limited, casual. No 
direct organisation 
beyond letters – no 
set or regular 
meetings. 
Organised 
interaction with 
high level of 
policy issues 
discussed. Close 
relationships. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on 
policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Format of 
Department, 
alongside 
relationship with 
National Board for 
Prices and Incomes 
and the Monopolies 
Commission made 
institutionalisation 
difficult – 
Whilst not 
formally 
organised, 
confidence to 
act and refer. 
Establishment 
of “early 
warning 
system” with 
brewers on beer 
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dependent on other 
departments. 
price changes 
indicative of 
closer links. 
 
When considering a traditional policy community approach there are two potential 
communities that could explain the policy arguments in this period, both of which 
are considered in table 5.1. When considering the dimensions of the traditional 
policy community, the approach has seemingly large gaps, with clear clashes. By 
this it is a question of whether a traditional community surrounding the 
Department of Economic Affairs was effectively developing policy or was in fact an 
outsider to this development.  There was no regularisation of meetings, the close 
relationships found in a traditional policy community almost replaced by elements 
of confrontation. The National Board for Prices and Incomes and the Monopolies 
Commission also had apparent influence – institutionalisation may have been 
difficult. By comparison, using the same approach, in considering whether a 
community that surrounded the MAFF finds adequate criteria within the 
dimensions to indicate that a traditional policy community was in existence. There 
were close relationships in a regularised format, there was a clear 
institutionalisation of this relationship and acceptance of the terms of debate. Yet 
whilst this fits quite neatly with the approach, it does not necessarily offer 
explanation – actions were taken that were not within the negotiation proxy of the 
MAFF conversations. The criteria may have been right, yet the outcome and 
development of the policy do not follow the traditional approach. In the end the 
focus reset with the better fitting explanation retained, there was notable 
instability and challenge that would not be expected in the traditional approach.  
 
Table 5.2.: The policy communities surrounding the complaints of brewery 
profiteering compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial 
policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community 1965-1970 
Alcohol and the MAFF  
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range 
of interests represented. 
Long-term relationships with 
alcohol-producer groups. Major 
participants, such as the 
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Brewers’ Society and the largest 
brewers at the core of the 
membership. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Organised interaction with high 
level of policy issues discussed. 
Close relationships. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Whilst not formally organised, 
confidence to act and refer. 
Establishment of “early warning 
system” with brewers on beer 
price changes indicative of 
closer links. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
1965-1970 
Alcohol and Economic Affairs 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Newly interested Government 
department, some alcohol-
producer groups. Views clearly 
differing from established core 
community. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation – of an 
alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Limited, casual. No direct 
organisation beyond letters – no 
set or regular meetings. 
Differing methods of 
communication and 
development from the core 
community – less established. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of 
Format of Department, 
alongside relationship with 
National Board for Prices and 
Incomes and the Monopolies 
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alternative procedures to 
approach policy problems. 
Commission made 
institutionalisation difficult – 
dependent on other 
departments but potential for 
development. 
 
If we consider an adversarial approach, then these two competing departments 
can be considered as a core and an alternate. The core community that was mainly 
filled by alcohol-producer groups temporarily lost influence as what was 
previously regarded as settled elements of policy were challenged. Effectively 
unable to share these new policy objectives an alternative community began to 
form and seek authority – moving authority for this issue away from the core 
policy community. In effect this development of a new political pressure went 
against the core community interests, with public interest piqued, political opinion 
was being pushed towards the need for action – therefore to this alternative policy 
community that had a shared acceptance for these policy outcomes. This new 
alternative community, as indicated in table 5.2., surrounding the Department of 
Economic Affairs was still effectively in its formative stages without the clear 
institutionalism of the core community. The concern of government regarding the 
price of beer as both a consideration for inflationary control and its position 
almost as a worker’s reward disrupted the core policy community temporarily but 
the lack of institutionalism and integration for the alternate meant that its 
challenge to the core community was unsuccessful. The victory for the core 
community was not clear-cut - the inquiry into the ‘tied-house’ relationship was 
the first of many battles on this issue and potentially could have been very 
disruptive to alcohol interests if the new government had not reset the 
departmental structure, eliminating the venue for the alternative community. As 
the core community took control again this potential for more radical change was 
lost and in effect the status quo returned.  The core community successfully moved 
the argument from one over ownership, monopoly and price towards licensing 
reform – in turn providing more challenges as indicated in Chapter 3 but at this 
point no radical shift to the established structure. When introducing the report 
under the Labour government Tony Crossland said, ‘It therefore recommended 
that, by way of remedy for the defects which it found in the tied house system in 
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the United Kingdom, the licensing system in England and Wales should be 
substantially relaxed (with the situations in Scotland and Northern Ireland being 
reviewed separately by the authorities concerned), the general objective being to 
permit the sale of alcoholic drinks, for consumption on or off the premises, by any 
retailer whose character and premises satisfied certain minimum standards.’ (HC 
Deb, 1969-1970). The situation, under the new Conservative government, was 
summarised quite neatly in a parliamentary question when John Hall MP said, 
‘Does my Hon. Friend agree that to make worth-while changes in the tied-house 
system will require beforehand a very comprehensive review of the licensing 
system? Is he prepared to undertake that extremely difficult task?’ (HC Deb, 1970-
1971). The response from the Minister for Employment, Paul Bryan MP, was 
indicative of the slowdown in pace, plus the movement between networks – ‘I 
think that what my Hon. Friend is saying is that apart from the economic aspects of 
the matter there is a very big social aspect as well. In this connection, clearly, the 
Home Office will have to have quite a large inquiry before we come to a final 
decision.’  
 
5.2. Price and policy – departments in conflict  
The next section will consider in more detail the report of Central Policy Review 
Staff (1979) that considered potential government actions across all areas of policy 
that was intended to limit the negative impacts of alcohol. For the purposes of this 
section, amongst these areas of focus was the potential impact of using taxation as 
a tool in increasing the price of alcohol - as a policy device intended to improve 
health, rather than an economic or moral measure for the first time.  This was 
entirely new and brought in health rather than moral or economic concerns into 
pricing for the first time. Given that policy communities had focused around 
departments with either these moral or economic objectives it is understandable 
that this led to a new level of conflict – as issues that had a settled home in a 
departmental policy community were suddenly conflated with a considerable 
cross over with new participants. With new cross-departmental advice the 
opportunity for a shift in policy stance was considerable and the expansion of the 
evidence base on which policy decisions were made notable.  This section will 
consider the various reactions to the Central Policy Review Staff recommendations 
that sought to increase alcohol duties and therefore seeking to raise the price of 
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alcohol. It will look at how policy communities formed with different purposes, 
around different objectives, reacted, sought influence and attempted to push 
forward or resist this suggestion using their influence.  
 
The report from the Central Policy Review Staff, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, caused a significant amount of political challenges thanks to its 
leaking and recommendations for actions at a scale not seen since the peak of the 
temperance movement. On pricing, its recommendation related to an area where 
government already exerted considerable authority – excise duties. Central to the 
review was the section on, ‘Taxation,’ (Central Policy Review Staff, 1979) which 
noted the real terms fall in price of alcohol over a sustained period. It is also worth 
reflecting that an earlier note by the Central Policy Reviews Staff referred to 
section entitled, ‘The price of drink,’ (Central Policy Review Staff, 1978), which 
made similar commentary regarding the impact of taxation. When it came to their 
conclusions it was notable that there was a clear message that governance of this 
issue had not led to desirable outcomes, ‘Since the war Governments have 
contributed to increased consumption by allowing a substantial fall in the real 
value of alcohol duties, especially as compared to real incomes,’ (Central Policy 
Review Staff, 1979, p. 91) and that this current status quo was seen as 
unacceptable, ‘The criteria for determining duty levels should be changed to reflect 
the Government’s stance on total consumption levels.’ They recommended that 
this new criteria should adopt three major features, firstly the key feature that, ‘As 
a minimum requirement, the Government should adopt a policy of linking 
increases in alcohol duties to the Retail Price Index,’ (Central Policy Review Staff, 
1979, p. 91). More broadly they recommended that, ‘The Government should adopt 
two further working criteria on which to move forward from the minimum 
requirement. First, that its stance on the total consumption of alcohol should be 
given increasing weight in determining duty levels. Second, that insofar as this 
does not happen duty levels should normally reflect increases in real incomes,’ 
(Central Policy Review Staff, 1979, p. 91). 
 
Whilst conflict regarding the report’s publication is outlined in the previous 
chapter, the advocacy from the Department for Health and Social Services and its 
policy community of medical interests for a health focused excise duty policy is 
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worth further consideration.  The Department for Health and Social Services 
sought to press their apparent advantage in a letter to the Chancellor addressing 
the potential to limit alcohol consumption through increased taxation. In the letter 
the Secretary stated, ‘A good start could be made now by action to raise the level of 
taxation and discourage consumption,’ (Jenkin, 29 May 1979). The letter’s annexes 
went considerably further noting, ‘The British Medical Journal of 10 February 
1979 concludes that a steep rise in the price of drink would be the single most 
certain means of lessening the damage caused by alcohol.’  It was also indicated 
that this wider piece had been made available to the Treasury by the health team. 
This was immediately followed with a public attempt to exert influence in a speech 
on alcohol abuse from the Secretary of State who noted that, ‘The continued 
freedom of the vast majority to enjoy the social pleasures of alcohol must go hand 
in hand with our determination to help and encourage the minority to come to 
terms with and surmount their problems,’ (Department of Health and Social 
Services, 30 May 1979). The original draft of the speech cited the CPRS report but 
this was removed following a request from the Cabinet Office, who oversaw CPRS, 
given the report was still classed as confidential. Yet in the press release of the 
speech the reference remained, the Cabinet Office was not impressed, ‘I have asked 
DHSS not to issue further copies but the damage is done,’ (Johns, 1 June 1979). As 
the previous chapter stated the report was never formally published but leaked 
out via a Swedish journal, which led to increasing parliamentary pressure. The 
Department of Health and Social Services also began preparing a cross-
departmental paper that would seek to be a ‘Consultative Document on Prevention 
of Alcohol Misuse’, (Pearson, 14 June 1979). Within this document was Chapter 7 
that considered potential options on alcohol duties such as ‘maintaining alcohol 
price relative to incomes’, and ‘reducing consumption’. It also had a proposed 
section on ‘taxation to serve social ends’. 
 
This is indicative that the policy community surrounding the Department of Health 
and Social Services, made up of its combination of medical professional 
organisations and health groups, had overreached in both their attempts to push 
the Treasury and to redesign the policy framework of other departments. It 
appears to be an example of an adversarial policy community attempting to seek 
influence and dominance – but failing in that fight – offering an indication that 
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domination of a policy area by one policy community does not necessarily mean it 
is the traditional approach that applies – instead it could have the necessary 
influence to supress alternatives. Correspondence offers an indication of this 
dissatisfaction at the health policy community attempts. The Department of Trade, 
of which Scotch Whisky as Scotland’s ‘top exporting sector until the early 1980s’ 
(Nicol, 2009, p. 8) stated that, ‘We simply cannot afford to damage the prospects of 
a successful exporting industry in this way and this must call into question the 
acceptability of tackling the problem of alcohol abuse by sweeping across-the-
board measures rather than by action aimed at those individuals and 
circumstances directly concerned,’ (Allpress, 16 June 1979).  H.M. Customs and 
Excise challenged the language of this proposed consultation, ‘We consider the 
presentation of some of the alcohol tax options is unnecessarily prejudicial,’ 
(Howard, 20 June 1979). These disagreements were increased by more 
considerable interventions from the Treasury and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries, to which the previous section demonstrated its own 
community engagement with alcohol-producer groups. The Treasury requested a 
completely rewritten paragraph on taxation, with their new paragraph which 
included the line, ‘Setting alcohol duties primarily to serve health and social, rather 
than fiscal, ends would reduce their value to the Government as flexible 
instruments of macro-economic policy and could pre-empt the scope for 
increasing the level of other indirect taxes,’ (H. Griffiths, to Pearson, M. A. J., 20 June 
1979). It also went further requesting commentary on the risk to the UK balance of 
payments and to jobs of any policy that focused on health and social concerns 
primarily. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries officials responding 
were equally challenging refusing to acknowledge the proposals as an agreed 
consultation (W. E. Mason, to Pearson, M. A. J. , 20 June 1979). The response also 
highlighted that, ‘this does raise a question of principle for a new Administration 
which has been elected on a mandate of reduced Government intervention and 
increased responsibility for the individual.’ In a follow up letter, several further 
criticisms were highlighted and an indication that this would not be accepted as a 
consultative document by the Ministry given the current drafting (W. E. Mason, to 
Budd, J., 28 June 1979). 
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Meetings were set in place across departments with numerous amends accepted to 
the majority of the consultative paper (Central Policy Review Staff, 22 June 1979). 
Despite this broad agreement of the DHSS paper a separate meeting would be held 
on the taxation chapter, with a caveat that, ‘MAFF, Treasury, and Customs and 
Excise would be described as being closely involved in preparation of the 
important Chapter on Alcohol and Taxation.’ The indications of conflict across 
departments were considered of significant concern by the Cabinet Office with the 
civil servants involved stating, ‘I am not sure whether the other Departments will 
be content for the DHSS to rake the lead,’ (Merrill, 10 July 1979). The solution from 
their point of view was to publish the CPRS report and delay the consultative 
paper – recognising the CPRS report had originated from one of their team. This 
was not pushed forward when it became apparent Ministers did not want the CPRS 
report published. With this option rejected the increasingly contentious status of 
the Department of Health and Social Service’s proposed consultative paper 
required considerably greater cross-government coordination if it was to progress. 
The separate meeting on the contentious chapter was put back, following another 
speech by a DHSS Minister, this time Sir George Young, who managed to include 
mentions of alcohol price in a public speech on alcohol misuse (Pearson, 12 July 
1979).  The meeting was put back to the end of the month – when amusingly 
another letter was sent to the Treasury (Pearson, 27 July 1979) which outlined 
that the delegation they may run into from ‘Save Alcoholism Services in South East 
London’ which included a peer, MPs and interest groups who were there on an 
entirely coincidental, unrelated basis.  
 
The debate would come to a head at a meeting of the H Committee of the Cabinet, 
chaired by the Home Secretary. Ahead of this, a new participant department 
sought to directly engage the Chair – the Department of Industry – specifically its 
Secretary of State Keith Joseph. This engagement supported some of the general 
points made in both the CPRS report and the consultative document whilst noting, 
‘the possible scope for increasing revenue by higher taxes on alcohol, particularly 
wine and spirits’, (Joseph, 31 July 1979). The briefing for the H Committee (Harrop, 
1979) indicated that there was potential scope to publish the CPRS report and 
have the consultative document published. It did indicate that this was dependent 
on views expressed at the meeting – with the Ministerial attendees taken from the 
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Home Office, Transport, Trade, Treasury, Employment, Agriculture and Health.  
Minutes of this meeting are unavailable but, in the end, a much more limited paper 
was published outlining the Government’s thinking on alcohol policy, which 
reflected the least controversial elements of both the CPRS report and the draft 
consultative document. The Treasury also formally put an end to any debate on 
how excise duty would be considered when the Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
John Biffen made clear, over a year after the first attempt at changing the policy 
framework stated, ‘I must make it clear that the question of taxation of alcohol 
remains a matter for the Chancellor and his Budget judgement, and this position 
must be reserved in discussion of the social and other issues involved,’ (Biffen, 12 
December 1980). 
 
Table 5.3. The policy community surrounding consideration of taxation as a 
health tool compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy Communities 1979-1980 
Taxation as a health tool 
Membership Very limited number 
of members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Apparent series of different 
memberships of communities 
surrounding Government 
departments. Within each, 
membership was narrow with 
dominant, but different, interests. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Evidence of close relationship on the 
health policy communities. Less 
evidence of integration between 
other communities, though actions 
indicative of high levels of group 
involvement within the respective 
communities. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Each community was very much 
ingrained within their department, 
which explains some of the clashing 
of interests. 
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New evidence of policy impact on an area previously outside of the scope of one 
policy community, and the reverse scenario, caused a significant tactical battle 
between departments. The speeches by DHSS that accidently had inappropriate 
references are worthy of consideration, alongside accidental delegations of an 
attempt to build pressure – alongside awkward parliamentary questions. 
Attempting to explain this by using the traditional policy community approach is 
challenging. It is clear who had the initial power, and where it was established. 
Within the traditional approach policy communities evolve with their membership 
changing or their members interests changing – table 5.3. highlights how the 
membership seems to work with the Daugbjerg typology yet there are multiple 
membership sets all interested in the same policy arena. In this circumstance 
groups seeking influence played by the rules of the game, but almost had a 
different playing board in an alternative department – as indicated in the 
institutionalisation dimension within table 5.3. In effect – the approach dimensions 
are met, but by too many examples – therefore making the approach impractical in 
understanding the policy development in this time period. 
 
Table 5.4.: The policy communities surrounding consideration of taxation as a 
health tool compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial policy 
communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Alcohol-producer-based 
policy community 
surrounding MAFF and HM 
Treasury  
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Membership very exclusive to 
alcohol-producers and 
retailers. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any specific 
point. Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Integrated within the MAFF 
and HM Treasury systems. 
Negotiation, yet department 
civil servants in a greater 
position of strength than 
normal expectation. 
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Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
General agreement on 
principles (negotiated 
economic settlement). Clear 
agreement that procedures 
should only involve the group 
participants and their framing 
of the policy issues. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Medical groups based policy 
community surrounding DHSS 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Narrow health and medical 
membership. Interests clash 
with the core community.  
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Evidence of close relationships 
within the health policy 
community, surrounding the 
DHSS. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Very much ingrained within 
their department and 
completely different framing of 
the issue, and purpose, of 
alcohol taxation. 
 
Considering the adversarial approach, a more compelling argument can be made to 
understand the policy development process. When considering the community 
that surrounded both MAFF and HM Treasury, which had alcohol interests within 
its membership as the core community and the DHSS community as being the 
alternate an easier understanding of the developments can be found. Table 5.4. 
outlines these factors and the considerably different framing of the alcohol 
taxation issue which was in effect the challenge. That policy principles were 
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entirely different is at the core of the conflict – these are closely aligned with the 
adapted typology. It also provides an example of an alternate challenging and 
losing - which control remained in departments with the established policy 
community, with interests divergent from DHSS proved central in considering the 
outcome. The arena of the conflict was one in which alcohol-producer interests 
were more closely engaged and they had an established, strong policy community 
in the department that sought to represent their interests across government. This 
status quo of comparative influence and engagement would remain established for 
many years to come.  
 
5.3. From tax rises to Minimum Unit Pricing to a penny off a pint 
The economic crisis that began in 2007, proved to be challenging for alcohol-
producer interest groups with pressure on taxes and lower cost policies. As the 
period began the Labour Government sought to use the negative media attention 
on alcohol to its financial advantage with a significant increase in alcohol duties 
that the Exchequer Secretary Angela Eagle MP described as ‘the intention of the 
increase in alcohol duty announced at Budget was to raise revenue, not to tackle 
problem drinking’, (HC Deb, 2007-2008), whilst also resisting the temptation to 
use this attention as an opportune moment to implement more dramatic alcohol 
interventions following its licensing changes. This section will consider the impact 
of the Labour government’s decision and how one policy had differing 
justifications from government departments, alongside their interests. It will also 
explore the influence of the Chief Medical Officer in pushing government policy – 
effectively using their status as an apparently independent expert to push policy 
interests in areas where previously influence could not be exerted without careful 
policy development and collaboration with existing policy communities. The new 
coalition government then sought to review alcohol duty from the ground up, 
which opened up dividing lines in alcohol policy that had previously not been 
apparent. It also created new relationships that were positive and useful for 
alcohol-producers – a double-edged sword of being given opportunities for new 
areas of policy interest, whilst limiting the previous dominant position over 
existing policy areas. At the same time, the profile of the alcohol issue, with heavy 
media and political attention led to a major shift on pricing policy. The journey 
where a coalition government went to the development of what would generally 
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be considered a timid minimum unit price to a Prime Ministerial-influenced full 
blown price intervention, to retreat and then to actively cutting the price of certain 
alcoholic drinks with the Chancellor raised as a champion of pubs. 
 
The framing of the considerable liberalisation of licensing under the New Labour 
government would seem to be indicative of opposition to firm market 
interventions such as price controls. In the post-Blair environment there was the 
potential to change this as part of Gordon Brown’s attempted redirection of the 
Labour party and government policy. The first Budget under the Brown 
premiership caused a decisive shift in policy on alcohol. A new policy was 
introduced known as the alcohol duty escalator – which over a sustained period 
would increase the duty on alcohol at a rate above inflation. This began with an 
increase at six per cent above RPI immediately and two per cent above RPI for the 
next four years, In his speech Alistair Darling justified this on the basis of 
affordability, ‘Mr Deputy Speaker, as incomes have risen, alcohol has become more 
affordable. In 1997, the average bottle of wine bought in a supermarket was £4.45 
in today's prices. If you go into a supermarket today, the average bottle of wine will 
cost about £4,’ (Darling, 2008). Alistair Darling’s decision to implement the alcohol 
duty escalator in his first budget came as a surprise to alcohol-producer groups. 
Robert Hayward, then the Chief Executive of the British Beer & Pub Association 
said, ‘Government is punishing all beer drinkers rather than tackling the minority 
of drunken hooligans. But Government tax policy is fuelling Britain’s binge drink 
problem by driving people away from beer, out of the pub into the arms of the 
deep discounting supermarkets,’ (British Beer & Pub Association, 2008). Gavin 
Hewitt of the Scotch Whisky Association said, ‘Scottish distillers are astonished by 
the chancellor's announcement. A tax rise is a blow to international 
competitiveness when the industry has been investing significantly to meet 
growing global demand for Scotch Whisky,’ (BBC News, 2008).  It also led to a 
situation where the Public Health Minister, Dawn Primarolo claimed that, ‘Our 
estimates suggest that higher taxes, if they do feed through to price, will mainly 
affect the 7 per cent of the population who drink one third of all alcohol consumed 
in Great Britain. And that, in England alone, the total number of lives saved up to 
the end of March 2013 – when Budget 2012, the last Budget with a 2% above 
inflation increase has taken effect – will save 3,250 lives by the Department’s 
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calculations,’ (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2008). Countering this argument for the 
duty increases, the response to this from the Treasury was clear – this was not a 
policy based on health grounds, instead purely on revenue raising and they were 
not seeking this hypothecation (HC Deb, 2007-2008).  
 
In the Chancellor’s pre-Budget report of the same year the decision was made to 
temporarily reduce Value Added Tax from 17.5 per cent to 15 per cent as a method 
to stimulate the economy. There was also the counterbalance added in that as 
alcohol should not benefit from this there would be an increase of 8 per cent in 
alcohol duties, which unlike the VAT decrease would be permanent. This led to a 
situation where regionalised interest played a significant role. Whilst for beer, 
ciders and wines there was a broad interest across the nation, for spirits primarily 
through Scotch whisky there was a niche interest with a very specific focus. This 
advantage was used to full effect with the Chancellor backtracking and increasing 
the duties by four per cent for spirits, allegedly on the grounds of the different 
sales patterns, but the importance of this regional interest played a much more 
significant role – ‘and with very little revenue benefit, Chancellor Alistair Darling 
has realised there is far too much political pain in this.  The whisky lobby is a 
formidable one, and Labour's opponents are quick to back it’, (Fraser, 2008). This 
was also an indicated that alcohol-producer groups were actively sectioning off to 
protect their own product interests. 
 
Following the liberalisation of the licensing laws, as discussed in an earlier chapter, 
a considerable amount of media and political pressure was brought to bear on the 
Government in terms of alcohol policy. There was increasing media narrative 
regarding the potential options for intervention and accounts of very low-priced 
alcohol. In response to this the Department of Health commissioned what was 
intended to be a comprehensive review of the evidence into alcohol pricing and 
promotions. This was commissioned with the University of Sheffield’s already 
active Alcohol Research Group that had by combining the results of several studies 
developed the ‘Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model’. This model was designed to be able 
to assess the impact of changing a variable within alcohol policy in terms of wider 
harm.  The report produced (Brennan et al., 2008) outlined modelled impacts of 
interventions based on a theoretical approach that produced results in terms of 
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financial and lives saved through fiscal intervention at a much greater level than 
previous studies. Similarly to the earlier statements by Dawn Primarolo this model 
sought to put exact numbers of lives saved in relation to the increased price of 
alcohol.  
 
This political will to take forward this evidence was put to an early test by the 
publication of the Chief Medical Officer’s Annual Report that called for a minimum 
unit price for alcohol. The report stated that, ‘As an immediate priority, the 
government should introduce minimum pricing per unit as a means of reducing 
the consumption of alcohol and its associated problems. Consideration should be 
given to setting the minimum price per unit at 50 pence,’ (Donaldson, 2009, p. 23). 
This report had further detail calling for a two-tier MUP with a higher rate for pubs 
and bars, whilst also highlighting other interventions that it was believed would 
make a difference in managing alcohol-related harm. A theoretical model, based on 
analysis of other surveys, was being put forward by the Chief Medical Officer very 
much as an advocate for the Department of Health’s own alcohol policy 
community. The community surrounding the Chief Medical Officer was highly 
similar to that found in the 1980s in the Department of Health – that the Chief 
Medical Officer had become progressively more integrated into their work was not 
unsurprising given they increased the resources and were practical examiners of 
the impacts of current alcohol-harm reduction policy. Their policy community had 
become strengthened, potentially the dominant alternative policy community, but 
was calling for a radical policy shift – yet as it was outside of their direct influence 
their own changes would be incremental.  
 
Initial response from the Labour government was complete rejection of minimum 
unit pricing proposals, despite rumours of disquiet from the Department of Health. 
It was quite unequivocal, ‘The Prime Minister said that he would protect the 
interests of the "sensible majority of moderate drinkers" when responding to 
proposals from Sir Liam Donaldson for a minimum charge of 50p per unit of 
alcohol to be imposed on beer and wine,’ (Hencke & Sparrow, 2009). Some 
fractures started to appear the next year with media coverage (Winnett & Prince, 
2010) of a battle between the Health Secretary Andy Burnham and the Business 
Secretary Lord Mandelson regarding minimum unit pricing. The battle appeared to 
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indicate a traditional style play where one department was opposed to another. As 
was indicated in early sections, by this stage policy communities were organised 
quite effectively around the Department of Health and HM Treasury. The Business 
Department, whilst relatively more recent in creation, would be a natural home for 
interests that would be unlikely to be in favour of intervention.  
 
An election soon changed the course with the Conservatives elected on a platform 
with new policies to both investigate alcohol duties alongside a ban on below cost 
selling.  As an early feature of the new government they commissioned a review of 
alcohol taxation, which would consider a range of features across the current 
regime. Included within this was the potential to offer further taxes on what was 
referred to as problem drinks – the ready to drink, usually referred to as ‘alcopop’ 
category and the so called ‘super strength’ beers. Beyond this evidence was also 
requested into alcohol taxation per se, in terms of how the system could be 
changed or improved to offer wider benefits.  On the first feature most producer 
groups were united in believing extra taxes were unnecessary. On the beer front 
the British Beer & Pub Association and the Campaign for Real Ale jointly made a 
submission calling for a lower duty rate for beers below 2.8 per cent alcohol by 
volume – as was permitted by European legislation but not previously utilised in 
the UK. This led to a considerable fission between alcohol-producer groups – 
dividing over the existing framework of alcohol duty and the comparative benefits 
for different types of alcohol. The main perpetrator of this was the company 
Diageo – which was, and is, the world’s biggest spirits producer, whilst also owning 
Guinness – using this breadth to be a member of most major alcohol-producer 
associations. They proposed a model where eventually all alcohol would be taxed 
the same per unit. They ‘suggested that the simplest way to implement this would 
be to hold spirits duty at its current level and use the RPI+2% alcohol excise duty 
escalator to move other categories of alcohol up to the level of spirits duty over 
time,’ (Talking Retail, 2010). This was fiercely resisted by other groups with the 
British Beer & Pub Association commissioning research to highlight the negative 
effect this would have on jobs in the licensed trade, whilst also highlighting the 
jobs that could be secured by preferential treatment of beer compared to other 
alcohol categories.  The results were not unexpected – no major changes were 
made and alcohol groups effectively saw only minor changes that were 
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manageable. On super strength beers a new higher charge was implemented at 
effectively 50 per cent greater than those below the 7.5 per cent alcohol by volume 
barrier. Yet certain alcohol-producing groups also had success in building the case 
for the lower rate for beers below 2.8 per cent alcohol by volume, with a 50 per 
cent duty discount secured. 
 
Whilst the Conservatives had been elected on a platform that would have 
introduced a below-cost selling ban, and the Liberal Democrats appeared to be 
similarly inclined, problems had appeared early in the process of policy 
development – cost prices varied from retailer to retailer. Equally no manufacturer 
would be keen for this information, or indeed their own production costs to be 
known publicly to their customers. The compromise put forward by the British 
Beer & Pub Association was cost price to be the cost of Duty and VAT on the 
product. Others considered proposals that would have another set percentage for 
an estimate of production costs. On a practical basis this would actually affect very, 
very few products with nearly all of the market considerably above either of these 
tiers. The Secretary of State for Health had stated his opposition to MUP whilst in 
opposition and newspaper reports indicated his position was maintained  - with 
Andrew Lansley outlining that, ‘many low income households who don't drink 
irresponsibly, but where this would have a significant effect’, ("Minimum alcohol 
price ‘unfair on poor’," 2 June 2010). The Home Office were proceeding with 
below-cost selling ban as a feature of licensing on a practical basis (Whitehead, 18 
January 2011). 
 
Improved organisation of alcohol-health groups, including launching into the 
Alcohol Health Alliance that brought together over a dozen charities, professional 
groups and research organisations as many of the members of this new alliance 
already had influence with the Department of Health and beyond. They also 
attracted increased media traction for their messaging and bodies such as Balance 
North East, an NHS-funded public information and campaigning organisation, 
pushed this further with a targeted lobbying campaign calling for MUP. In March 
2012, the policy shifted with MUP becoming formal Government policy, alongside 
multi-buy restrictions, with the Prime Minister David Cameron taking personal 
ownership of the proposals. The arguments of the Sheffield model and previous 
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statements regarding lives saved were once again focused when he stated, ‘We’re 
consulting on the actual price, but if it is 40p that could mean 50,000 fewer crimes 
each year and 900 fewer alcohol-related deaths per year by the end of the decade,’ 
(Prime Minister's Office, 2012). 
 
Whilst the policy on MUP was being consulted upon, the beer-producing interest 
groups and the Treasury began a separate conversation on the rate of beer duty. 
Having previously submitted proposals jointly to the government with other 
alcohol groups, such as the Wine & Spirits Trade Association and the National 
Association of Cidermakers – with the occasional support of the Scotch Whisky 
Association the combination of fraying relationships following the debate of the 
entire structure of alcohol duty, added with the beneficial relationship of working 
with the Campaign for Real Ale and their large consumer membership changed the 
relationship structure within alcohol-producer groups with the British Beer & Pub 
Association splitting away. A campaign that included a parliamentary rally, ‘a 
message in a bottle’ to all MPs and other stunts, alongside a full constituency level 
breakdown of industry impact marked an increase in public activity. Yet on a 
private level engagement was also much more intense – detailed research, 
coordinated activity through the All-Party Parliamentary Beer Group and a series 
of targeted treasury meetings changed the conversation on beer duty (Gornall, 
2014a). Arguing that revenues could be increased, pubs saved and political 
popularity through enthusiastic pub reaction secured not only the end of the Beer 
Duty Escalator two years early but the first cut in beer duty for around fifty years – 
with George Osborne in his budget statement saying, ‘We’re looking at plans to 
stop the biggest discounts of cheap alcohol at retailers. But responsible drinkers – 
and our pubs - should not pay the price for the problems caused by others,’ 
(Osborne, 20 March 2013). This gave the distinct appearance that the alcohol-
producer-led policy community around the Treasury, which was so historically 
prominent until the shift by Alistair Darling had managed to reset itself. That 
‘Cheers, George!’ beermats and posters were distributed by the major brewers and 
pub companies across the country in praise of the then Chancellor George 
Osborne, alongside public pronouncements of price falls or similar activities 
demonstrated that the group could deliver its members and the policy outcome 
desired. 
 165 
 
The charge against MUP was led by the Wine & Spirits Trade Association (Farey-
Jones, 21 February 2013), with support from the Scotch Whisky Association and 
formal support, without practical intervention, from the British Beer & Pub 
Association ("Why should we pay more? Who are we," 2013). In general, the more 
of any alcohol-producer interests that were sold via the retail rather than the 
hospitality route the more likely they were active in pursuing the removal of the 
MUP policy ("Alcohol minimum pricing: the industry responds," 28 November 
2012; J. Woodhouse, 29 August 2018, p. 7). Given the Prime Minister’s active 
support it appears most groups did not expect to be successful in changing the 
policy (J. Woodhouse, 29 August 2018, p. 6). Advice from the Chairman of the All-
Party Parliamentary Beer Group to the industry at its annual Christmas Reception, 
was to accept the policy and work out how to promote the industry – following on 
from early supportive comments (Perrett, 20 May 2012). Yet, the continued legal 
dispute in Scotland, which will be discussed in the next section, also played a factor 
in turning the tide against the MUP policy – this would be a considerable battle 
that would use much government resources whilst representing no actual income 
and potentially having initial costs of falling duty revenues at a faster rate than 
potential benefits which were more long-term. 
 
Almost as quickly as the policy appeared it was gone.  In rather less politically 
charged manner, the policy was dropped in a speech to the House of Commons by 
Jeremy Browne, then a Minister of State in the Home Office, who also announced 
that proposals on multi-buy bans had been dropped. He said on MUP, ‘That policy 
will remain under consideration, but it will not be proceeded with at this time. We 
do not yet have enough concrete evidence that its introduction would be effective 
in reducing harms associated with problem drinking—this is a crucial point—
without penalising people who drink responsibly. We will tackle the most 
egregious examples of cheap alcohol by banning sales of alcohol below the level of 
alcohol duty plus value-added tax. That will come into effect in England and Wales 
no later than the spring of 2014, and will stop the worst instances of deep 
discounting that result in alcohol being sold cheaply and harmfully. It will no 
longer be legal to sell a can of ordinary-strength lager for less than about 40p,’ (HC 
Deb, 2013-14). The language had shifted from that of the health focused policy 
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community relating to exact lives saved and costs of alcohol harm, returning to the 
language of previous times relating to the individual and the risks of penalising the 
majority. The proposal of the British Beer & Pub Association on below-cost selling, 
thought too weak the previous year, was also notably reinstated (although never 
actually developed). In both 2014 and 2015 beer duty was cut again – with other 
alcohol-producer interests also benefiting from a combination of cuts, freezes and 
limited rises in the same period, considerably under the alcohol duty escalator 
proposed levels. The policy community surrounding HM Treasury was back and in 
a position of influence, whilst at the brink of achieving a long-held pricing 
objective, it seems the policy community surrounding the Department of Health 
had been defeated. This was indicative of a return to incremental policy on alcohol 
pricing, the government had tried to deliver policy without taking the groups who 
would on a practical basis be implementing the policy along with them. 
 
Table 5.5.: The policy communities surrounding the end of Labour and the 
Coalition term compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy 
communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
2008-2010 
The last years of 
Labour 
2010-2015 
The changing 
Coalition policies 
on alcohol  
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. 
Narrow range 
of interests 
represented. 
No clear community 
surrounding the 
Treasury, yet close 
community of health 
interests 
surrounding 
Department of 
Health. 
Close community of 
health interests 
surrounding 
Department of 
Health. 
Reconstruction of 
Treasury and 
alcohol-producer 
group community, 
with tight, limited 
membership. 
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Integration Bargaining 
and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Some formal 
interactions by 
alcohol-producer 
groups. Much closer, 
well organised 
relationships in the 
Department of 
Health. 
Frequent, organised 
interaction with 
high level of policy 
issues discussed. 
Close relationships. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on 
policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach 
policy 
problems. 
Similarly, little 
institutionalisation 
with the Treasury – 
the abolition of an 
institutionalised 
relationship. Very 
clear organisation 
and formal 
relationship with 
health interest 
groups. 
Both becoming 
increasingly 
institutionalised. 
 
If we consider the traditional approach, we find potential for explaining the 2008-
2010 period – when we consider the dimensions of the Daugbjerg typology in table 
5.6. it is clear that the community surround the Department of Health was well 
established with a clearer framing and dimensions that worked. That the 
community surrounded HM Treasury was comparatively poorly established or had 
broken down since earlier periods played a significant role. Yet there is not 
complete clarity as to whether the health policy community actually took control 
of the policy arena or instead the lack of a policy community around HM Treasury 
which led to the policy shift – the presence of the health policy community offers 
no better explanation for the policy than the lack of the Treasury one. The policy 
was still the Treasury’s – whether the health policy community had direct 
influence is clear – but it was a voice within policy development that was not 
countered by an alternate. By 2010-2015 this had shifted – there was organisation 
around the Treasury again – more radical policy against the interests of alcohol-
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producers may have been explained by their absence previously – yet their 
presence led to an equally radical policy in their favour. If we put aside the health 
policy community and look exclusively at the Treasury there is evidence that 
demonstrates by playing by the rules of the game – re-engaging – there are clear 
benefits for the groups in terms of policy outcomes that are directly related to their 
members interests, or at the very least not as actively against their interests.  
 
Table 5.6.: The policy communities surrounding the end of Labour and the 
Coalition term compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial 
policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Alcohol-producer based 
policy community 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Membership very exclusive to 
alcohol-producers and some 
retailers. Latter focus on certain 
alcohol groups (the British Beer 
& Pub Association and the 
Scotch Whisky Association) 
being more essential. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Whilst dissipated initially, 
become integrated within the 
Government systems – 
primarily HM Treasury. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
General agreement on 
principles (negotiated economic 
settlement) and wider 
contextualisation (impact on 
pubs). 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Health groups based policy 
community surrounding the 
Department of Health 
 169 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Narrow health and medical 
membership. Interests clash 
with the core community.  
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation – of an 
alternative style to the 
core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Evidence of close relationships 
within the health policy 
community.  
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Very much ingrained within 
their department and 
completely different framing of 
the issue, and purpose, of 
alcohol pricing to prevent harm 
or promote the public good. 
 
Considering the adversarial approach, core and alternate communities are 
discernible with a core community populated by the key alcohol-producer groups 
with interests in multiple government departments but with HM Treasury key and 
a health-based alternate community that surrounded the Department for Health. 
This situation, as broadly outlined in table 5.6., facilitated effectively clashing and 
competing policy goals which caused enough significant tensions to lead to 
substantial policy shifts. The core policy community looked dissipated yet proved 
increasingly resilient, to an extent the challenge from the alternate led to re-
engagement and policy shifts. The weakening or softening of the core policy 
community that facilitated the large increases in taxation and the alcohol duty 
escalator invariably led on to the arguments of minimum unit pricing which saw 
authority removed from the Treasury. This could be argued to be the jolt that 
restarted the core community that then needed to both reframe and then act on a 
policy direction to reassert itself – it could also be analysed in the context of the 
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second face of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) – with the latter efforts to 
restrict the policy direction indicative of this. To an extent the first significant 
change beyond the incremental led to a reaction within the core policy community 
but at first the alternate was in a more powerful position – it was a delayed, 
challenging process to reset the policy frame - in effect by modest compromise and 
the reigniting of relationships. 
 
5.4. Scottish attempts at Minimum Unit Pricing  
In the next section the shift in interactions on alcohol policy from a voluntary, 
coordinated approach with close industry group interactions under the Labour 
administration to the more dramatic shift in policies under the Scottish National 
Party will be considered. For this section there will be a focus on the headline 
feature of this shift which were the proposals made to introduce a Minimum Unit 
Price for Scotland, which became the most contentious focus of their alcohol 
policy. This section will consider the announcement of the principle of MUP, the 
background to this announcement and the effect this had on policy networks. It 
will then briefly consider the debate over the actual price per unit that was to be 
set and how groups interacted with this. It will then consider the breakdown of the 
policy community relationships that led to a legal challenge, a long-term battle 
with policy development in flux. There will then be some consideration of the 
reaction and impact on networks of the legal decisions made that had a significant 
effect on this pricing policy. 
 
Ahead of the 2007 Scottish elections that saw the establishment of the SNP 
minority administration, there had effectively been a working policy community 
for alcohol where alcohol-producer interests were favoured, it was also broader in 
membership and influence than the UK policy communities. Part of this was that 
the network was organised around the issue of alcohol, rather than separated 
based on departmental spheres of influence as at the UK level. They also 
formalised the alcohol-producer side of the relationship establishing the ‘Scottish 
Government Alcohol Industry Partnership’ in February 2007, formed with major 
alcohol-producer, retailer and larger alcohol businesses, with the intention that it 
would, ‘be a long term collaborative approach to fostering a culture which 
recognises that responsible, moderate consumption can be part of a healthy 
 171 
society’, (Scottish Executive, 2007a). The elections saw the SNP come to power for 
the first time. This represented a new environment for the policy communities 
interested in alcohol policy and created the opportunity for more dramatic policy 
shift.  
 
In June 2008 the Scottish Government published, ‘Changing Scotland’s relationship 
with alcohol: a discussion paper on our strategic approach,’ (Scottish Government, 
2008) which put on record their proposal to introduce what was then called a 
Minimum Retail Price for alcohol. This document represented a shift in both terms 
of discussion and potential policy interventions. The discussion paper led to a wide 
consultation that indicated both the divide in group positions and the influence of 
the respective groups on policy.  Whilst, ‘almost all health organisations and local 
government bodies supported minimum retail pricing in principle’, (Scottish 
Government & Hexagon Research and Consulting, 2009, p. 32) there was a marked 
difference from the trade groups where, ‘thirty of the 36 organisations that 
expressed their opposition to minimum pricing were trade and business 
organisations’, (Scottish Government & Hexagon Research and Consulting, 2009, p. 
33). Though there were some divisions from the trade perspective, ‘Ten trade and 
business organisations supported the minimum retail pricing proposal in principle 
(for example, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association) or expressed a view in 
favour of one of the criteria suggested in the discussion paper for determining the 
minimum price,’ (Scottish Government & Hexagon Research and Consulting, 2009, 
p. 33). It should be noted, that many of these had a hybrid response – approving a 
minimum retail price for retailers rather than the hospitality sector for example. 
The consultation summarised the response in terms of the percentages of 
organisations that supported the proposal (65 per cent), a somewhat trivial 
measure given the different status and size of various organisations, yet used as a 
justification to indicate significant support. The support from the public 
responding was less decisive – with 49 per cent in favour of the measure. 
 
The next step was the publication of a formal strategic policy proposal in ‘Changing 
Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action,’ (Scottish 
Government, 2009). This document made clear that, ‘we are persuaded by the 
representations from health organisations and others that the evidence to show 
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the correlation between price, consumption and harm is strong,’ (Scottish 
Government, 2009, p. 11) and indicated the Scottish Government would soon bring 
forward proposals. This represented a situation where an insider network of 
health policy groups had significant influence within the Scottish Government 
whilst the alcohol-producer groups found themselves on the outside, to an extent a 
reverse of the wider British arrangement.  The proposals came forward in the 
Alcohol etc (Scotland) Bill in November 2009, with the proposals for MUP 
headlining the Bill. Yet, it was a minority SNP administration and despite the 
conversion of the administration towards the case for MUP, this was not shared 
across the Parliament. There was a successful exercise of an almost shadow policy 
community, showing evidence of another alternative policy community, 
surrounding the opposition parties, highlighting flaws and practical concerns with 
the policy. 
 
The SNP administration saw their proposal on MUP fall in the Scottish Parliament 
on a 76-49 vote, with opposition parties effectively uniting in opposition. The 
reaction to this from health policy groups and the SNP was firm.  The leader of 
opposition to MUP, Jackie Baillie MSP, then Labour’s health spokesperson, came in 
for criticism from health policy groups and the SNP representatives. Arguably 
inappropriately SAB Miller sent boxes of beer to all opposition MSPs who voted 
against the proposal. Jackie Baillie donated these to a local veterans’ organisation 
but that did not free her from criticism, with SNP MSP Michael Matheson saying, 
‘this is clearly Labour's reward for a job well done. I'm pleased to see Labour are 
donating the beer, but a far better gesture would be to commit to supporting 
minimum pricing instead of playing party political games,’ ("MSPs accused over 
beer gesture," 2010). Others, such as Donald Henderson, the Head of Public Health 
for the Scottish Government in this period, said, ‘I think both sides recognised that 
the war had got pretty bloody, and that some in the alcohol trade had gone beyond 
legitimate tactics,’ (Gornall, 2014b). Clearly there was considerable dissatisfaction 
from both the SNP and those within the alcohol health policy community with the 
outcome, in a very different fashion to the reaction in the wider United Kingdom. 
 
There are examples of certain groups believing that their evidence is both 
independent and therefore incorruptible, whilst any evidence from alcohol-
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producer groups is by comparison tainted. For example the report, ‘ALCOHOL: 
Price, Policy and Public Health,’ (Gillan & Macnaughton, 2007) from Scottish Health 
Action on Alcohol Problems (SHAAP), a consortium of health policy interest 
groups, is cited as a primary evidence source, independent from external influence 
within the consultation documents and beyond. By comparison a report 
commissioned by SAB Miller, from the Centre for Economics and Business 
Research is treated in a different fashion. The British Medical Journal (Gornall, 
2014b) quoted Evelyn Gillan, then Chief Executive of Alcohol Focus Scotland and 
one of the authors of the SHAAP report said, ‘”The CEBR critique of [the University 
of] Sheffield’s [alcohol policy research] didn’t meet the standards of peer reviewed 
science,” says Gillan, “yet they were sitting there giving evidence at the health 
committee as if they were a set of [independent] academics.”’ 
 
The elections of 2011 saw the SNP re-elected now with a majority in the Scottish 
Parliament. Given there was a manifesto commitment to introduce MUP, it was not 
surprising this proposal came forward fairly rapidly.  The Alcohol (Minimum 
Pricing) (Scotland) Bill was tabled on the 31st October 2011 as a key Government 
priority. Given the changed political balance the shadow policy network the 
alcohol-producers had established had less useful potential than previously. The 
proposals passed easily in late May of 2012, with the Bill receiving Royal Assent in 
June. An indicative take on the policy community surrounding this can be found on 
the special Scottish Government web page that focuses on MUP. They include 
quotes from supportive organisations such as Alcohol Focus Scotland, the BMA and 
SHAAP (Scottish Government, 2012b), including reference to the one trade group 
that supported the proposals, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association, and two 
alcohol-producers who also supported the concept. 
 
The industry responded to these proposals by taking forward a legal challenge to 
the proposals based on European law. This changed the dynamic of the policy 
community, moving to an arena where the alcohol-producers were far better 
organised and had established relationships.  The European Commission (26 
September 2012) quite rapidly issued a ‘Detailed Opinion’ that heavily criticised 
the proposal and called for reconsideration (BBC News, 25 July 2013). Not 
unexpectedly this was welcomed by alcohol-producer groups and opposed by 
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health policy groups. The Chief Executive of Alcohol Focus Scotland said, ‘The EC 
opinion was very poor, with factual inaccuracies. It was really clear that the 
industry had been doing massive lobbying over the summer months and about two 
days before the EC was due to issue its response to the UK and Scottish 
governments, a number of member states rushed in responses in opposition,’ 
(Gornall, 2014b).  
 
The court battles lengthened the period ahead of implementation – going on for 
several years with partial victories for both sides. It finally escalated to the 
European Court of Justice who issued what was very close to a final, definitive 
opinion – although some options do remain. The media reports seemed to indicate 
that the result was a victory for the alcohol-producer groups (Carrell, 2015), with 
the proposal as it stood ruled in breach. In their ruling the court said, ‘The court of 
justice considers that the effect of the Scottish legislation is significantly to restrict 
the market, and this might be avoided by the introduction of a tax measure 
designed to increase the price of alcohol instead of a measure imposing a minimum 
price per unit of alcohol,’ (Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 December 
2015). Yet despite this, it also established formally the scenario where it would be 
possible and permissible.  This opportunity was welcome by some health policy 
groups with SHAAP stating, ‘We welcome the ECJ opinion, which effectively 
confirms that the Scottish minimum unit pricing policy has to be justified as a 
regulatory measure to work alongside taxation increases. Taxation increases, 
incidentally, are also consistently opposed by the opponents of MUP. We hope that 
the Scottish courts will now move quickly to gather evidence to conclude this case 
and that the Scottish government will then implement this key policy without 
delay,’ (Carrell, 2015). There was recognition that a policy community had taken 
control with alcohol-producers to effectively outside of the levels of access they 
previously enjoyed was acknowledged by the Scotch Whisky Association’s Chief 
Executive who said, ‘We told them that effectively anything which actually 
interfered other than through tax with the pricing of alcohol was likely to run into 
problems [but] by the time we actually told them that minimum pricing was totally 
unacceptable to us and would remain so, they didn’t believe us, and therefore 
we’re in the legal fight that we are now in,’ (SWA’s Hewitt: should have acted sooner 
to block minimum pricing., 19 November 2013). 
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Eventually, and after years of legal fights, on 15 November 2017, the UK Supreme 
Court ruled that the legislation that sought to introduce a minimum unit price was 
lawful ("Scotch Whisky Association and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate 
and another (Respondents) (Scotland)," 2017). In response the Scottish 
Government announced they would introduce a minimum unit price in May 2018 – 
although a consultation from December 2017 until January 2018 on the 
practicalities of implementation was offered. It finally became policy – at the 
original 50p per unit – on the 1 May 2018 – a month short of a decade from its first 
announcement. Given the time that had passed, that it was still at the same 
proposed price could be an argument that on one level at least, there had been 
success for the alcohol groups. 
 
Holden and Hawkins (2013) make a strong argument that Scotland is unique in its 
radicalism because of the lack of influence or establishment of imbedded interests. 
Whilst there is a clear argument that Scotland has moved further and faster part of 
this could be down to the tools available for influence. By using the adversarial 
policy community approach framing, we can consider that Scotland cannot control 
rates of taxation of alcohol – the primacy of the Treasury affected this in the UK 
context by in effect empowering its policy community to push back the alternate 
health policy community on this issue. In Scotland the fact that this is not an area 
they have influence, means that interests have not formed a policy community 
focused on this area. The established policy community in the UK cannot use its 
influence on Scotland – it in effect does not have dominance or primacy. In the 
Scottish context it is not core, it does not necessarily have the potential to be an 
alternate. The core policy community is formed around the Scottish health 
department and the alternate struggles for a venue or vehicle – hence we see the 
legal system and the European Union level being engaged. Scotland is not 
necessarily different due to the distance from alcohol interests – it is just that it has 
a political system designed, contrasting with the greater devolution or 
independence demanded, that sets a policy framing where alcohol, and economic, 
interests have departments with less influence around which they had organised 
in the United Kingdom context. There are policy limitations in Scotland – primarily 
that they cannot influence levels of alcohol duties or introduce new bands within 
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the duty system – are also an opportunity for the health policy communities. This 
system means there is no government department or policy community 
surrounding it that benefits or is harmed directly from this taxation interest 
removes what had been the dominant community. In contrast health-led policy 
groups find departments where they are more naturally the obvious membership 
for core communities and the alcohol interests find themselves alternates looking 
for venues. Whilst not a perfect analogy – the rules of the game are different. It is 
not that they do not influence – as was demonstrated by the delays in MUP and 
that the price point remained at the proposed level from ten years before – but 
that it is a system that currently does not have a venue where alcohol’s economic 
interests are considered in the same context as the wider United Kingdom. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Government intentions on alcohol pricing have changed markedly over time, from 
concerns on prices rising too fast causing inflation and hurting consumers; to the 
modern advocacy of price as a tool to limit alcohol consumption.  Within the wider 
British system the established policy communities, usually surrounding 
government departments such as the Treasury with direct policy responsibility 
that gave the opportunity for considerable alcohol-producer engagement have 
proved successful at limiting major policy changes and leading a process of 
effectively incremental change. Looking at only this feature would offer evidence 
for a traditional policy community approach being an appropriate fit.  
 
Yet when new participant departments tried to have influence, and the established 
community sought to resist this change, there was evidence of an alternative 
community even if it was unsuccessful in taking the place of the incumbent. Whilst 
defeated alternative attempts to influence were found – for example when the 
Department of Economic Affairs managed to refer the issue of beer price to the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes, even if this failed. The close relationships 
of the incumbent policy community, with considerable continuity, proved 
influential in developing final policy, even if interim battles saw them defeated or 
alternatives given an airing. 
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The attempts of the medical and health policy groups to bear new influence 
following recommendations on policy made outside of the community, 
demonstrated the strength of the existing policy communities and their ability to 
show resilience, as well as hold their place - alongside the evidence of civil 
servants as advocates of policy community interests. Yet with the establishment of 
the Alcohol Duty Escalator it was also apparent that whilst the incumbent policy 
communities were influential within their policy arena, they had little influence 
when their arena was of less political significance than other priorities – as well as 
the importance of actively seeking to maintain its own policy community 
relationships which appeared to have slipped. In rebuilding the policy community, 
or restoring the original policy community membership, surrounding the Treasury 
with changing partnerships and new access levels for different alcohol-producer 
groups examples can be drawn with the reaction of the agricultural policy 
community to the egg crisis of the 1980s as seen in Chapter 2. 
 
The UK Government’s rapid shift to Minimum Unit Pricing and then away again, 
also demonstrated how policy developed outside of the incumbent community can 
be influential. Once again the re-establishment of control with the communities led 
to a policy more incremental and acceptable to alcohol-producer groups being 
implemented. The core policy community, whilst challenged, in the end remained 
the core – with the alternate remaining in its outsider position. It also contrasts 
with Scotland where a very different policy community in a position of influence, 
led to different policy challenges. The acknowledgement by industry groups that 
insufficient efforts had been put in to making these relationships is indicative that 
the UK model is one of considerable continuity, one that was developed by history 
rather than designed by political choice. It also demonstrated that the lack of 
engagement of groups that had responsibility for policy implementation would 
lead to considerable problems for enacting policy. Incumbency was often there as 
the advantages outweighed political inflexibility in general. Scotland could be 
considered to be an outlying policy because of factors entirely exogenous to 
alcohol – that of system design. That alcohol revenues effectively do not have a 
clear, direct impact on the Scottish exchequer and there is no department tasked 
with maintaining this revenue has had a significant effect on policy. It has also led 
to continuous seeking of venues for the effective alternative policy community 
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made up of alcohol-producers. Scotland could be different by design – but this 
could be a design flaw, not an intention. Scotland could be different by error, not 
choice. 
 
The policy case studies regarding alcohol price offers influential policy 
communities with alcohol-producers at their core, with preferable policy and at a 
steady pace – in isolation an observable traditional policy community style. It also 
demonstrates that they are not all-powerful and can be overcome when political 
will is considerable. This distinction is more notable than other case studies, policy 
communities cannot necessarily explain policy divergence or shifts that occur in 
pricing. Whether this is a shift in taxation policy or curtailing of a desire to shift 
taxation policy there is not always clear evidence that groups and the policy 
communities they play a part in actually have clear influence. For alcohol 
producers, influence can on occasion be evidenced, but so can circumstances when 
they are entirely bypassed and not involved in a consultative environment – with 
the CPRS report and the Alcohol Duty Escalator the clearest examples of this gap 
from a policy community environment – either for the alcohol sector or public 
health groups. Yet their engagement leads to more workable policy, which on a 
practical basis is desirable.  The various iterations of pricing policy have affected 
the policy communities and it is indicative that there is strong evidence for an 
adversarial policy community environment that affected iterations of pricing 
policy – it explains many of the developments effectively. These symbiotic 
relationships found of which examples can be evidenced across the case studies, 
are indicative of policy communities, of an adversarial nature, being important for 
the development of alcohol policy. 
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Chapter 6 
Alcohol strategies 
A comprehensive approach to tackle alcohol harm? 
‘We are fighting Germany, Austria and drink, and as far as I can see, the greatest of 
these three deadly foes is drink.’ 
David Lloyd George (28 February 1915) 
 
Whilst previous chapters have focused on specific areas of alcohol policy – 
licensing and drink-driving – this chapter instead seeks to consider key case 
studies of policy development when the initiatives on alcohol were broader than a 
single policy area. This is a consideration of what is termed as an ‘Alcohol Strategy’ 
– a broader attempt at influence that extends beyond a single functionary element 
of alcohol policy. This will mean consideration of developments made across areas, 
government departments and how groups responded in these circumstances. 
Implicit within this is that these broader strategies are externally viewed as 
government-led – the strategies of government departments and agencies, 
influenced by groups rather than groups own alcohol strategies. The previous case 
studies, including consideration of Scotland, have shown that groups compete in 
policy development, but so do government departments, inquiries, the nations and 
regions, non-ministerial departments and wider venues. The evidence has 
suggested that influence has been found in within a venue and from venue 
shopping. Groups have sought to stop a radical policy shift or indeed instigate one 
through the gaming of these options. Yet when a more comprehensive approach is 
sought, it crosses these venues, risking disruption of long held relationships or 
processes. If the alcohol sector is dominant, then this is where it would most likely 
be felt – the overall policy direction, strategy and process.  
 
In considering this broader perspective, whilst respecting government policy 
boundaries, provides an opportunity to consider if there are adversarial policy 
communities who interact on competing issues, what areas may be conceded and 
what areas protected. It will also allow us to consider, on a comparable basis, to 
what extent relationships in less dominant policy communities have, or do not 
have, an impact on policy development. If issues end up moving from one policy 
community to another, does it have an impact on the policy resolution? The first 
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section will look at the role of alcohol policy in the First World War and inter war 
period when government put the focus on alcohol. The development of new, 
powerful bodies to set alcohol policy required new relationships with groups – and 
new reactions to policy ideas. This period saw considerable success for the 
temperance movement, which arguably was sustained post the Second World War. 
In the 1950s new considerations on alcohol appeared with the medical community 
and alcohol had more of a medical, rather than moral focus. The second section 
will consider the period from the start of the Thatcher government, when the first 
real consideration of a broad alcohol strategy was made, how groups reacted, the 
communities that development and the policy outcomes. It will then move on to 
the New Labour alcohol strategies, alongside other policy side-lines that may have 
been less successful than desired. 
 
The third section will look at the Public Health Responsibility Deal and the Alcohol 
Responsibility Network – potentially a directly created policy community that 
would publicly negotiate alcohol policies. It will consider the successes and failures 
of this in terms of developing policy – the challenges it faced and the outcomes. 
The final section will look towards Scotland that used their devolved authority to 
pursue a unique course on alcohol. It will seek to consider both the Labour and 
Scottish National Party-led governments - whether their respective approaches 
resulted in a traditional or adversarial policy community that may have played a 
role in the different policies – or whether other factors played a more influential 
role. 
 
6.1. Temperance and the alcoholic 
Whilst there is a long history of intervention into individual elements surrounding 
alcohol policy, the first attempts for a more strategic approach to the alcohol issue 
began around the period of the First World War – when the state took a new and 
deeper interest. The peak of the moral crusade accompanied this from the 
temperance movement made up of religious groups and social change activists; 
alongside a Labour Party with a new view on alcohol and uncoordinated alcohol 
interests without a clear unified structure. This period, which lasted until the mid-
1920s, saw considerable formal group involvement in developing responses to the 
alcohol problem. A change began when a reconsideration of the alcoholic and 
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alcoholism began within the then Ministry of Health. Alcoholism had been seen in a 
similar fashion to vagrancy, a social ill to be overcome, not a medical disease to be 
treated. With a new way of considering the alcoholic coming from the United 
States new groups were established led by the medical community that went from 
disinterest to key interest in the issue. This section will seek to consider whether 
policy communities were apparent in these periods, seeking to understand if a 
policy community could have existed, how it influenced policy on alcohol and the 
effect it had on policy development. It will also seek to consider whether this more 
closely matched the approach of the traditional or adversarial policy community 
structure. 
 
The supply, sale and consumption of alcohol piqued political interest as the First 
World Ward began. Alcohol became a war issue almost immediately, ‘the Defence 
of the Realm Act gave the military authorities powers to regulate hours of sale in 
certain key areas,’ (Greenaway, 2003, pp. 91-92). Further pieces of legislation also 
developed these restrictions further – with large swathes of the country under new 
regulation that sought to limit the hours of sale for alcohol – other measures – 
including the No Treating Order from 1915 restricted the ability to buy someone 
else a drink – effectively ending the concept of rounds – indeed as a Guardian 
editorial from the time noted, ‘The terms of the order are pretty closely drawn, and 
if it is to be evaded it can only be in one way - through the provision which allows 
intoxicating liquor to be bought by one person for another if at the same time the 
purchaser is also entertaining his friend to a meal,’ (Editorial, 1915).  Initially the 
division was between two groupings – the temperance groups mainly made up of 
the religious activists and social crusaders and the alcohol groups, dominated by 
the brewers, but in a somewhat indirect manner, advocating their respective sides 
of the argument - ‘brewers stressed their patriotic credentials in view of the new 
beer taxes, while temperance advocates stressed old arguments about the 
detrimental effects of alcohol consumption on the national character,’ (Greenaway, 
2003, p. 92).  The intervention of Lloyd George changed this, with fiery vitriol and 
the clever use of public relations tools – such as leaking a pledge from the King to 
abstain throughout the war period. This led to a proposal that divided group 
interests – nationalisation. This proposal – and the prospect of state ‘disinterested 
management’  became the two options that came under the spotlight in the years 
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ahead. The Central Control Board (CCB) Liquor Traffic was established in May 
1915 with wide-ranging authority to manage the alcohol issue throughout the First 
World War. In its initial establishment organised groups were formally kept off the 
board, ‘a feature of the work of the CCB, evident from the outset, was its 
independence from the vested interests of the Drink question: the temperance 
organisations and the trade,’ (Greenaway, 2003, p. 98). Whilst initially having 
limited authority, the CCB soon developed the ability to be a significant regulator 
of alcohol. Sales were restricted, experiments in ownership conducted and wide-
ranging proposals made. Significant within these was the greater restrictions on 
licensing hours, which became firmer and less favourable to higher volume sales of 
alcohol. The CCB even proposed, and made some progress on, plans to nationalise 
the alcohol sector. In the end, costs became a factor, with compensation likely to be 
too expensive for a government on a war footing, but it offered an indication of the 
balance of influence – it was certainly not in the producers, mainly brewers’, 
favour. Yet the CCB also had a time limit – its abolition only one year after the end 
of the First World War written into its founding legislation ("Defence of the Realm 
(Amendment) (No. 3) Act 1915," 1915). As a compromise its authority was given 
to the Home Office to release this time pressure, and, in a significant backtrack 
Lloyd George arranged a negotiated settlement at a conference between Members 
of Parliaments considered to be representative of all parties. ‘The round table 
conference sat in June under the Chairmanship of the Attorney General; it 
consistent of eighteen MPs: four each from the temperance and Trade sides, two 
representing clubs, four neutrals, and two each from the government and Labour 
opposition,’ (Greenaway, 2003, p. 124). This firmed up some of the licensing 
measures put in place temporarily and allowed all sides to come away with some 
victories.  
 
The end settlement to this period of policy flux had been negotiated in a way that is 
arguably very similar to a traditional policy community – various invited interests 
on the inside, participation has value and there is a negotiated settlement. The 
major weakness for this interpretation was the lack of institutionalisation.  
Considering the Daugbjerg (1998) typology, table 6.1. indicates that membership 
and integration were in general in line with the anticipated rational policy 
community approach, yet in terms of institutionalism there was a significant 
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deficiency. Looking beyond this limited timeframe, in terms of policy development, 
it was the producer interests who made greater progress. Greenaway (2003, p. 
128) argues that, ‘the connections forged at this period between civil servants and 
the Trade persisted into the interwar years.’ Further former civil servants found 
roles with individual brewers and their trade association the Brewers’ Society, a 
feature that is heavily highlighted by Richardson and Jordan (1979) as an 
established feature of a sustained policy community relationship. In many ways 
the example of centralised control and attempts to set policy had made something 
clear, ‘the First World War had proved that Government had need of producers 
and manufacturing pressure groups when it sought to regulate,’ (Greenaway, 2003, 
p. 128). Greenaway (2003, pp. 128-129) further argued that in comparison the 
temperance movement had champions in parliament but had not built the 
institutionalised relationship with civil servants. A major part of this was the 
conflicting demands of the groups – there was not a single unified group or 
position that could deliver wider support for a proposal. These groups were not 
necessary to regulate, they did not have clear interests and their volume of 
complaint was now falling on deaf ears. This weakness proved ever more 
important as considerations of the influence of the temperance movement is made 
in other chapters. The First World War and the concerns surrounding alcohol 
created a circumstance where the development of a policy community system of 
governance became apparent. The initial exclusion of groups – such as the 
Brewers’ Society, the National Union of Temperance and others who all had an 
active, engaged membership, did allow for significant and rapid policy change, yet 
produced several, serious negative side effects. The first negotiated environment 
addressed this challenge of policy implementation with group representatives, as 
seen by Lloyd George’s desire for a settled position. This was still at a political 
level, with MPs’ representatives, admittedly isolated from latter consideration of 
group engagement but nevertheless offered an example of a developing situation.  
The position of civil servants as negotiators and their increased role in policy 
development was also apparent – as was the more fluid employment relationship 
between civil servants and interest groups. More widely the latter beginning of 
institutionalisation observed by Greenaway (2003) from the producer perspective, 
and the comparative disorganisation of the temperance movement also offers 
indications to the relationships seen in the licensing changes in the 1960s.   
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Table 6.1.: The policy communities surrounding the first attempts of alcohol 
strategies compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy Communities 1914 – 1925 
The Temperance Years 
Membership Very limited number 
of members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Government departments, 
employers and labour groups 
alongside some medical 
community. More extreme 
temperance and alcohol interest 
groups generally excluded. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Interaction between them is 
frequent, coordinated visits to sites 
and formal meetings. Close 
working relationship. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Development of the process of 
responding to policy problems. 
Time limits indicate lack of 
institutional structure. Beginning of 
institutional relationships between 
civil servants and interests. 
 
In this period, it is difficult to say there was a true traditional policy community in 
place, as the exclusions had made policy implementation challenging – delivery 
was a counterpoint. The potential structure for a community was established as a 
result of these challenges - indicating that the embracing of a policy community 
had wider impacts. As indicated in table 6.2. there is a narrative that indicates the 
potential presence of an alternative policy community within an adversarial policy 
community environment may be applicable in an earlier period. The time-limited 
core policy community progressively became an inappropriate or incomplete 
policy community and then somewhat overtaken by an alternative policy 
community with producer interests more central. Whilst this transition is not 
evidenced as being complete, there is evidence if an alternative policy community 
that seemed to use some of the structural environment created by the first – with 
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observable features of a better fit within typology. Yet, as the table indicates, 
except for institutionalism the core policy community had many of the features 
apparent, yet the alternative is very much vaguer – the evidence can be considered 
to be better explaining a limited traditional policy community approach rather 
than the adversarial approach. That the future observable environment sees 
relationships with groups – the Brewers’ Society as a clear example on one side, 
the various temperance groups and unions on the other – both finding themselves 
outside of the policy community at this stage does not necessarily indicate they 
were formed within an alternative policy community. 
 
Table 6.2.: The policy communities surrounding first attempts of alcohol 
strategies compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial policy 
communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Employers, labour and 
medical community 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Government departments, 
employers and labour groups 
alongside some medical 
community. More extreme 
temperance and alcohol 
interest groups generally 
excluded. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any specific 
point. Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Interaction between them is 
frequent, coordinated visits to 
sites and formal meetings. 
Close working relationship. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Development of the process of 
responding to policy problems. 
Time limits indicate lack of 
institutional structure.  
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Alcohol-producers and 
retailers 
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Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Effectively the producers and 
licensed retailers of alcohol. 
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Evidence of interaction, with 
departments and organisations 
on the edges of the core 
community. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Beginning of institutional 
relationships between civil 
servants and interests. 
 
The temperance movement had established alcohol’s position as an issue of 
morality – the social ills of the alcoholic playing heavily into the movement’s 
imagery. This was a position shared by the then Ministry of Health when in 
correspondence it was stated that alcohol, and the alcoholic, was a ‘social rather 
than health problem’, (Elkington, 28 January 1957). This position was to face 
challenges and in changing influence policy communities. The slowly changing 
positioning of alcoholism as a health issue, had its main focus surrounding external 
evidence coming into focus, mainly from the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
which it some ways changed opinions in this area (Greenaway, 2003, p. 161). This 
argument, that alcoholism was a treatable disease, found elements of favour, yet 
equally only added to further disputes within policy development. With 
comparatively little evidence of the number of alcoholics, and it being seen as an 
individual, not societal, problem the question of how to respond was seen as 
challenging. The developing evidence base that suggested alcoholism was a disease 
and the significant aggravating factor that crime associated with alcoholism was 
increasing led to influential groups publicly increasing the pressure for action. The 
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British Medical Association and Magistrates Association (1961) commissioned a 
joint memorandum that called for action.  Further support came from professional 
committees within the Ministry of Health, mainly the Standing Mental Health 
Advisory Committee (SMHAC) that stated, ‘that the government should expand the 
specialist treatment of alcoholism within the NHS’, (Baggott, 1986, p. 472).  
 
This increased the pressure on the Ministry of Health with the Home Office also 
seeing pressure added from, ‘ the professional organisations concerned with law 
and order also become particularly worried about the increasing level of 
drunkenness in the 1960s and voiced their concern to the Home Office,’ (Baggott, 
1986, pp. 472-473). Other groups also appeared on the radar such as the Medical 
Council on Alcoholism that was, ‘formed in 1967 by a number of doctors who 
wanted to promote a greater awareness amongst the medical profession of the 
extent of alcohol problems’, (Baggott, 1986, p. 471) and a new brand for an old 
interest in the, ‘National Council on Alcoholism (NCA), a precursor of Alcohol 
Concern, was established in 1962 as a voluntary organisation, but was in fact 
created by the temperance movement,’ (Baggott, 1986, p. 471). Within Parliament 
an All-Party Parliament Group on alcoholism which Baggott (1986, p. 476) notes, 
‘provided a platform for lobbying on this issue’. Whereas in a traditional policy 
community’s interests gather around government departments, in this 
circumstance alcoholism was an issue that no government department wanted 
ownership of. Baggott (1986) and Greenaway (2003, p. 164) outline a conflict 
between the Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS) and the Home Office 
where at the end of a cross-departmental inquiry responsibility for 
implementation became a major sticking point. Finally this was addressed with 
responsibility assigned to the DHSS – the Home Office’s previous formal 
responsibility for habitual drunkenness now intertwined with the DHSS 
responsibilities for alcoholism. This was followed by a major decision to expand 
alcoholism services, with an investment of some £2 million per year for alcoholic 
treatment units, with the ambition to cure, rather than just treat alcoholism 
(Baggott, 1986, p. 476). The focus of the issue in one Government department, and 
the launch of a policy with wide backing, led to considerably increased 
engagement from groups. ‘Even the voluntary organisations that had, prior to 
1970, been largely excluded from consultation were drawn into a close 
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relationship with DHSS,’ (Baggott, 1986, p. 476). Arguably this could be considered 
a negative to a policy community structure, and more of an argument for an issues 
network being in place. However, Baggott (1986, p. 476) further argues that, ‘this 
was chiefly because their co-operation was essential for the successful 
implementation of the new policy.’ As an indication of the keen role of groups in 
this process where an interest was not represented a group was developed with 
the direct support of the government department – in this case the establishment 
of the Federation of Alcoholic Residential Establishments (FARE). As considered in 
table 6.3., the institutionalisation of this relationship was further developed with 
the creation of the Advisory Committee on Alcoholism in 1974, which although 
advisory had a significant level of influence. The membership was relative narrow 
with representatives exclusively from, ‘medicine, the voluntary organisations, the 
statutory social services, the police and magistrates associations’, (Baggott, 1986, 
p. 477). Their interests were not dissimilar, but they were distinct – the police and 
the magistrates had to deal with the after-effects of alcohol consumption in the 
more extreme situations. The medical groups had both the extreme and the 
regularised consumption issues – whilst for the social services and voluntary 
sectors it was to an extent the regularised consumption that was the issue. This 
explains the challenges in achieving consensus – with only one group dedicated to 
tackling policy that affected both the after-effects of acute consumption and 
prolonged consumption. The outcome wanted was the reduction in consumption 
of alcohol that led to problems for these groups – yet the style of consumption 
created cleavages in desired outcome – so a policy was needed that in effect took 
on both elements. The lack of presence of producer interests within this 
community is worth some consideration – the Brewers’ Society, British Hotels & 
Restaurants Association and similar. The effects of their products and any role in 
responding to the issue may well have affected their interests. Yet in the policies 
pursued they were apparently, ‘broadly in favour of the government’s willingness 
to tackle alcohol misuse in this way’, (Baggott, 1986, p. 476). Similar to the earlier 
examples surrounding drink-driving, an element of outsourcing policy 
development to an alternative community may have been apparent. 
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Table 6.3.: The policy communities surrounding the consideration of policy 
towards alcoholics compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy 
communities 
Dimension Policy Communities 1960 – 1970 
The Alcoholic & Health 
Membership Very limited number 
of members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Narrow medical professional 
membership, but informal in their 
representation. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Efforts at consultation, but 
different viewpoints and changing 
interaction. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
Eventually reached a collective 
viewpoint, but large differences 
for a sustained period. 
 
The development of a wider consideration on alcoholism throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s demonstrates that elements of the approach of policy communities put 
forward by Richardson and Jordan (1979) contained elements of self-fulfilment.  
When they stated the interests tend to organise around government departments, 
this approach also suggests that when an interest is spread across government 
departments’ policy development and group engagement become ever more 
challenging. As policy was assigned to a single environment a small policy 
community developed, which expanded whilst keeping some of its structure – the 
consent, co-operation and consultation still mirrored that tighter policy 
community. It also allowed for some wider policy shifts – with alcoholism being 
redefined and readdressed. Some interests were deliberately excluded – the 
producer groups in this case.  There was a change in policy tools, but in the wider 
scheme of things the shift was incremental. This comfort and closeness within the 
policy community was sustained by mutual goals and a toolbox under their 
control. They were the delivery agents for the alcoholism policy as well as those 
developing it. Whilst there was certainly a closeness between the groups Baggott 
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(1986, p. 471) assesses influence such that, ‘in general the professional groups 
have tended to be more influential but less intense, given their wider interests and 
concerns, whilst the reverse has been true of the temperance and voluntary 
organisations.’ There was a structure and dominant interests – more points 
indicating a policy community in action. The evidence for an alternative policy 
community is obvious by its absence – whether this was from disinterest or that 
the traditional policy community being a better reflection of the policy 
development process is unclear. That this changed going forward can be 
considered in two ways – that the alcohol groups suddenly had an interest or that 
the medical communities stepped out of their own policy arena and into another. 
Outside of DHSS’s alcoholism community there is only limited evidence of 
community activities throughout this period.  This would hold a traditional policy 
community approach as being evident, the actions, activities and, in consideration 
of the Daugbjerg (1998) typology holding to be fairly accurate, as indicated in table 
6.3.. It is recognisable that departments responded in a manner consistent with the 
interests of groups that evidence has previously suggested were organising in 
communities surrounding them. In this sense the background policy community, 
accepting incremental changes but rejecting dramatic shifts seems to hold – that 
one community wanted a more radical vision was tempered by the collective 
influence of the others for only incremental change in policies that would impact 
beyond original community boundaries. 
 
6.2. The modern development of alcohol strategies 
Towards the end of the Callaghan government in the late 1970s there began a 
consideration of what would be considered in the 21st century to be an alcohol 
strategy. Moving behind a strategy for alcoholism, and managing those risks, these 
new stratagems were being prepared to take a new embracing look at alcohol 
policy – from licensing to price, marketing to treatment. New research was 
commissioned and new ideas put forward for consideration.   In a not unexpected 
fashion, a general election got in the way and the return of a Conservative 
government to power affected considerations going forward. This development, its 
effect on policy communities relating to alcohol policy is of first consideration 
within this section. Secondly this section will seek to consider the range of 
attempts to form embracing alcohol strategies under the New Labour government 
 191 
during its years of power 1997 to 2010. In an era of wider, cross-departmental 
strategies can we find evidence for policy communities and given the effective 
departmental battles it should rationally hold that this is a prime environment for 
adversarial policy communities – can we find evidence of these and consider their 
role in developing alcohol policy.  These early attempts to create a broad strategy 
compared to the latter more arguably Blairite consensus-led policy movements 
should offer opportunities to consider whether traditional policy communities can 
be found, whether they could persist in a changing policy framework or whether 
the changing framework gave opportunities for the development, or the 
appearance from the shadows, of alternative policy communities enabled to take a 
lead in policy development for alcohol. 
 
As indicated in the previous section and chapter 4, producer groups have 
demonstrated an acceptance of stepping away from a policy community, or at least 
a core policy community, if they are in general agreement with the policy goal and 
the proposed policy interventions does not substantially impact on their day to day 
operations. They disengaged and arguably outsourced policy development to an 
alternative community rather than focus on a policy area where they have limited 
necessity to engage. They have also indicated an ability to seek engagement when 
the balance changes and proposed interventions impact on them in ways they find 
undesirable.  In considering the movement in alcohol strategies and example of 
this shift began when a new report from the Department of Health & Social 
Services Advisory Committee on Alcoholism (1977) on the prevention of alcohol 
harm was published. The primary call of this report was the maintenance of 
alcohol pricing in line with incomes – to use taxation to make sure alcohol did not 
become any cheaper, and ideally increased in price. There were further calls on 
supply and other factors that addressed concerns that for the first time went far 
beyond the areas of influence for the DHSS. This led to some significant dispute 
across departments. The neat policy community within the DHSS had suggested a 
policy solution that affected further communities. Other departments had 
concerns, but lacked a clear emphasis on the desired outcomes that interlinked 
these separated policy areas. What did appear was a general acceptance across 
departments that something more holistic should be considered appearing and 
coinciding with the end of the Callaghan government. Previous chapters 
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demonstrated how issues relating to alcohol had surrounded certain government 
departments – the issue of licensing being intertwined with the Home Office, then 
Culture, Media & Sport, and back to the Home Office again, with drink-driving 
linked closely to Transport. In this chapter the development of the health 
arguments on alcohol and alcoholism is noted with new communities appearing. 
Beyond this the Treasury affects alcohol price through taxation and other 
departments have specific interests (trade, agriculture etc.) all of which play a role 
in wider alcohol policy development.  As noted previously Grant (2000, p. 65) 
argues that, ‘policy communities and networks tend to form around government 
departments’. The decision to have this policy development in a unit separate from 
any department would therefore be presumed to have an effect on community 
structure – with no community in place for policy development and its creation not 
linked directly to a focused area of interest.  The issue of cross-departmental 
interests’ negotiations reached the point that the Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS) within the Cabinet Office were given the task of investigating policy options 
that cut across departmental interests. The potential direction of travel was 
empowered in effect to a limited set of civil servants, with the primary author 
being Stephen Boys-Smith. The lack of direct ministerial accountability gave 
greater authority to the CPRS to make recommendations without political 
considerations, whilst equally limiting its ability to have a champion within the 
higher echelons of government. At this stage it was notable for almost a lack of a 
policy community – a new venue was developed for policy development and in 
establishing a reaction to this the constructive side of a policy community may be 
considered. 
 
Unlike traditional Government relationships there was less interaction and 
communication between departments – in effect this was research that for the 
most part was conducted by two individuals. This also led to a lack of traditional 
relationships, nothing had any established routes and there was limited 
engagement with venues that had alternative policy communities. Tellingly the 
brewing side made a significant attempt to engage – with an invitation to the CPRS 
team to tour Allied Breweries. This invitation was accepted and then the level of 
hospitality became apparent. The two civil servants outlined this in a memo, ‘I 
have checked with one or two other people in Whitehall about our acceptance of 
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the somewhat lavish hospitality promised for the tour next week. Since they have 
conducted innumerable similar parties of civil servants around their premises 
(presumably with a view to influencing those civil servants’ perceptions) it seemed 
sensible to follow the common form on the financial side.’  It was later expanded 
that, ‘we may tranquilly enjoy the cuisine of Le Talbooth, the beds in Maison 
Talbooth and the cross-section of Ind Coope pubs’ in the Romford area’, 
(Bridgeman, 1 December 1978).  As an indication of an alternative community 
seeking to assert itself, they were joined on this excursion by representatives from 
the Brewers’ Society, HM Treasury, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries 
and the Department of Industry (Mills, 21 November 1978). Where meetings had 
minutes, full letters kept and engagements carefully managed the CPRS team were 
able to proceed without the standard formalities of a government department. 
Obviously this created difficulties in analysing the relationships and engagements.  
Helpfully, after the report had been completed, and a staff change occurring within 
the CPRS led to a handover note on what to do with the report (including its 
expected publication) with a list of people who had been helpful in its 
development to receive an advance copy. These 39 recipients included 
representatives of the Brewers’ Society, the BMA, the Magistrates Association and 
the National Council on Alcoholism. It also included the Chief Medical Officer, 
representatives from foreign governments, a range of government departments 
and many researchers into the effects of alcohol. The decision by the Thatcher 
government to not publish the CPRS report was despite the difficult political 
realities. Firstly, it had been commissioned by the previous Labour government, so 
they knew of its existence and secondly, with a more obvious issue, it had already 
been published in Sweden when it was leaked by an unknown source. Yet, the line 
held. One of the major difficulties in this was the differing departmental 
perspective. The Department of Health, having built up a medical community 
interested in alcohol, now had an almost wish list of policies that, on apparent 
independent assessment were likely to produce the outcomes on alcohol which 
they desired. Take for example taxation – the report suggested that, ‘as a 
minimum, duty levels should be kept in line with the RPI’, (Central Policy Review 
Staff, 1979, p. viii). Baggott (1986, p. 479) summarised the proposals as, ‘first, that 
government should announce a positive commitment to counter the rise in alcohol 
consumption and problems. Second, that it should use control policies to this end – 
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in particular drink should not become cheaper and the liquor licensing laws should 
not be relaxed. Third, that a special government body be established to monitor 
and co-ordinate policy.’ In effect it was an endorsement to expand the sphere of 
influence of the alcoholism policy community, although it may have been 
structurally different to the current membership. 
 
This provided an enhanced negotiation position for various Departments when it 
came to alcohol. The Department of Health tried to push its advantage. In a letter 
the Health Secretary, Patrick Jenkin, sought to make a point on taxation to the 
Treasury – he stated, ‘A good start could be made now by action to raise the level 
of taxation and discourage consumption,’ (Jenkin, 29 May 1979). Despite an initial 
response of, ‘I will certainly bear what you say in mind,’ (Howe, 5 June 1979), the 
Treasury however would have none of it noting that whilst they, ‘refer to possible 
changes the Chancellor might make in alcohol taxation in his next Budget, and 
point to the desirability of the social issues, including health and crime, being 
looked at before decisions are made. I am sure this will be helpful, but I must make 
it clear that the question of taxation remains a matter for the Chancellor and his 
Budget judgement,’ (Biffen, 12 December 1980). The community surrounding 
alcohol taxation, and taxation in general, was somewhat different to the medical 
professionals considering the impacts of alcohol price with the Department of 
Health. They were, despite apparent evidence in their favour, unable to have a 
significant influence.  This tool being off the table further consideration of the 
other areas drew out more challenges. Different departmental interests appeared, 
with their own interests – arguably formed by their own policy communities. The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries had a policy of continuous market 
expansion for alcohol – it was desirable to always sell more and expand the sector 
which obviously clashed with any consumption limiting policies.  This pressure 
resulted in a limited compromise, with the publication of a new discussion 
document on alcohol entitled ‘Drinking Sensibly’, (Department of Health and Social 
Services, 1981) which focused on intervention and education rather than 
population level action – incrementally more than previously, but certainly less 
than the wider policy pitch made by the CPRS. There is evidence that this approach 
had significant support from producer interest - ‘in 1981, for example, the brewing 
industry co-operated with government in establishing the Alcohol Education and 
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Research Council,’ (Baggott, 1986, p. 481). The interests of the alcohol producers 
were in many ways directly benefitting from health education and intervention 
that sought to limit extreme drinking, whilst not interfering with the consumption 
of the average drinker.  
 
Whilst we can find indications that something close to a policy community existed 
around alcohol in the Department of Health and Social Services, with the insiders 
being a combination of interested health groups and professionals such as the 
British Medical Association and the medical Royal Colleges, they lacked the ability 
to influence beyond their own delivery capacity. They did not have a role in 
influencing or managing alcohol production and distribution, they could not 
enforce licensing or regulation and they did not have the ability to collect or 
administer taxation. Whilst they came together to consider policy that could lead 
to desired outcomes, they did not have the membership to be delivery agents for 
this policy. Other communities may have existed that did have this capacity, 
however membership of these was not open to these groups that surrounded the 
Department of Health and Social Services. Therefore the structuring of 
communities that considered alcohol policy could feasibly be argued to have a 
significant effect on outcomes.  Taking an example of taxation, the Treasury’s 
interests are very different from the DHSS. Income from alcohol consumption 
exceeds the direct costs of current interventions, therefore any activity that may 
negatively affect this income would need to be proportionally beneficial – 
something which was not clear from the evidence. Aligning around Departments 
where they were comfortable, or indeed invited, had significant limiting effects on 
the actual outcomes. Comparably those who aligned around influence such as the 
alcohol producers and retailers, alongside groups such as the Magistrates’ 
Association, whilst not necessarily having a greater understanding of the health 
research or evidence that the groups such as the BMA had, arguably had a much 
more substantial effect on the policy outcomes. 
 
From the debates of the early 1980s to the beginning of the New Labour 
government there were a range of interesting developments. Firstly, was the 
launch of the Parliamentary Beer Club, latterly the All-Party Parliamentary Beer 
Group, in 1991. This group was funded by the industry with donations of several 
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thousand pounds each year that paid for an Honorary Secretary to run the 
organisation – the individual in question was Robert Humphreys, formerly the 
Director of Public Relations at Bass plc. This group became a consultee to 
government alcohol policies, sent a delegation on taxation and licensing, as well as 
running its own investigations into various areas of alcohol policy. Another unique 
policy was the expansion of the ‘Flavoured Alcohol Beverage’ sector. Whilst they 
had appeared internationally in the 1980s an expansion of, ‘the FAB category 
emerged in the mid-1990s from Australia and Great Britain in the form of 
"alcopops", a lemon flavoured concoction that could have a malt, wine, or distilled 
spirit base,’ (Mosher & Diane, 2005, p. 327). These were introduced responding to 
a taxation shift that was intended to create a new category of alcohol in which 
consumption was more limited due to restricted strength and product size. This 
policy was rapidly reversed with a significant tax increase in 1996 when the 
marketing of these products and their consumption did not fulfil prejudged 
assumptions. They also inspired an increase in self-regulation, ‘The Portman 
Group, funded by alcohol producers, had been set up in 1989 to encourage 
responsible drinking. But its first code of practice was directly prompted by the 
alcopop furore in 1996,’ (Rohrer & de Castella, 31 July 2013). 
 
Whilst the New Labour government initially proposed a wide reaching alcohol 
strategy as part of their programme of government in the early stages of their 
legislative programme (Cm 3852, 1998), this somewhat transformed into a 
legislative programme of licensing reform. The intense response to this licensing 
reform from a variety of groups and the national media led to the demand for an 
alcohol strategy somewhat later with a 2004 publication of the ‘Alcohol Harm 
Reduction Strategy for England’, (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2004). Whilst it 
created a rather unfortunate acronym, it had been preceded by an earlier version 
in 2003, which was a consultation document. The comparative responses to the 
final report offer some insight as to the relationships between groups and 
government.  The British Beer & Pub Association (2004) responding to the final 
report stated that, ‘the industry shares the concern of Government and other 
groups over the misuse of alcohol and certain patterns of drinking such as 
concentrated excessive drinking. Government have based their new Alcohol 
Strategy on careful consideration of the evidence and developed policies designed 
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to tackle these issues decisively and effectively.’ Baggott (2010, p. 140) notes, 
‘there was particular unease, expressed by professional and voluntary 
organisations in the alcohol field, about the partnership role given to an industry 
body known as the Portman Group,’ of which further comment was noted in the 
previous chapter on drink-driving. Anderson (2007, p. 1515), who acknowledges 
his position at the time of this report as being a Policy Advisor to the European 
Alcohol Policy Alliance, which is a pan-European organisation with members 
including the Institute of Alcohol Studies and Alcohol Concern, stated that, ‘its 
industry-friendly approach rather than reducing alcohol-related harm, has not 
only failed to stem the increasing trends that it inherited but has positively 
encouraged major increases in harm.’ Plant (2004, p. 905) added that, ‘A 
postgraduate thesis could be written to document and analyse the differences 
between the interim report, the final report, and the inconsistencies between 
different sections of the final document.’  
 
At this stage there was evidence of a close, structured relationship between the 
major industry participants and Government. The industry groups had seen, for 
the most part, their preferred policy outcomes post-consultation in both licensing 
and wider alcohol strategy – a liberalisation of the licensing regime, intervention 
on the most extreme consumers of alcohol, although no generalised policy to 
reduce consumption, alongside no major movement on price or taxation. Neither 
of these policy shifts were incremental – the licensing changes were highly 
significant whilst the alcohol strategy had at least been framed as a major shift, 
even if in reality it had been limited. When there was comparatively little shift in 
alcohol harms and the café culture promised by licensing did not appear more 
pressure became apparent. This led to the publication of new policy suggestions 
rather rapidly in 2005 in ‘Drinking responsibly’, (Department for Culture Media 
and Sport, Home Office, & Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). These 
included new policies such as ‘Alcohol Disorder Zones’ that in theory created areas 
of increased enforcement against alcohol consumption (though only ever used by 
two authorities). Further measures on enforcement and ‘drinking banning orders’ 
soon appeared much to the chagrin of the alcohol producer associations.  At the 
same time, the conflicting interests in the medical and new temperance groupings 
coalesced together to form the ‘Alcohol Health Alliance UK’, a new body to 
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coordinate the interests of a considerable number of groups.  At launch it was 
stated that, ‘the Alcohol Health Alliance UK is a ground-breaking coalition of 24 
organisations, including the Institute of Alcohol Studies, and headed by the Royal 
College of Physicians. Its mission is to reduce alcohol-related health harm which it 
says continues to spiral’, (McNeill, 2008, p. 2). This still did not abate the pressure 
and in 2007, ‘Safe.Sensible.Social’, (Department of Health, Home Office, 
Department for Education and Skills, & Department for Culture Media and Sport, 
2007) was published which although retaining its support for working with 
industry included considerations on putting restrictions on pricing against the 
alcohol-producer desires. This included potential policies such as removing heavy 
discounting and upselling whilst also for the first time, formally regulating 
promotions that would have seen certain noted promotional activity restricted or 
banned. Indications of the clear direction of travel were most obvious in the 
Budget 2008, where the ‘Alcohol Duty Escalator’ was introduced which committed 
the Government to raise alcohol duty by two per cent above RPI inflation for an 
initial period of four years (Darling, 2008). Policy was shifting heavily against the 
interests of alcohol producers and in favour of what was at the start of this chapter 
considered temperance groups but would now be better analysed as the health 
groups. Yet once again, an election appeared which had a notable effect on policy 
development structure and outcomes.  
 
Table 6.4.: The policy communities surrounding the more modern alcohol 
strategies compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
1980s 
A wider alcohol 
strategy? 
1997 to 2010 
Alcohol Harm 
Reduction 
Strategies 
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. 
Narrow 
range of 
interests 
represented. 
Evidence of 
communities 
around issues with 
varying 
memberships. 
Effective 
relationship 
between industry 
and government. 
Attempts to bring in 
health groups, 
however 
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participation not 
seen as beneficial. 
 
Later developments 
saw a seeming 
reverse of this 
position. 
Integration Bargaining 
and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Interaction exists in 
silos around 
specific issues. 
Broader interaction 
is mainly between 
Departments.  
Public consultation, 
but effectively 
private negotiations 
give appearance of 
higher effectiveness. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on 
policy 
principles 
and 
procedures 
to approach 
policy 
problems. 
Initial work of the 
CPRS as a vessel to 
develop policy 
outside of 
departments. Later 
collapsed into 
Departmental 
spheres of 
influence. 
Movements of 
departmental 
control over the 
period however 
improved broader 
coordination. 
 
The experience of the 1980s alcohol strategy attempts offers notable challenges if 
the developments are to be explained by the traditional approach of policy 
communities. As table 6.4. indicates, the arguments and challenges to the CPRS 
report indicate multiple communities seeking to influence with leadership moving 
about – the lack of one clear, community in charge consistently and clear 
indications that challenges existed across all dimensions mean that it is difficult to 
argue that a traditional policy community is useful as an explanation policy 
development in this context. The example of Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategies 
can be seen as a better fit to the traditional policy community approach – table 6.4. 
indicates that on membership and integration there are elements that show an 
indication that the traditional policy community approach could apply – yet the flip 
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in membership and the institutionalised shift of departmental oversight and 
interest offers compelling evidence that a traditional approach does not 
sufficiently explain the development of alcohol strategies in these periods. 
 
Table 6.5.: The policy communities surrounding the 1980s alcohol strategy 
developments compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial 
policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community HM Treasury and the Home 
Office 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Alcohol producers and retailers 
at the Treasury – with some 
other agricultural interests, 
alongside the same alcohol 
groups with groups such as the 
Magistrates’ Association at the 
Home Office. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any specific 
point. Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Interaction between them is 
frequent, coordinated visits to 
sites and formal meetings. 
Close working relationship. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Clear consensus on principles 
that taxation is a Treasury issue 
and that licensing is a Home 
Office issue. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Department of Health 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Narrow health and medical 
membership. Interests clash 
with the core community.  
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Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Evidence of interaction, with 
departments and organisations 
on the edges of the core 
community. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Beginning of institutional 
relationships between civil 
servants and interests. 
 
If an adversarial policy community approach is considered, then many elements 
indicate the presence of core and alternative policy communities. In the example 
involving the CPRS in the 1980s then there is a clear alternative policy community, 
surrounding the Department of Health that seeks to broaden and remove 
segmentation of alcohol policy. Building from table 6.5. this community has a clear 
purpose, an alternative venue, is integrated with a limited membership and clear 
shared principles. In a slight turnaround rather than a single core – there are at 
least two – as the policy is segmentalised – with the alternative seeking to take 
both areas in. These two cores effectively had control over taxation/price and 
availability – the attempts by the Department of Health policy community to take 
control failed – arguably by being divided they were harder to conquer. 
 
Table 6.6.: The policy communities surrounding the New Labour Government’s 
Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategies compared to the adapted Daugbjerg 
typology for adversarial policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Alcohol-Producer and 
Retailer Focus 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Effective relationship between 
industry and government. 
Some engagement of health 
groups but decided not to 
engage with alcohol groups. 
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Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any specific 
point. Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Integrated within departments 
initially focused on strategy. 
Public consultation, but 
effectively private negotiations 
give appearance of higher 
effectiveness. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Consensus on need to reduce 
harm, but without negative 
impacts on industry. Cultural 
focus of policy shift. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Alcohol Health Policy Focus 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Narrow health and medical 
membership. Interests clash 
with the core community.  
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Focused around Department of 
Health, with some engagement 
with others. Close relationship 
and membership aligned 
together. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Reduction of harm the priority 
over industry impacts. 
Regulatory intervention the 
focus of policy shift. 
 
The New Labour government’s Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategies development, 
and various iterations, offers multiple opportunities to be explained by the 
adversarial policy community approach. At first, the dominant departments in 
development were surrounded by a core community that from the group 
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perspective was led by alcohol-producers and retailers – whilst there may have 
been a perception of public engagement the reality was negotiated closed-door 
settlements. Table 6.6. outlines that both the core and alternative community had 
features that had close similarities – the major difference occurred with the 
institutionalism dimension when the fundamental difference being that whilst 
both wanted harm reduced the core policy community focused on policies that 
sought to effect the culture of alcohol consumption to reduce harm through softer 
measures whilst the alternative sought to use regulatory measures to change the 
culture of alcohol consumption by making certain behaviours illegal – such as 
promotions or multiple purchase discounting. Arguably the difference was carrot 
versus stick – those who wanted the carrot had an economic interest, and those 
who wanted the stick had arguably more altruistic goals – though it is possible to 
argue they had their own economic interests through changing health provision. 
 
6.3. The Public Health Responsibility Deal and the Alcohol 
Responsibility Network 
Whilst the end of the New Labour period saw a shift in influence towards the 
alcohol harm groups, rather than producers, policy was still overall on a favourable 
environment for producers. In a similar way to the Thatcher government’s 
reaction to the CPRS report, how the new Conservative administration responded 
to the developing policy environment would influence policy networks 
considerably. This section covers the launch of the Public Health Responsibility 
Deal and specifically the Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network. This was a new 
development in terms of network structure for alcohol policy – an attempt to 
establish a policy community with a clear membership, which whilst not closed 
would require commitment to agreed outcomes, negotiated settlements and close 
co-operation. This section seeks to understand how the community developed, 
whether groups saw value in participation and what affect it had on policy 
development. 
 
In September 2010 the Department of Health brought together a range of groups 
to discuss a variety of potential public health measures that could be taken 
forward on a voluntary basis. There were consultations with various groups and 
interests, with terms of negotiations established by the Government – although it 
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was claimed by some alcohol harm groups, all of whom later withdrew from the 
network, that these terms were instead set by industry (Royal College of 
Physicians, 2011). The primary areas of negotiation surrounding labelling, 
education and the number of units of alcohol in the wider market all linked to a 
primary focus to, ‘We will foster a culture of responsible drinking, which will help 
people to drink within guidelines,’ (Department of Health, 2011, p. 13). This new 
network was to be led by a joint chairmanship from an alcohol producer and an 
alcohol harm group with a supporting minister assigned to each network. 
Following some behind the scenes negotiation the Public Health Responsibility 
Deal (Department of Health, 2011) was launched in March 2011 with various 
pledges made across food, alcohol, physical activity and health at work. Its launch 
stated that, ‘the strength of the Deal lies in the diversity of organisations that it 
brings together – public sector, commercial, non-governmental, and academic – to 
determine things business can do to accelerate the progress towards public health 
goals,’ (Department of Health, 2011, p. 2). Its early optimism on this ambition was 
already hit at launch – with six groups Alcohol Concern, British Association for the 
Study of the Liver, British Liver Trust, British Medical Association, Institute of 
Alcohol Studies, and the Royal College of Physicians all publicly announcing their 
withdrawal before the networks had even been launched. The headline statement 
indicated that whilst there were a range of disagreements primary focus was on 
the fact that, ‘the scope of the RDA is currently too limited. It does not tackle issues 
such as, availability or promotion of alcohol, and focuses on voluntary 
interventions with no evidence of effectiveness,’ (Royal College of Physicians, 
2011). 
 
Further issues included that the ‘process has prioritised industry views and not 
considered alternative pledges put forward by the health community. These have 
included proposed pledges: to not advertise alcohol based on price; to not 
advertise in cinemas for under-18 films: and to include health warnings on all 
drinks products,’ (Royal College of Physicians, 2011). Whether these are issues of 
convenience is also arguable with notable comments in their joint press release 
(Royal College of Physicians, 2011) from the British Association for the Study of 
the Liver highlighting, ‘the priority for the drinks industry is to deliver shareholder 
value - this basic conflict of interest should preclude them from an influence on 
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alcohol policy,’ and from the British Liver Trust, ‘At the heart of our decision not to 
join the initiative is the inherent conflict of interest in the alcohol industry’s 
involvement in developing alcohol policy, especially when the key policy impacting 
health – an overall reduction in consumption – is so directly contrary to the alcohol 
industry’s profit motive.’ That for some groups any network or community with 
alcohol-producer interests included was not worthy of participation was clear – 
therefore some groups would by this requirement always remain on the outside.  
 
The Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network launch whilst troubled did lead to a 
range of voluntary objectives, most of which would be monitored by the Portman 
Group. The joint Chairmen at launch were Jeremy Beadles of the Wine & Spirit 
Trade Association and Professor Mark Bellis of the Faculty of Public Health 
offering the balance that the premise of the deal required. The participation of the 
Faculty of Public Health was despite their dissatisfaction with the initial pledges, 
they made clear that, ‘for the moment, FPH intends to remain engaged with the 
process, where it will continue its efforts to bring evidence to the heart of the 
debate, challenging industry to take a more responsible attitude to protecting and 
improving health,’ (Faculty of Public Health, 2011). During this initial period a shift 
occurred in industry representation with Jeremy Beadles leaving the WSTA and a 
replacement Chair coming from the Portman Group. The individual, its recently 
appointed Chief Executive Henry Ashworth, also followed a similar career path to 
those observed by the early observation of Richardson and Jordan (1979) having 
come to the Portman Group directly from the civil service – specifically the 
behavioural insights team that had a significant role working on the PHRD (Pescod, 
2012). Regular meetings were had to enhance the pledges, negotiate further and 
deliver new policy outcomes. Some progress was made with clearer pledges on 
removing units of alcohol announced with some fanfare as a key outcome of the 
network’s negotiations.  The Health Secretary stated, ‘Cutting alcohol by a billion 
units will help more people drink sensibly and within the guidelines. This pledge 
forms a key part of the shared responsibility we will encourage as part of the 
alcohol strategy,’ (Department of Health, 2012a). A supportive, yet critical quote 
was also provided by Professor Mark Bellis stating, ‘Making this pledge work is not 
just about increasing sales of lower alcohol drinks. For real public health benefits, 
industry must also reduce sales of higher strength products.’ 
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Soon after this pledge Professor Mark Bellis stood down as Co-Chair having 
completed his agreed term and was replaced by Dr Nick Sheron, a similarly 
experienced public health representative. There was a clear caveat to Dr Sheron’s 
chairmanship whereby he, ‘confirmed his acceptance of the post emphasising that 
the Responsibility Deal was a parallel process and not a replacement for the 
Government’s evidence-based alcohol strategy with its flagship policy of tackling 
cheap alcohol through minimum pricing,’ (Department of Health, 2012b, p. 1). In 
effect, this offered an indication that this was not an embracing policy network as 
had been initially discussed – those who had chosen not to participate had a 
parallel interest in the areas they had wanted to discuss in relation to pricing with 
this outside of the scope of the network. Equally there was no reason why 
participants in the Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network could also not be part of 
those consultations. Whilst the headline rejection by the six alcohol harm related 
groups had been taken up considerably by the media major groups such as Cancer 
Research UK, the National Heart Forum and the Association of Chief Police Officers 
had remained important participants (Department of Health, 2012b). The 
Government’s reversal on Minimum Unit Pricing, discussed in the previous 
chapter, led to a major crisis within the network. The Telegraph reported that in 
response ‘A key adviser, Nick Sheron, resigned as co-chair of the Department of 
Health’s alcohol network, which drives efforts to promote responsible drinking, in 
protest at the decision. Cancer Research UK, the Faculty of Public Health, and the 
UK Health Forum also formally withdrew from the same government programme, 
which is part of the department's Responsibility Deal with the industry,’ (T. Ross, 
2013). In turn other groups followed, leaving only ACPO, Addaction and Mentor UK 
as the alcohol harm representatives. It was decided at this point that Henry 
Ashworth would continue on as solo chair. Whilst the network membership 
appeared to be in turmoil the headline policy intention – the removal of one-billion 
units of alcohol from the market made progress. In December 2014 the 
Department of Health (Public and International Health Directorate, 2014) 
announced that more the one-billion units of alcohol had been removed from the 
market.  Henry Ashworth, wearing his Portman Group hat, advertised the 
industry’s position that this was a success story, stating that, ‘This is a fantastic 
result achieved through the collective efforts of producers, retailers, wholesalers 
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and pub groups, supported by Government. We have exceeded a voluntary target 
to remove 1 billion units of alcohol from the UK market by growing a new market 
for lower alcohol drinks. This is yet more concrete evidence of what can be 
achieved when government and industry work in partnership, responding to a 
growing consumer demand for lower alcohol drinks; further proof that our 
drinking culture is changing,’ (Portman Group, 2014). There is some argument 
over this target with the University of Sheffield (2015) commenting that, ‘a closer 
look at the analyses and data that underpin this headline figure raises questions 
about how much of the recent changes in alcohol consumption are truly 
attributable to the pledge,’ highlighting the general fall in alcohol consumption in 
total, rather than shifting of product choice and lowering of ABV which was 
originally intended to make the pledge. Nevertheless, the Government rejected 
these criticisms. 
 
Table 6.7.: The policy communities surrounding the Public Health 
Responsibility Deal compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy 
communities 
Dimension Policy Communities 2011-2015 
Public Health Responsibility Deal 
Membership Very limited number 
of members. Narrow 
range of interests 
represented. 
Initial wide membership across 
alcohol-producer groups and those 
groups with an interest in alcohol 
harm. Resignation of alcohol harm 
groups did not cause a 
disestablishment of the network. 
Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent interaction. 
Agreed terms for interaction 
created difficulties – price and 
promotions being limited cause 
friction and withdrawal.  Integration 
of some, but not all interests – as 
groups left those who remained 
successfully moved to this position. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on policy 
principles and 
Completely formal body, within the 
Government framework, indicative 
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procedures to 
approach policy 
problems. 
of clear status within policy 
development and outcomes. 
 
The evidence is sufficient to sustain a basic narrative that the Responsibility Deal 
Alcohol Network is a policy community, designed to follow an ideal-type 
traditional approach – in effect a system put in place to make an easy analytical 
tool for research purposes.  As indicated by table 6.7., the mix of interests, the close 
relationship with government and negotiated policies are clear examples. That 
government had desired a policy community is probably a fair assumption based 
on the evidence. There were different levels of power but an acceptance of this was 
clear. It was in the end sustained by a limited set of groups with narrow interests – 
the rewards of participation were not significant enough to keep a wide range of 
groups desperate for a seat at the table. The parallel discussions on a wider alcohol 
strategy also offer complexities that conflict with or support the policy community 
narrative – dependent on assessment. If this was about activity and policy on 
alcohol that did not require legislation, then this community was in many ways a 
successful example – the parallel development was simply of a different area of 
alcohol policy. Arguably then the lack of participation by alcohol harm groups 
limited their influence without counter advantages in the legislative alcohol policy 
negotiations.  The Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network looks like a policy 
community, acted like a policy community yet it is uncertain if it ever really was 
one – continuity is the question and if it manages to continue, even under a 
rebranded scheme, then the analysis for a community is clearer – if not then the 
waters have become even more cloudy. Its design and obvious status also made 
the attempts to find an alternative within government difficult – this was not a soft 
policy community, rather a formal institutional device. Therefore, for other 
departments or venues to form alternative structures would be challenging with 
an ‘official’ body in place – arguably the attempt to not just design but officially 
implement a policy community may have removed the approach as a useful device. 
 
6.4. The Scottish model for alcohol policy communities 
From its initial devolution, even under Labour power, Scotland began a different 
course on alcohol policy. The balance of power within interest group relationships 
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with Government institutions had not yet been established, which considering in 
the wider United Kingdom can be analysed back to just after the First World War 
provides an opportunity for an entirely different institutionalisation. The added 
feature of the Scottish National Party taking power towards the end of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century also adds complications, with a demand for 
uniquely Scottish solutions to policy challenges. This section will seek to 
understand what style, why and who benefits from each policy community’s 
existence in the Scottish environment, how they have influenced alcohol policy and 
how alcohol policy has influenced their structure. 
 
The Scottish Labour Executive moved faster than Labour south of the border 
across the majority of areas that affected alcohol policy. Firstly, they established a 
new, independent body in 1999 – the Scottish Advisory Committee on Alcohol 
Misuse. The membership of this was broad – with some trade representatives but a 
fundamental majority in favour of those representing public health interests 
MacAskill, Cooke, and Hastings (2001). Notably members from the trade included 
the Portman Group, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association and Scottish & 
Newcastle plc. They were on the same group as representatives of local authority 
education departments, policy chiefs, regional and national alcohol harm groups, 
GPs and health researchers.  This body held evidence sessions, commissioned 
research from a range of academic sources and made recommendations that had 
been generally agreed – noting full agreement was not a prerequisite for a 
recommendation. This effective outsourcing of policy consideration to an external 
group led on to the publication of the ‘Plan for action on alcohol problems’, 
(Scottish Executive, 2002). For comparison, this strategy was ahead of licensing 
reforms in Scotland, opposite to the process in England and Wales. This strategy 
was different through its use of milestones; clear targets and the noting of what 
success would look like – as well as failure. Whilst there was nothing focused on 
pricing or licensing it would feed into considerations of these areas where 
devolved authority was available. Following the publication of the new strategy, 
and some considerable parliamentary discussion, new Scottish Licensing Laws 
came into force with the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005. Of specific note was the 
maintenance of powers within the local licensing boards in terms of hours of trade 
although more liberalism was introduced. Further, the overprovision assessment 
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that allowed these licensing boards to reject a new licence if it would cause too 
many premises to be present in a set locality was maintained. With a key win for 
alcohol harm groups that unlike for England and Wales, an extra licensing 
objective calling for ‘protecting and improving public health’. In effect, these 
conditions set Scotland on a different track to the rest of the United Kingdom, 
although they had always had separate licensing laws that had some of these 
features. In 2007, ahead of the Scottish Parliamentary elections, the then Scottish 
Executive published an update on its alcohol strategy – including progress made to 
date and objectives going forward. Of significant note was a new partnership 
agreement (Scottish Executive, 2007b) with industry that included the Scotch 
Whisky Association, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association, the Scottish Beer & 
Pub Association and the Wine & Spirits Trade Association. This agreement called 
upon industry to participate in a variety of actions to improve standards, support 
marketing initiatives and similar positive objectives going forward. The plan was 
for this to represent three years of progress with an assessment going forward. 
 
The 2007 Scottish elections saw the first SNP government come into power. The 
nature of relationships, governance styles and ambitions changed. This became 
apparent with the launch of, ‘Changing Scotland’s relationship with alcohol: A 
discussion paper on our strategic approach’, (Scottish Government, 2008). These 
proposals, put forward under then Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for 
Heath & Wellbeing, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, represented a significant shift in policy – 
as well as fulfilling the higher end objectives of the alcohol harm groups. From a 
policy community perspective this called for an expansion in partnership beyond 
alcohol-producer groups (somewhat ignoring the previous policy development by 
the Scottish Advisory Committee on Alcohol Misuse for the convenience of making 
a political point). From the point of policy development, the first objective 
represented a major shift from all previous alcohol strategies – an ambition to 
reduce alcohol consumption at the population level using a range of tools available 
to the Scottish Government. The proposals put forward, many of which became 
law with the Alcohol etc (Scotland) Act 2010, were in areas which led to conflict 
with alcohol-producer and retailer groups in direct comparison to the partnership 
model of the previous Labour administration’s strategy.  Increasing price, but not 
using taxation, with a minimum unit price proposed for all alcohol, was put 
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forward – though this will be more closely discussed in a later chapter. Promotion 
restrictions were put forward that primarily affected shops and supermarkets, but 
further measures on the licensed trade were also very clearly suggested. The 
suggestion to move the age of purchase to 21 for retail was put forward, but 
instead the power to do this was granted to Licensing Boards, though is yet to be 
used. Smaller measures were proposed and then acted upon for wine and spirits. A 
social responsibility fee to apply to certain alcohol retailers as a charge to fund 
wider research and education initiatives was also put forward, though again 
remains in development. Proposals for alcohol only checkouts were also put 
forward though these have been experimented with, as they are still under wider 
consideration. Despite the comparatively draconian and certainly radical nature of 
the Scottish policy proposals there was also a great contradiction. At the same time 
as seeking to decrease the overall alcohol consumption in Scotland the export of 
Scotch whisky was a very different matter. Indeed, ‘a new £3 million fund to allow 
Chinese whisky connoisseurs to invest in some of Scotland’s rarest drams has been 
revealed by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon,’ (Scottish Government, 2015). This is 
indicative of groups having differing levels of influence around different issues and 
indeed different departments. The focus of alcohol being near exclusive 
surrounding the Scottish health department may help explain the situation – 
without a policy community invested in the Treasury or established relationships 
with a Home Department those interests which even in the wider UK dominate the 
Health Department’s alcohol policy community dominate in this case the more 
powerful body. 
 
The two different parties’ styles of governance offer the opportunity to understand 
the influence of political changes on policy that a community arrangement cannot 
combat. Scottish Labour’s initial set-up of policy development saw industry have a 
significant role, but also a greater voice for alcohol harm groups. This was a 
negotiated, thought out settlement that was probably more favourable on the 
alcohol harm groups than the UK policy but had the consent and the co-operation 
of the wider community. This was very much a structure, observable policy 
community in the traditional sense. As indicated in table 6.8. it was arguably highly 
functional and fit for the purpose the Government had set. Alcohol producer 
groups were also seen as primary delivery agents – understanding that it was 
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there members who could go beyond and faster than the strategy suggested. It was 
also consistent, self-renewing and collaborative. Its effectiveness still had 
questions – progress whilst faster than the wider UK was still incremental – even if 
the steps were often and continuous. The SNP relationship was very different – 
clearly policy objectives were favoured, and it seems unlikely, especially with on-
going disputes and legal cases, that alcohol-producer groups provided their ready 
consent for policy implementation.  It also indicated a policy community was in 
existence – a newly designed, potential adversarial community but in some ways 
more of an exclusive variant of the traditional approach. The secondary policy 
community was also arguably flawed in its output compared to what would be 
expected form a policy community.  One of the key advantages of policy 
communities is that the groups have the ability to deliver their members – the 
failure of some policies and the dispute over others indicates that the SNP missed 
the challenge of actually delivering a policy rather than just proposing it. When the 
next chapter considers minimum unit pricing it will allow for greater consideration 
of these implications. 
 
Table 6.8.: The policy communities surrounding the Scottish model for 
alcohol strategy compared to the Daugbjerg (1998) typology of policy 
communities 
Dimension Policy 
Communities 
1999- 2007 
The Labour 
Executive 
2007 – 2015 
The SNP 
Government 
Membership Very limited 
number of 
members. 
Narrow range of 
interests 
represented. 
Diverse range of 
interests 
represented in 
specialist group. 
Further direct 
relationship with 
industry on 
issues where 
their ability to 
implement policy 
is needed. 
Unclear, little 
evidence of 
industry 
participation. 
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Integration Bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Frequent 
interaction. 
Interaction 
between them is 
frequent, 
coordinated and 
formal meetings. 
Published 
reports for wider 
consideration. 
Efforts at 
consultation, but 
legal arguments 
persist. 
Institutionalisation Consensus on 
policy principles 
and procedures 
to approach 
policy problems. 
Specific, 
established 
committee and 
contractual 
arrangements. 
No evidence of 
institutional 
arrangements, 
some 
partnerships 
with specific 
groups. 
 
The period with the leadership of the Labour Executive saw a generally broad 
membership of a core policy community with medical and alcohol groups both 
working together – a consensus and partnership focused approach. Arguably this 
was a better functioning model of the Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network policy 
community by design approach. The adversarial approach does not provide any 
clear guidance on what happened next – in simple terms that there was not a clear 
alternative; there were no major disputes in the public sphere and no indication of 
attempts at alternative policy development – table 6.9 does not tell us much.  
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Table 6.9.: The policy communities surrounding alcohol policy developments 
during the Scottish Labour Executive period compared to the adapted 
Daugbjerg typology for adversarial policy communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Scottish Advisory Committee 
on Alcohol Misuse 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Very broad range of 
membership. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any specific 
point. Bargaining and 
negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Interaction between them is 
frequent, coordinated policy 
development and formal 
meetings. Close working 
relationship. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
to approach policy 
problems. 
Acceptance that some areas out 
of scope such as pricing and 
licensing – but full range of 
options within scope. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Pricing and licensing 
interests 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Unclear.  
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
No clear evidence. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
Push on areas such as pricing 
and licensing. 
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potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
 
Table 6.10. offers an indication to the level of shift in approach to policy 
development that happened when the SNP came into power in 2007 – the 
community split, the focus changed and there were significant power shifts – the 
groups that had limited but notable influence in the partnership arrangement 
suddenly were in control – and the prior major participants who had offered 
concessions were purposefully excluded. The post-shift policy development 
environment that can be better explained by an adversarial policy community 
approach is interesting as it was not triggered by the actions of the group or 
arguably a failure of policy – the prior partnership policy had not had the 
opportunity to succeed or fail – instead an exogenous factor – in this case a Nicola 
Sturgeon-led Health Ministry had shaken up the policy community – splitting it in a 
way not seen in the United Kingdom since the start of the twentieth century. 
 
Table 6.10.: The policy communities surrounding the SNP policy development 
on alcohol compared to the adapted Daugbjerg typology for adversarial policy 
communities 
Dimension Core Policy Community Changing Scotland’s 
relationship with alcohol 
Membership Very limited number of 
members. Narrow range of 
interests represented. 
Close relationship between the 
Health Department, alcohol 
campaign groups and medical 
groups. 
Integration Integrated into the 
dominant body for policy 
development at any 
specific point. Bargaining 
and negotiation. Frequent 
interaction. 
Integrated within departments 
initially focused on strategy. 
Public consultation, but 
effectively private negotiations 
give appearance of higher 
effectiveness. 
Institutionalism Consensus on policy 
principles and procedures 
Consensus on need to reduce 
harm, reduce overall level of 
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to approach policy 
problems. 
alcohol consumption and 
change the Scottish alcohol 
sector significantly. 
Dimension Alternative Policy 
Community  
Alcohol Groups 
Membership Very limited number of 
members, mostly different 
to the core policy 
community. Narrow, 
alternative range of 
interests represented. 
Producers and retailers, with 
other economic interests. 
Mainly former members of the 
Labour Executive approach.  
Integration Bargaining and negotiation 
– of an alternative style to 
the core policy community, 
potentially including 
alternative venues. 
Frequent interaction. 
Venue shoppers – whether 
consultations, courts or the 
European level. 
Institutionalism An alternative consensus 
on policy principles – with 
potential use of alternative 
procedures to approach 
policy problems. 
Recognition of need to reduce 
alcohol harm but focus on 
partnership working between 
government and industry – in 
line with previous approach. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
The history of the all-embracing alcohol strategy is surprisingly long and provides 
an element of explanation for the more common fragmentation across different 
venues. The complexity of the policy development, legislative and regulatory 
requirements indicate that a more general approach is more challenging than 
actually considering them individual – the sum may actually be less than the parts, 
even if not, it is a slow and unwieldy process of development as Scotland has 
demonstrated. To an extent this explains the earlier failures of strategy and the 
lack of impact from the policies developed in the 1980s and 1990s - detail and 
practical delivery matter. The medical groups development in how they frame the 
policy is also important – beginning from a framing surrounding the alcoholic, 
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moving slowly into whole population interventions, effectively succeeded the 
temperance movement as that side of the policy debate. The ability to compromise 
is also notable – the alcohol producers and retailers negotiate – possibly in bad 
faith on occasion but at least seemingly willingly – by comparison to a more black 
and white interpretation of what is acceptable or not from the medical groups. 
This has an effect in influence – that the alcohol sector never willingly leaves the 
policy negotiations, effectively staying in the conversation, rather than seeking the 
opportunity to be louder outside has approved to be a significant advantage. There 
is certainly influence to be felt from the alcohol sector, but part of this is an active 
attempt to be in the negotiations and an unwillingness to leave even if they are not 
progressing in a manner they would like.  Probably not dominance of policy, but a 
certain determination in achieving their policy goals. 
 
Looking at the long-term development of wider alcohol strategies it becomes 
apparent that recognition of the benefits of close participation between groups and 
government appeared relatively early in the 20th century. There was evidence from 
the early stages that something that had the same elementary nature as a policy 
community was in existence. This realisation led to close relationships forming 
that often appear to meet the criteria set by Daugbjerg (1998) for the existence of a 
traditional policy community throughout the longer term development of alcohol 
strategies. The cross-departmental reality of alcohol strategy problems also 
identifies the weaknesses of the arrangement, whilst at the same time providing 
further evidence of their individual existence. It also provides an, often 
substantive, narrative for the existence of the adversarial policy communities 
ready to take a lead when their community would better deliver desired policy 
outcomes. 
 
The development of policy on alcoholism within the Department of Health shows 
the way a policy community was created that emphasised the groups with clearer 
policy, the ability to deliver and coordinate were treated more favourably than 
others without the same advantages. The attempts by this community to expand 
their influence into areas previously under the control of other departments saw 
them get one area of policy as their own – yet without the policy tools to act in the 
way they would have preferred. The CPRS report showed how an attempt to make 
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policy separate from these policy communities would lead to different desired 
outcomes. The reaction to it across the board saw limited progress made on 
alcohol policy and potentially even a retreat from a potential negotiated 
settlement. The neat comparisons of this to the New Labour arrangements with 
their own policy unit demonstrates that a policy community can organise around a 
department or body as appropriate – if it knows that this is an area where their 
participation is desired or indeed that they know they should be seeking to 
influence. 
 
The unexpected interconnected relationship between licensing and alcohol 
strategy (from the policy community perspective at least) also demonstrates again 
why a stable policy community is linked to incrementalism – larger changes 
necessitate external interest and the costs to the alcohol-producer groups were 
considerable. To an extent the interests were saved by a Conservative government 
and the Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network – which despite for a sustained 
period looking like it may not be enough to stop wider alcohol policy shifts – and 
being seemingly unworthy of participation by alcohol harm groups proved to be 
the delivery vehicle for the last government when further agendas were dropped. 
Latter consideration will show how much the pendulum then shifted back to 
alcohol-producer groups. 
 
Finally, Scotland give us examples to how a policy community can be established 
which allows for quite considerable policies that are acceptable to all to be 
developed, whilst also showing how more radical policies can lead to conflict with 
groups. The comparison between a strong model for a designed policy community 
and a manner to attempt to redesign, rather than seek a true adversarial policy 
community, should not be lost. Policy positions and style affect the dominance of a 
policy community – yet interests that can deliver require some element of 
representation within a policy community to realistically deliver policy – this in 
turn may well have an effect on policy outcome if it cannot actually be delivered. 
The exogenous shock of the SNP entry to the policy development arena also 
changed not only the dominant policy community it allowed for the creation of a 
core and alternative – in a way that has comparative features to policy in the UK in 
the First World War. 
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Overall there are several indications that observable examples of a traditional 
policy community can be found in the development of alcohol policies in the 1960s 
to the 1980s. There is also an example of this in Scotland with challenging the 
success of adversarial policy communities. Even in the earliest examples in the 
First World War wider evidence for the potential development of adversarial 
policy communities can be found, alongside in the 1980s, the Blair government 
years and the Public Health Responsibility Deal. This trend offers an insight that 
traditional policy communities are generally more observable and attempting to 
change them by design, rather than find an alternative existing structure that 
shares the common policy purpose creates issues for policy development that a 
more fluid adversarial arena does not – the evolution of a policy community and 
the movement of authority between the most suitable or adaptive within 
communities has significant advantages and strengths. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Alcohol, policy communities and policy networks 
 
Alcohol is an arena of policy that has long-term social, cultural and economic 
impacts, alongside a clear evidence base of concern regarding public health. It has 
almost a split perception of being part of our social fabric, especially in times of 
national celebration, alongside a history as a social ill that has seen movements 
against it that have lasted centuries. UK alcohol policy, we are often told is 
dominated by the alcohol industry. This argument is most clearly found in the 
works of Holden and Hawkins, alongside McCambridge, who had described the 
governance of UK alcohol policy as, in effect, a closed policy community premised 
on a privileged relationship between representatives of the alcohol industry and 
government representatives (Hawkins et al. (2012); Holden and Hawkins (2013); 
McCambridge et al. (2014); and Hawkins and Holden (2014)). They ask whether 
the alcohol should, ‘enjoy the same (or greater) level of influence on the policy-
making process as practitioners and experts within a given field’, (Hawkins & 
Holden, 2014, p. 68). In this interpretation the apparent lack of access from the 
public health community to these networks where policy is decided is a negative 
and the benefits of access of the industry is substantial. It was also noted that 
Greenaway (2011) had challenged this understanding, highlighting the context of 
policy definition being just as important in understanding policy development, as 
the policy outcome or content is itself. By considering three clearly distinct case 
studies, alongside attempts at a broad-brush alcohol strategy, the examination of 
both the policy framing and outcomes has offered the opportunity to consider both 
the questions of dominance and framing. 
 
It is in seeking to understand whether the influence of alcohol groups was so 
overwhelming that it is an explanatory device for what the public health 
community has termed as poor or ineffective policy, that this thesis has found 
evidence of complexity that demonstrates there may have been a position of 
privilege but it came at a price, alongside occasions when this privilege evaporated 
as policy objectives shifted beyond the scope of what the alcohol groups could 
deliver. In this it has offered evidence that helps understand both alcohol policy 
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and policy communities in more depth. The focus on both individual areas of 
alcohol policy alongside considerations at attempts made at wider alcohol 
strategies has demonstrated that there is not a single policy community or indeed 
a series of homogenous policy communities for alcohol policy. There are 
demonstrations that the comparison of the traditional and adversarial policy 
communities approach has facilitated an understanding of the British typology of 
governance in a very challenging policy arena, offering opportunities for the 
further development of this approach. This is most evident in the competitive 
nature from multiple policy communities being identifiable with variable 
memberships and policy objectives. As will be discussed further, there are lessons 
for alcohol and there are lessons for policy communities, which have proved a 
valuable and insightful tool in seeking to understand the development of UK 
alcohol policy, across distinct areas and as a collective or wider policy. 
 
The thesis has seen alcohol prove to be a case study with a combination of 
intricacies and broad elements that do not fit a simple narrative. Despite the 
separation of policy communities, there is an element of countervailing power 
within alcohol policy that could be identified from the licensing reforms – that 
when liberalisation of one element occurs, there will be a broader reaction and 
impact on different policy areas, and different policy communities. In what is an 
effect very much like a speedboat passing through a race of people on small boats, 
it takes a time for the stability and flow to return that allows for the normal 
conditions – and in many cases those boats that had previously been moving quite 
nicely may have capsized, lost an oar or indeed find their position occupied by 
something that has floated in to their prime position. 
 
In seeking to understand the governance of alcohol policy and gain the opportunity 
to answer Dahl’s (1961) question ‘who governs’, the examination of both the 
traditional Richardson and Jordan (1979) policy community, alongside the 
rethought adversarial policy community of Dudley and Richardson (1996), both 
gave a vehicle to understand the framing, development and outcome of policy, 
whilst seeking to re-examine a potential British typology for group politics, which 
had often been marginalised into a smaller, conservative and static feature of 
policy network typology such as its consideration within the typologies such as 
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Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) with their seven-step spectrum or the broader matrix 
that began to appear in Rhodes (1997). Combining an analysis of alcohol policy, 
using the examples of major development points – or notable intervention 
attempts that did not arrive into policy – this thesis has shown the complexity of 
alcohol policy, the moments that showed there was still validity to the traditional 
policy community approach and how the adversarial policy community approach 
has proved to be an improved, though imperfect tool for understanding the 
governance of alcohol policy. In attempting to understand the influence of groups, 
the development of policy and the structure of governance – this work has shown 
that whilst perceptions of influence have a high element of truth, they alone do not 
explain policy development and that the influence itself is given by the context of a 
policy when brought forward for consideration alongside the practical concerns of 
implementation. It is argued that a better interpretation of the governance and 
development of alcohol policy can be understood within an adversarial policy 
community – contrasting with the closed environment that Holden and Hawkins 
suggest. Whilst offering a contrast in policy outcomes, Scotland, it can be 
considered, reaffirms the adversarial policy community approach, and can be 
explained by the way relationships develop, linked to the desired policy impacts – 
whilst also explaining the prior role of what Dudley and Richardson (1996) would 
consider the core community. 
 
Breaking down the development of alcohol policy 
In the 20th and since the beginning of the 21st century alcohol has remained in the 
public discourse but had only discrete moments of real policy development. In 
general, these have focused on one element of alcohol policy, a sub-policy 
environment that has allowed consideration of each element.  When there have 
been times of policy change that were broader, or linked, this has allowed for 
further comparative analysis. When considering these elements as a whole, it 
allows for a historical policy focused narrative of the development of alcohol 
policy, one that does not fit with simple narratives of powerful interests 
dominating the agenda – whilst also questioning what power is. It does show that 
the alcohol-producers and retailers have played a long-term role in alcohol policy. 
It does not show they alone decide the policy that affects them directly. This 
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chapter considers some of these key findings for alcohol policy from the case 
studies and offer a viewpoint on the historical policy narrative. 
 
Literature on alcohol is focused most notably on the negative effects of 
inappropriate consumption of alcohol. Alcohol was, and remains, a highly 
regulated product with potentially serious negative connotations. In terms of 
policy the literature often takes an opinion on the participants, based on an 
outcomes-focused interpretation, rather than looking more closely at participants’ 
ability to actually deliver policy. This chapter will also consider whether there is 
scope for a wider scope in analysing the agency of participants in the development 
of alcohol policy. 
 
A window of observation 
Whilst alcohol is a multi-faceted case study, this chapter looks to understand what 
can be learnt for the window from which it was viewed – policy communities. 
Since Richardson and Jordan (1979) first considered their approach of policy 
communities it has certainly not been without criticism, development or 
reinterpretation. Its original rigidity may have led to the comparative casting aside 
of the entire policy community approach, something which this thesis argued 
begins to be addressed by Dudley and Richardson (1996). They considered 
adversarial policy communities as either an enhanced or alternative approach – 
made from their core community and what can be best considered as alternative 
communities rather than limit the variables considered within the original 
approach, an interpretation that can be found within the Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992a) policy network typology. 
 
Alcohol is a controversial topic. It could be considered as something accepted as 
being part of society, but the prevailing assumption is that its consumption is not 
necessarily a societal benefit – so it should be limited or restricted. In this context  
considering alcohol policy as  Holden and Hawkins  have done  is clearly 
compelling – poor policy must have a root cause and in their analysis caused by 
alcohol having the, ‘same (or greater) level of influence on the policy-making 
process as practitioners and experts within a given field’, (Hawkins & Holden, 
2014, p. 68). This work has offered evidence that this interpretation which focuses 
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on policy outcomes and a presumed closed community does not comprehensively 
explain the governance or development of alcohol policy. Instead this thesis has 
found there is competition for policy development and there is competition 
between policy communities. This chapter will seek to understand what can be 
learnt within the literature for both policy communities and policy networks more 
widely from the evidence of alcohol policy development in the United Kingdom. 
 
7.1. Alcohol case studies – consideration of policy communities 
In using four key policy areas of focus and seeking to find case studies of policy 
development has offered a range of information and evidence that documents the 
changing policy environment for alcohol.  The first of these – licensing reform – has 
probably the most applicably similar examples of the reforms of the 1960s and the 
early 21st century. The second, drink-driving, offers slightly more examples but 
also a greater level of public concern and an area when alcohol-producers’ 
interests are more variable, as well as being less clear. The third case study 
considers the attempted interventions made on the price of alcohol – which have 
interestingly varied from price limitation to minimum pricing. A broader policy 
position is offered in the final example – the attempts for a comprehensive alcohol 
policy that have been made since the 1970s. These case studies give a broadened 
understanding of the competition between policy communities across government 
departments and other venues – as departments, inquiries or other bodies have 
responsibility either for tools of policy intervention or desires for policy outcomes 
they can either compete or collaborate in developing desirable policy outcomes.  
All of these offer findings that are worthy of consideration and offer a considered 
analysis of the development of alcohol policy and the policy communities that 
existed, exist and could yet play a role in policy development. 
 
Licensing reform 
The two case studies of licensing reform in the early 1960s and the early 21st 
century offered an environment that could directly compare two similar periods of 
policy reform, their policy communities and outcomes. Chapter 3 considered how 
the ability to compare between these two moments of major reform was made 
easier by the incrementalism and stability in periods both before the earlier act 
and between the two periods. The fundamental elements of both periods – both 
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being major comparative liberalisation of the entire licensing system for alcohol 
sales demonstrated both the changes in methods of policy development and the 
continuity throughout. Whilst there is clear evidence that alcohol-producer groups 
were very much involved in the new policy development, in both cases the 
instigation began with a new policy direction from government. Whilst there was 
negotiation on the detail and potentially relationships that benefitted those 
groups, there was evidence public, democratic consent that began the process.  
 
In the first scenario in the 1960s this consent was broad, with both parties in 
general favour. It was a two-stage solution – the Licensing Act 1960 effectively 
tidying up all the relatively uncontroversial issues with the Licensing Act 1964 
adding the shift in licensing regimes that had more disagreement. This was a tight 
policy community, with the major participants being alcohol-producers, focused on 
detail and delivery – close to the public servants delivering the policy and in 
regular communication. Whilst these reforms were certainly a major liberalisation 
of what was previously a very stringent system of alcohol sales, in the modern 
context they were marginal – and the beneficiaries could arguably be challenged to 
be amongst the more middle class elements of society – with lunchtime wine 
service and city venues opened up later highlighted heavily. The reaction to the 
reforms was also comparatively muted – there was no swing back of new alcohol 
regulations or a renewed focus on alcohol by other participants that appears in 
other examples. There appeared to be no clear alternative or adversarial 
community – this seemed to fit a very traditional policy community approach.  The 
second example, the reforms of the early 21st century, offers a somewhat different 
setting. Whilst again a period of great liberalisation, and a manifesto commitment 
from the Labour party apparent offering evidence of democratic consent, there 
were major differences that permitted the breaking of incrementalism and the 
status quo.  Firstly, there is a very clear example of an alternative policy 
community taking over– from the Home Office to the Department for Culture, 
Media & Sport. The new, or alternative, policy community had participants in it 
who were willing to deliver the policy. For instance, the Magistrates’ Association, 
who were not a keen participant in the reforms were replaced with the Local 
Government Association. The move to DCMS also meant that those with the 
traditional responsibility for enforcement were no longer part of the policy 
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community – now Councils were the enforcer and the judge. What is clear is that 
there was a fightback - even in the traditional Home Office-based policy 
community. An adversarial community environment could be identified, as power 
shifted. 
 
This example appears to have found a strong case study for the Richardson and 
Jordan (1979) traditional policy community in the Licensing Act 1964 
considerations – with clear evidence to identify a policy community – with 
elements that argue for the Holden and Hawkins typology of the sector. The second 
example however, demonstrated that different actors, excluded from one policy 
community would, if an interest remained, seek to be part of an alternative policy 
community, maybe one that had no influence immediately – but would be willing 
to take on influence at any point – which they did in the Licensing Act 2003. That 
certain groups were members of multiple policy communities is also of interest – 
effectively playing all sides, or at least multiple sides in an argument. They also 
indicate that the difficulty in finding them may be directly related to their 
quietness – ready to appear but in many cases only when opportunity presents 
itself – an adversarial environment but one that is not initially apparent. It is also 
possible that this adversary may have appeared in the first example if an 
opportunity had presented itself.  In effect, there is an evidence of a traditional 
policy community and an adversarial policy community environment – with the 
evidence of the first not eliminating the case for the second. 
 
Drink-driving 
Drink-driving, or driving under the influence, presented a different and more 
challenging scenario than licensing, which was considered in Chapter 4. The 
negative effects are clear, there are theoretically easy ways to stop the issue and no 
participant wished to be the voice in favour of the practice. The first instance of 
real intervention on this issue took place shortly after the licensing reforms in the 
1960s – where the policy community surrounding licensing specifically and 
deliberately sought to separate the issue from its key work. Unlike licensing, or 
price, this was a policy area that was almost created by design and it could be 
considered in comparison to examples of the development of regional policy 
communities. The initial policy community centred on the Department of 
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Transport with some participation from alcohol-producers, who at that stage were 
the major retailers as well, a specific representative from the accident reduction 
area alongside the core interests of motoring groups, alongside those with medical 
interests also present. This led to what was known as the Marples Act in the early 
1960s which brought in some limited policies that did not dramatically change the 
effective policy – although following the election of 1964 saw a shift in control a 
new Act became more likely with more wide-ranging impact. This saw a shift in 
dynamic with one of the major participants (Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents) changing their position due to membership pressure and became 
supportive of more significant change. This led to the first compromise on the 
implementation of a drink-driving limit – which was set at 80mg per 100ml of 
blood.  This was an example of a developed policy community, bringing in 
expertise from other groups on an area deemed almost ‘too hard’ or politically 
difficult by the licensing policy community. Alcohol groups were on the outskirts 
and it was motoring groups at the core. Whether this was an adversarial or sub-
community is slightly unclear – at the very least the previously dominant group 
had outsourced the issue.  
 
The concern surrounding this area reappeared and to an extent they were again 
outsourced this time to a separate research group which went on to produce the 
Blennerhassett et al. (1976) report. This report made a range of recommendations, 
some of which reflected the improvements in technology, and some of which 
brought in greater recommendations on promotion of anti-drink-driving 
messaging.  The alcohol groups also progressively showed more interest – being in 
favour of greater investigation and punishment, but against a reduction in the limit 
– which they argued would criminalise anyone who had a single drink. The 
reaction was a continued outsourcing, almost movement to the long grass, of this 
difficult area continued with the two North Reports on drink-driving in the 1990s 
and early 21st century. The final review clearly recommended a reduction in the 
drink-driving limit to 50mg per 100ml of blood and increased penalties. It was 
welcomed by the membership of the policy community who had formulated the 
original policy and managed the policy arena since that point. That it did not 
happen could be a demonstration of the parent, or core, policy community that 
surrounded licensing more widely, effectively sweeping in and coming up with an 
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alternative incremental alternative. That Scotland, lacking this established 
adversary or parent, decided to lower its limit offers a demonstration that the 
comparative lack of established relationships and the choice of policy community 
by design created a very different policy outcome – it also led to practical concerns 
and elements that have created difficulties for enforcement in Scotland. 
 
The drink-driving case study indicated that whilst there is an alternative policy 
community, whether they are adversarial in the standard interpretation of the 
word is slightly unclear. An alternative community can be useful to the core – 
however when this proves not to be the case, the reassertion of influence and 
control is notable. That Scotland went in a different path makes a clearer case for 
an adversarial environment in the traditional sense, with desired policy direction 
also a key factor. 
 
Price and taxation 
There have been multiple attempts to influence the price of alcohol in British 
political history (Chapter 5), whilst the modern focus has been on raising price, 
this has not always been the political desire. The attempt by the Department for 
Economic Affairs to combat increasing prices of alcohol in the 1960s demonstrates 
that alcohol is both an article with negative side effects and positive political 
elements. When these new participant departments tried to have influence, and 
the established communities sought to resist this change, there was evidence of an 
adversarial community even if it was unsuccessful in taking the place of the 
incumbent. Whilst defeated, alternative attempts to influence were found – for 
example when the Department for Economic Affairs managed to refer the issue of 
beer price to the National Board for Prices and Incomes, even if this failed. The 
close relationships of the incumbent policy community, with considerable 
continuity, proved influential in developing final policy, even if interim battles saw 
them defeated or alternatives given an airing. The attempts of the medical and 
health policy groups to bear new influence following recommendations on policy 
made outside of the community, demonstrated the strength of the existing policy 
communities and their ability to show resilience, as well as hold their place - 
alongside the evidence of civil servants as advocates of policy community interests. 
With the establishment of the Alcohol Duty Escalator it was also apparent that 
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whilst the incumbent policy communities were influential within their policy 
arena, they had little influence when their arena was of less political significance 
than other priorities. In rebuilding the policy community, or at least restoring the 
original policy community membership to influence, it also saw changing 
partnerships and new access levels for different alcohol-producer groups.  
 
The UK Government’s rapid shift to Minimum Unit Pricing and then away again, 
also demonstrated how policy developed outside of the incumbent community 
could be influential. Once again, the re-establishment of control with the 
communities led to a policy more incremental and acceptable to alcohol-producer 
groups implemented.  It also contrasts with Scotland where a very different policy 
community in a position of influence, led to different policy challenges. The 
acknowledgement by industry groups that insufficient efforts had been put in to 
making these relationships is indicative that the UK model is one of considerable 
continuity, one that was developed by history rather than designed by political 
choice. It also demonstrated that the lack of engagement of groups that had 
responsibility for policy implementation would lead to considerable problems for 
enacting policy. Incumbency was often there as the advantages outweighed 
political inflexibility in general.  Using various policy examples regarding alcohol 
price demonstrates potentially influential policy communities with alcohol-
producers at their core, anchoring policy in both preferable and deliverable chunks 
– in isolation an observable traditional policy community style. It also 
demonstrates that they are not all-powerful and can be overcome when political 
will is considerable. Their engagement leads to a more workable policy, which on a 
practical basis is desirable.  The various iterations of pricing policy have affected 
the policy communities and it is indicative that there was an adversarial policy 
community environment that affected iterations of pricing policy. This symbiotic 
relationship of policy communities, examples of which seem to exist, are indicative 
of policy communities, of an adversarial nature, being important for the 
development of alcohol policy. 
 
A comprehensive strategy? 
In Chapter 6 it was considered that whilst on licensing, drink-driving and price 
there are demonstrations of links and separation between policy communities 
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across the topics, there have been multiple attempts throughout history to create a 
comprehensive, all-embracing policy settlement for alcohol. From the scope of the 
elements of this thesis, the first clear case study surrounds the First World War 
and a designed policy community – with deliberate exclusion, close relationships 
and regular interaction. Whilst the focus was on temperance and the evils of 
alcohol, with some interesting elements such as the Carlisle experiment, this 
initiative in many ways ran out of steam with limited progress – there was 
compromise, but not on a significant enough scale to deliver any notable outcomes. 
The follow-up settlement with a more extreme temperance position could be 
argued to be the end outcome for that movement, but lasted only a few decades 
before a more liberal, regulated system was formed. What is notable from this 
period is the beginning of the relationships between alcohol-producer/retailer 
groups and government departments with the importance of delivery becoming 
more paramount and the staging post for incrementalism. As noted, this was 
effectively the end for the leading role of the temperance movement in the debate 
over alcohol, but the beginning for the role of medical groups. The debate around 
the ‘alcoholic’ in comparison to a wider alcohol issue represented a limit as to 
where medical groups, and their policy community surrounding the Department of 
Health, had near complete autonomy. This remained until the policy community 
expanded its interpretation from it being an individual to a societal issue – at 
which point they were not the prime policy community for debate. This tension of 
elements being outsourced, as found with drink-driving, but only within a limited, 
specified context could be considered apparent once again.  
 
Another example of outsourcing of policy development took place at the end of the 
1970s and beginning of the 1980s. The Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) were 
tasked with considering the issue of the negative side effects of alcohol in the 
whole. This was arguably the first attempt for a truly comprehensive model for 
reducing alcohol harm by looking at all policy areas. It was also a highly convenient 
way to once again deflect a major issue at a politically opportune time – in this 
occasion at the eve of the 1979 General Election. This also allowed for observation 
of competing policy communities that shared many characteristics with the Dudley 
and Richardson (1996) approach of adversarial policy communities. The report, 
which was leaked, recommended broad actions and policy direction that would 
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even now be considered radical. A commitment to increasing price, advertising 
restrictions and new messaging designed to stimulate significant reductions in 
alcohol harm. An emboldened policy community surrounding the Department of 
Health, previously seen under development in the alcoholic considerations, sought 
to take authority and lead on the issue. Policy was developed for implementation, 
discussions and meetings were had – letters were written, and the community 
began to act as if it was the prime vehicle for policy delivery. There was a snapback 
and reassertion of primary authority by the initial policy communities – the most 
forceful from the alcohol policy community that worked around the Treasury, 
which had developed policy focused on price and taxation. This snapping back of 
control and influence, from one policy community to another, as well as the earlier 
attempt to wrestle control away offers useful indications for an adversarial policy 
community environment. The next attempts follow the Alcohol Harm Reduction 
Strategies at the end of the New Labour period that saw some rotation around 
Government departments in a way similar to the snapback seen in the 1980s. The 
major difference at this stage was the increased organisation of the medical 
representatives into a more campaigning orientated role with a greater public 
communication element. Despite this the outcome was similar – moderate at best 
change, headline by the incrementalism synonymous with a policy community 
approach. 
 
The change in government at the 2010 general election once again shook up the 
desired policy outcomes, not dramatically, but certainly demanded a change in the 
perceptions of policy outcomes as being more broadly based. The Public Health 
Responsibility Deal was almost an attempt at policy community by design – 
representatives of the key interests invited in, close relationships and negotiated 
outcomes. When the alcohol-led interests, depending on viewpoint, either enforced 
limited discussion or maintained discussion based on only the agreed terms of 
reference the medical or health-focused groups gradually left the community and 
then moved outside. That for a sustained period this community, despite these 
unintended exclusions, retained policy influence demonstrated the usefulness of a 
policy community as a tool to develop, and deliver, policy. Further, that it seemed 
responsibility was returned to this core community, indicates the usefulness of the 
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policy community approach and that whilst the environment may be adversarial, it 
is not an argument amongst equal participants.  
 
7.2. Who governs alcohol policy? 
Who governs? Alcohol policy has been a useful case study to consider the 
development of policy, the decisions made and the direction taken. Whilst there is 
no consistent or single alcohol policy community and they vary considerably in 
scale, influence and regularity across all issues there is strong evidence for some 
form of hybrid policy development process across government and groups. 
Whether this is the discounting of the public voice or interest is worthy of 
consideration – the outcomes are often beyond their scope of consideration, their 
ability to have a direct say and could be considered outside representative 
democracy. Yet we have seen clear examples, in Chapter 3 with both licensing 
examples, in Chapter 5 with example of minimum unit pricing of alcohol how 
democratic influence, through manifesto policy commitments, is then developed 
from a few lines into practical implementation by consultation with a policy 
community. Arguably these policy communities are tools for effective 
implementation of policy direction set from the public, taking expert advice and 
consulting those who will implement policy. 
 
At the same time there are certain policy communities that have a larger influence 
than others, have the capacity both to outsource policy development and recall it 
as the policy environment changes. How can tools of the public be able to control 
other tools? This offers questions without clear answers. These levels of 
engagement by policy communities and influence have developed over the longer 
term – with history demonstrating alcohol-producers and retailers leading 
engagement in the policy community surrounding licensing date back to the late 
1950s – but at the same time a medical alcohol policy community surrounding the 
Department of Health dating back to the same period. These relationships are 
long-term, closed, consistent and coordinated. This does not fit the narrative of 
democratic influence. 
 
They have clear examples of many of the features and elements that Daugbjerg 
(1998) would consider being key typological elements for the traditional approach 
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of policy communities found in Richardson and Jordan (1979) and their first 
construct. There are two policy communities, with some shared membership but 
not consistent, who desire to influence the same area offers evidence for the 
Dudley and Richardson (1996) adversarial policy community approach. This offers 
a greater opportunity to consider whether policy communities exist as a feature of 
British democracy that enhances policy development, improves policy 
implementation and has the flexibility to act appropriately – or be replaced by a 
community that can. 
 
Whether we consider either a traditional or adversarial approach it is clear that 
incrementalism tends to be the outcome of consistent, more closed networks that 
can be considered as policy communities and also a tool for making sure that a 
policy community is maintained. Radical change leads to disruption of the policy 
community – as demonstrated most notably from the licensing reforms of the 21st 
century causing ruptures for alcohol policy that have still not healed.  The policy 
community structure and membership does have an effect on policy outcomes, 
often directing policy towards the preferred interests of its membership, but often 
will not select a policy area for development with political manifestoes often being 
the motivation – demonstrating that this is not an environment absent from 
democratic influence instead turning political objectives into actual policy – for the 
most part, but not without challenge. The department that has managed to own the 
policy area also affects it – this is often a direct influence on the membership of a 
policy community, which will affect its institutional position, and the community’s 
comparative membership influence. There is also a direct correlation between 
departmental ownership and outcomes – when Health has greater influence 
measures that have more of an economic impact will be more likely, when 
Treasury there are more likely to be economic motivations. Beyond the obvious on 
licensing the movement of influence from the Home Office to Culture and then 
back again, also demonstrates that it is not only policy communities that are 
adversarial – and that larger politics may play a role outside of the influence of an 
individual policy community. 
 
Scotland remains an important counterbalance to the historic development of 
alcohol policy communities in the wider UK context. The creation of these 
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communities by design, without the long-term development of relationships has 
demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of the policy community style of 
policy delivery. This could be argued as institutional interests, in this case alcohol, 
limiting change and having undue influence. It could also be counter-argued that 
trusted partners concerns receive a larger and legitimate hearing in a traditional 
approach – with a more holistic policy in the round approach being addressed. 
 
7.3. Alcohol policy – lessons for products with public health 
concerns 
This has indicated that alcohol policy is multifaceted, crosses government 
departments and has moved at a variable pace. This complexity has offered a 
challenge to frame in a simple device, whilst also highlighting opportunities to 
consider the varieties of interactions in a condensed, spotlighted environment. 
They have shown that whilst policy communities within alcohol policy do not 
operate in isolation, they are neither fluid nor necessarily linked environments – 
but the effect they have on each other is notable – a ripple effect that has an 
impact.  
 
The major question that remains for alcohol policy is that, for all the changes in 
habits, licensing and laws, how it has remained such a prominent feature of British 
culture. Whilst there may be now less alcohol consumed than at peak levels 
(Sheen, 2014) and that decline has been ongoing for over a decade, the negative 
side effects seem to be as prominently analysed as ever. Cairney (2007) considered 
why the policy on, and image of, tobacco has shifted so considerably. There is an 
argument that the end of industry dominance of the policy arena, or indeed the 
policy community, led to this change. The tobacco sector was also demonised, for 
misrepresenting research or discounting information that showed links to public 
health emergencies. This status, and legal cases, removed it from the negotiation 
table – there was no mutual acceptance of decisions and no ability for compromise. 
Following this line of thought, it would be assumed that alcohol interests continue 
to dominate. Recent work by Petticrew, Hessari, Knai, and Weiderpass (2018) 
effectively makes this argument. They go further to highlight this perceived 
stylistic similarities to tobacco, ‘This study shows that the AI (alcohol industry) 
uses similar tactics to the tobacco industry, to the same ends: to protect its profits, 
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to the detriment of public health,’ (Petticrew et al., 2018, p. 301). They also target 
the formed networks of professionals, such as elements of the Public Health 
Responsibility Deal, ‘Finally, some public health bodies, academics and 
practitioners liaise with the industry bodies included in this study, for example by 
acting as advisors or trustees, or by collaborating with them in implementation 
activities. Despite their undoubtedly good intentions, we suggest that it is 
unethical for them to lend their expertise and legitimacy to industry campaigns 
which mislead the public about alcohol-related harms.’ 
 
This work does find that alcohol interests are prominent, that they are often the 
key participants, such as the role of the Treasury in pricing. They also outsource 
some areas of policy where they do not desire to be closely involved – such as 
drink-driving. They can be challenged by developing adversarial policy 
communities, such as the increasing attempts at influence by the policy community 
surrounding the Department of Health. They can also be removed from influence 
when what was considered an adversarial policy community takes control, such as 
when minimum unit pricing became a consideration. What is clearer is that unlike 
tobacco the alcohol sector has, or at the very least had, a greater interest and 
responsibility in the sale and consumption of their product through their retail 
arms. Whilst for those who suffer from alcoholism, the negative side effects of 
alcohol are individual, the general negative effects are experience by a wider 
community – so a community level intervention may be appropriate – licensing 
and taxation being examples. When it came to areas of a specific individual focus – 
on drink-driving for example – this was more technically led. The alcoholic is an 
interesting phenomenon that plays a major part in the develop of alcohol policy – 
from early points when the disease was the focus of medical attention, to the 
narrative on what could be very simply referred to as ‘a few problem drinkers’, 
there is a perception that any one individual has the ability or option to not be a 
problem. 
 
The research indicates that alcohol has many differences from other highly 
regulated products and is contextually different from, for example, tobacco. There 
is the potential that this indication is due to case study selection, with those chosen 
likely to be those where the alcohol industry itself has the most focus, so the most 
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unique context. The studies themselves are comparable to other products – 
availability, pricing and wider strategy, alongside the somewhat unique example of 
drink-driving so there is general comparability of issues if not the product. Yet the 
developments have also been distinct to the policy area, showing hoe influence has 
fluctuated, with the policy solutions developed unique to the case studies – also 
showing that there has been limited policy transfer to alcohol from other areas. To 
argue for or against alcohol sector influence by using narratives found in tobacco, 
or to indicate that the industry role is inappropriate on this basis, does not take 
into account the sophisticated reality of alcohol policy development. Clearly the 
alcohol industry is an influential participant in policy development, but it is not as 
dominant as it can be initially perceived. It can be argued that the arguments made, 
the tactics used and the success in shifting policy on tobacco could be tools in 
explaining the lack of satisfaction from public health groups with the direction of 
policy on alcohol. That tobacco is still facing further restrictions on labelling and 
placement shows this is a continuing policy argument, yet the desired policy 
restrictions wanted for alcohol can also find their intellectual beginnings in the 
tobacco policy arena. Policy transfer is desired from a different arena, and the lack 
of transfer is concluded to be due to industry dominance being retained in alcohol 
policy. Whether tobacco policy development and the movement of influence from 
industry towards the public health groups is in effect the gateway for both the 
current pressure on, and interpretation of, alcohol policy is worthy of further 
investigation. The pressure the food and drink sector now faces on sugar, with 
similar requests being made on this area that were once made on tobacco, 
although clearly at a faster, or escalated, pace demonstrates that policy 
development styles can shift – is this new policy community, found potentially 
around Public Health England, now seeking to be an adversary to the existing 
alcohol and sugar policy communities? Whilst elements can be seen in the early 
twenty-first century for alcohol, there is clear evidence of the tobacco sector 
groups working in concert (Cairney, 2007), however alcohol groups have shown to 
be very much more divided and contentious – there were mixed interests. Given 
that it was demonstrated in this thesis that there are greater complexities to 
alcohol than is perceived at first sight, more research is needed to consider a 
comprehensive answer. Alcohol has a different organisation of groups, different 
desired outcomes and more complex impacts – is there less success for the public 
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health sector on alcohol simply because they misunderstand its structure, impact 
and interests? 
 
7.4. Policy communities and network literature 
Throughout the study of alcohol, there have been numerous features and elements 
that have offered insight into the potential existence of a policy community. Similar 
to how Grant (2005a) sought to bring policy communities back in, this work has 
demonstrated that in focusing on a key element of policy development, where it is 
focused within a government department, the approach of Richardson and Jordan 
(1979), amended in Jordan and Richardson (1983), still holds relevance. Whilst 
external influences can disrupt or even change a policy community, there is an 
almost an elasticity to returning back to this approach. That this focus was on 
issues where delivery was challenging and outside of the direct influence of 
government is also of note. It is also notable that the gaps that were found in the 
policy community typology by Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) and later updated at 
various points in an iterative fashion could be considered in an alternative manner 
with reference to Dudley and Richardson (1996) in their adversarial policy 
community approach.  
 
Alcohol has proved an insightful vehicle to consider group politics and the 
influence of policy communities. An area of both modern and historical intrigue 
with a combination of divisions amongst groups, it has proved that the course of 
influence has changed, that even within a policy community style environment that 
shifting objectives can shift a community and that the delivery of policy is a 
continually influential factor – eventually a policy community settles with those 
who can deliver the policy even if there is resistance or challenge. The study 
specifically of flashpoints of policy development within the arena of alcohol has 
allowed for a clear focus on the essential elements of policy communities, whilst 
acknowledging the blurring necessary from the earlier attempts to set a rigid 
model of a policy community. If a policy community appears impenetrable, 
interests that are separate or alternative will build alternative relationships which 
whilst not necessarily being an alpha or leading policy community are ready to 
take that role if opportunity arrives. The four focuses – licensing, drink-driving, 
alcohol strategies and pricing – provided evidence that an approach like a policy 
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community has existed within the development of alcohol policy. The use of 
Scotland as a different regional policy community also added extract contrast to 
this phenomenon. They also highlighted the imperfections within the hypothetical 
structure from Richardson and Jordan (1979) – there exist very few perfect types, 
despite this the overall structure has an inherent validity. The speed and extent of 
policy development also proved to have a significant impact on policy community – 
as indicated by Richardson and Jordan (1979) in their early development of their 
policy community approach – but more widely offering that Dudley and 
Richardson (1996) in their adversarial policy community approach may have been 
closer to an explanation of the flaws of the original style.  The development of 
alcohol policy has seemingly engaged periods of comparative calm and periods of 
considerable change or attempts at this that occasionally proved less productive. 
Although when these new participant departments tried to have influence, and the 
established communities sought to resist this change, there was evidence of an 
adversarial community even if it was unsuccessful in taking the place of the 
incumbent. 
 
Scotland offers a case study where a strong argument can be made that the 
approach of adversarial policy communities applies. An initial caveat that their 
policy communities were not developed over time, but instead more specifically 
designed with the group membership desired has played in role in different 
outcomes. The SNP effectively changed the game by moving influence to a new 
policy community – yet that their policy was ready to go and already in the civil 
service system indicates there was an adversary – which was instead empowered 
by the shift in desired outcome. The examples in licensing and pricing offer 
evidence that the close engagement of alcohol-producer groups tends to lead to 
either incrementalism over the longer term or greater liberalism of alcohol policy 
in the shorter term. In Scotland, these outcomes are not as consistent. Indeed 
measures that go counter to decisions in England and Wales or in some cases 
further despite objections from these groups questions their alleged dominance in 
policy, whilst the practical challenges Scotland has faced, and continues to, 
indicates that there are costs from moving to a policy community with less of a 
focus on delivery. This offers some support for the Richardson and Jordan (1979) 
analysis of the importance of long-term relationships built up over time with these 
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groups – relationships matter for a fuller analysis of what can actually be done but 
may also be a limiting factor on change or an excuse for inaction.    
 
Overall the study of cases of alcohol policy development has shown that even with 
large historical gaps, policy communities can be found surrounding specific areas – 
and communities that show a consistent, if not identical membership. It has also 
demonstrated that policy communities are dependent on being able to fulfil, or at 
least begin the journey, towards government objectives – if they cannot an 
alternative will be found. This alternative can sometimes be seen as an adversarial 
policy community but this itself is not a constant. There are competitive policy 
communities, but they are not always adversarial – there is an outsourcing 
element that can be integrated into the wider approach. It bears more similarity to 
a chimpanzee tribe – with alphas and betas who compete, but have similar 
characteristics, alongside non-competing omega elements that exist under either 
leadership structure fulfilling their assigned tasks. Within this approach it would 
be considered that there may not be a network spectrum of styles into which 
policy communities fit but instead a number of different devices with policy 
communities an approach that explains certain areas – and have consistently 
proved effective for policy development and implementation. 
 
The variation in policy communities is considerable but in general, delivery of 
policy remains the key factor. Adversarial, competitive or outsourced policy 
communities only prove effective if they can actually deliver policy outcomes. If 
they do not then their usefulness as a tool of governance is removed. This does not 
mean they are removed from the context of the policy, but instead makes the 
environment more challenging. Scotland and its quest for minimum unit pricing 
has shown that policy can be delivered with a network environment that does not 
have a policy community with a delivery element. Although it makes this harder, 
longer and as of yet the outcome remains uncertain.  Their different move on the 
drink-driving limit, which so far seems to have been delivered, may also indicate 
that the traditional negotiated approach may not be as successful as once thought 
with an over dominance from more established interests within the community 
supressing what could have been implemented by incremental measures if they 
had desired.  
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By seeking evidence for the Dudley and Richardson (1996) approach of adversarial 
policy communities, with elements of the operationalisation adapted from 
Daugbjerg (1998), the development of alcohol policy is clearer and more 
understandable. The approach remains imperfect, with further development 
needed. This thesis has indicated that the adversarial approach demonstrates that 
whilst each policy community is relatively closed, that they form without 
necessarily having primacy in a policy area, there is almost a policy community for 
every interest. It is a competitive environment where teams are formed, yet some 
groups can and do join more than one. The standard operation of a policy 
community is incrementalism, we find the adversarial nature when disruption and 
larger scale change occurs – with a previous core community losing control to 
develop a policy, or after it has. It will sometimes return, it will sometimes find a 
new adversary becoming the core. 
 
Two features do not fit as neatly within the approach and need further 
consideration. The first is a condition most evident in drink-driving sub-policy, but 
occasionally in the wider comprehensive context – the cooperative outsourcing of 
policy development to an alternative community when the situation suits. This 
practice, most notably seen in the outsourcing when policy development was 
moved to the Department of Transport, alongside the motoring and road safety 
associations, was snapped back when the policy direction began to move against 
the core community’s interest. In the same way in the comprehensive alcohol 
policy consideration, the way HM Treasury and its surrounding policy community 
pulled back policy on taxation from the Department of Health’s policy community, 
which had presumed to have been given authority for a call for alcohol taxation to 
go up faster than inflation following the CPRS report in the 1980s. The secondary 
dimension to this is whether a group can turn from being a cooperative ally to an 
alternative that seeks to displace the primary group – something that reflects 
elements of the Licensing Act 2003 when the policy community surrounding the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport took control of licensing from its 
predecessor that surrounded the Home Office – early indications were that they 
were cooperative, until external factors made it advantageous for the DCMS 
community to split and take authority. 
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This relationship can be better, but not comprehensively, described as having 
several features in common with an animalistic hierarchical structure within a 
tribe. There are many participants or members, with a basic common cause, but 
also individual interest of both survival and influence that at times will trump this 
common cause. There is a basic structure – an alpha, a beta and even some clear 
omegas – with the alpha having the key responsibilities, but able to move work to 
the betas and omegas. Most of the time this is cooperative and mutually beneficial, 
but if the beta or omega performs activities against the alpha’s interests they will 
retaliate and remove authority – as shown in the drink-driving example. Yet, if the 
beta, or an ambitious other member, sees weakness or opportunity they will act to 
remove power from the alpha – taking that role for themselves. Indeed arguably, 
an alpha policy community may, like its animal equivalent, age and become weaker 
as external events disrupt – giving opportunity for another policy community to 
climb the hierarchy. 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
Alcohol-producers and retailers may have effective working relationships with 
government departments and other venues responsible for policy development. To 
extrapolate from this, a conclusion that this is the reason for policy outcomes 
perceived as negative is open to considerable challenge and argument. Their 
involvement, all the evidence indicates, is both as an interested party and more 
importantly as a delivery agent for government – they have been removed or 
replaced when their ability to delivery policy direction or objectives does not 
match. The alcohol industry’s interests have also diverged over time – as the 
combined producer/retailer relationship or business structure declined. The 
indication is that alcohol is complicated, but it is about being able to actually 
deliver what their commissioners, the government, effectively wants. To interpret 
that alcohol groups bear exclusive responsibility for policy perceived as negative 
misses the point that there remains a government hand on the tiller and as such 
the argued position of dominance, or similarity to tobacco, does not appreciate the 
wider status of alcohol policy within government decisions. Industry influence is a 
considerable factor within alcohol policy development, across its wide array of 
linked, but separate policy areas and competes with other factors which set 
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direction of travel. This includes government policy direction, which is also 
influenced by how a policy area is identified and framed, and which government 
department or venue influences this area. This can be a challenge to industry 
influence, such as with minimum unit pricing in Scotland, and can be to its 
advantage, such as licensing change in England and Wales. They do not dominate 
these developments and adapt to the changing policy desires. 
 
In considering whether the policy community is a legitimate situation of 
governance, there are multiple considerations. That the Dudley and Richardson 
(1996) approach of adversarial policy communities, once operationalised, 
provides a more complete fit, for the example of alcohol policy development is 
evident although the approach itself is still in need of further development. Of this 
and the traditional Richardson and Jordan (1979) work indicates that the policy 
community approach retains value for the understanding of policy development – 
being of considerable use in explaining and understanding the politics of alcohol in 
the 20th and 21st centuries within the United Kingdom – whilst asking further 
questions beyond the scope of this thesis on the legitimacy of that policy – as to the 
question of democracy and governance in the round, not as one of being against 
the public good. On legitimacy itself there is an argument for agency – the agents of 
change of policy are involved in its development. If agency is unavailable an 
alternative community will become the core – it is not a static, rigid system with 
defined interests guaranteed influence. It is at worst a limited factor in terms of 
securing government policy objectives – at best it is an agent of realistic, practical 
development of policies that can be implemented. Fundamentally, when a policy 
community becomes core that does not have this agency, there is a slowdown in 
the process – democracy and legitimacy are clearly linked – so a policy community 
that does not seek to implement democratic will is illegitimate. Whatever the 
circumstance a policy community, network or government that cannot implement 
democratic will because of a lack of agency also has questions to answer. If 
legitimacy can be understood to be the implementation of policy that develops or 
delivers the will of a democratic government then the adversarial policy 
community approach can be understood to be a legitimate. 
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This thesis has indicated the complexities to the development of alcohol policy and 
that the reasons for the consistency in alcohol’s groups influence is far more 
complicated than being a single, overwhelming force dominating policy. The 
adversarial policy community approach is an effective tool in analysing and 
understanding the development of alcohol policy – seeking and to an extent finding 
the answers as to who governs the policy of alcohol. Policy communities as a 
concept have been utilised to explain an area in a more balanced context than 
focusing on the end policy – considering the role structure plays. It has also 
identified that adversarial policy communities help to explain some of the flaws 
highlighted in the traditional approach, in a more useful way than limiting the 
concept in the generally considered Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) construct. The 
phrasing of adversarial may be a flaw in the description of the updated policy 
community approach, but when considered in the widest interpretation, the 
cooperative yet competitive environment described within the adversarial policy 
community approach is an improvement that helps to explain not only who 
governs it but also the course of development of alcohol policy in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. What is apparent throughout the consideration of the 
development of UK alcohol policy is that the traditional approach of Richardson 
and Jordan (1979) with their framing of policy communities, still has much to offer 
in helping to understand British governance – with the work of Dudley and 
Richardson (1996) providing further development of their adversarial policy 
community approach that improves the understanding of policy development. The 
case studies surrounding the development of alcohol policy have offered further 
considerations for developing this approach in considering the opportunities for 
collaboration and outsourcing within this adversarial environment to create a 
more dynamic and improved explanatory mechanism for policy communities. 
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Annex A 
Table A.1.: Alcohol Legislation – Overview from the 12th Century to the 21st   
Year Regulation Notes 
1188 "Saladin Tithe" Believed by Brewers to be the first tax on beer 
(not verified) 
1215 Magna Carta Set there should be a standard size for wine and 
ale 
1267 Assize of Bread and 
Ale 
Set standard prices for beer/ale 
1277 Assize Formerly set standard sizes for ale 
1285 Statuta Civitatis 
London 
Regulated closing times for taverns 
1496 
 
Appearance of the 'Alehouse Recognizance' 
where a lesser than full license can be issued by 
two Magistrates with a surety offered 
1642 
 
First verifiable excise paid on alcohol to fund the 
Civil War 
1729 Gin Act 1729 First attempt to regulate gin sales - fails and 
repealed 1732 
1736 Gin Act 1736 Increased regulatory fees considerable - 
generally seen as a failure 
1743 Universities (Wine 
Licences) Act 1743 
Restricted the previous unlicensed sales of wine 
within a University 
1750 Sale of Spirits Act 
1750 
Restricted sale of gin to authorised sellers and 
increased licensing fees - more of a success 
1828 Ale House Act 1828 Consolidation of all previous licensing law - 
removed difference in types of licensing except 
category licensing 
1830 Beerhouse Act 
1830 
Further permitted for licenses to be issued on a 
wider, lower cost basis 
1834 Beerhouse Act 
1834 
Introduced the concept of 'on' and 'off' trade 
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1840 Beerhouse Act 
1840 
Required that a license holder actually occupy 
their premises (rather than using a name of 
another who is in good standing) 
1842 Licensing Act 1842 Update of regulations, fines and smaller measures 
1869 Wine and 
Beerhouse Act 
1869 
Greater regulation of volumes of sale, some 
review of judicial licensing procedure 
1870 Wine and 
Beerhouse Act 
Amendment 1870  
Further review of judicial licensing procedure 
(relating to delays) 
1872 Licensing Act 1872 Standardised fines, proceedings, time difference 
between 'beer houses' and 'refreshment houses', 
banned under-16 from drinking spirits, power to 
remove drunkards 
1874 Licensing Act 1874 Legal requirement to not serve drunkards and 
remove them appears 
1880 Beer Dealers Retail 
Licences Act 1880 
Increased ability to reject a license on 
appropriateness rather than character 
1882 Beer Dealers Retail 
Licences 
(Amendment) Act 
1882 
Offered further grounds, as above 
1886 Intoxicating 
Liquors (Sale to 
Children) Act 1886 
Moved the legal alcohol purchase age to 13 
(though may have unintentionally revoked 1872 
order on spirits) 
1898 Inebriates Act 1898 Ability for the state to send a 'habitual drunkard' 
to a state inebriate reformatory - and makes it a 
criminal offence for a convicted inebriate to seek 
alcohol 
1901 Intoxicating 
Liquors (Sale to 
Children) Act 1901 
Moved the legal alcohol purchase age to 14 
1902 Licensing Act 1902 Tightened the law related to serving and dealing 
with drunkards 
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1904 Licensing Act 1904 Rise of the temperance movement saw an act 
when a license up for renewal could be turned 
down and compensation paid for the closure of 
the venue, established the 'Compensation 
Authorities' 
1908 Children and Young 
Persons Act 1908 
Made it illegal for any child under 14 to enter 
licensed premises, made it a crime to give alcohol 
to a child under 5 
1910 Licensing 
(Consolidation) Act 
1910 
Greater highlighted the 1904 Act and formalised 
elements surrounding levies and compensation, 
again banned under 16 from spirits 
1918 ??? "Government Ale" price controls introduced in 
October for specific brew 
1923 Intoxicating Liquor 
(Sale to Persons 
Under Eighteen) 
Act 1923 
Made 18 the legal drinking age (16 with a meal) 
1961 Licensing Act 1961 Update of the law with some liberalisation, but 
using the existing framework. 
1964 Licensing Act 1964 First full consolidation of all licensing laws in a 
century, put in place wider hour restrictions, new 
style of regulation for licensees and variety of 
statutory requirements. 
1967 Licensing 
(Amendment) Act 
1967 
Minor amendment on renewals for off-licenses, 
with less regulatory pressure on them 
1976 Licensing 
(Amendment) Act 
1976 
Increased hours for special circumstances (in 
preparation for Silver Jubilee) 
1981 Licensing (Alcohol 
Education and 
Research) Act 1981 
Remove the previous 'compensating authorities' 
and set up AERC 
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1988 Licensing Act 1988 Limited expansion to previous Act - removes the 
'afternoon closing' gap so pubs can open all day 
and extends drinking up time by ten minutes (to 
twenty minutes) 
1988 Licensing (Retail 
Sales) Act 1988 
Tightens up regulations which left gaps for 
people to sell alcohol without a license 
1990 Licensing (Low 
Alcohol Drinks) Act 
1990 
Redefine a low-alcohol drink from 1.2% ABV to 
0.5% ABV 
1994 Weights and 
Measures 
(Intoxicating 
Liquors) Order  
Allows for 35ml spirits measure 
1996 Licensing (Sunday 
Hours) Act 
Allows for extending Sunday opening of licensed 
venues 
1996 Deregulation (Long 
pull) Order 1996 
Removes as an offense serving of alcohol in 
excess of what was ordered 
1997 Confiscation of 
Alcohol (Young 
People) Act 
Permitted the confiscation of alcohol held by or 
for young people in public or certain other places 
2003 Licensing Act 2003 Comparatively deregulatory - allowed for 
flexibility in hours, move authority to local 
councils, four key 'objectives', evidential burden, 
regulated serve size in on-trade, full de-
regulation on off-trade 
2006 Violent Crime 
Reduction Act 
Alcohol Disorder Zones introduced, 'Three strikes 
and you are out' on licensing breaches 
2009 Policing & Crime 
Act 2009 
Introduced Mandatory Code for Alcohol Sales: 
promotions banned, age verification scheme, 
drinking water, smaller drinks measures 
2010 Crime & Security 
Act 2010 
Early Morning Restriction Orders put on to 
statute book 
 261 
2011 The Beer 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2011 
Introduce new duty bands for beer (discounted 
below 2.8% ABV, increased over 7.5% ABV) 
2011 Police Reform & 
Social 
Responsibility Act 
2011 
Late Night Levy', more fleshing out of EMROs, 
reduction in evidential burden for licensing 
decisions, increased fines/punishments for 
underage sales, vicinity test removed, health and 
licensing authorities become 'responsible bodies' 
2012 Alcohol (Minimum 
Pricing) (Scotland) 
Act 2012 
First legislative attempt to introduce Minimum 
Unit Pricing – after much dispute came into force 
in 2018. 
 
